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Abstract
Employing a Foucauldian discourse analysis, this thesis examines knowledge
produced about transsexuality and sex reassignment surgery (SRS) through the fields of
medical, legal and news texts. I explore key shifts in Western feminist, queer and trans
approaches to sex/gender and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual o f Mental Disorders’
pathologization of gender-variance in the Gender Identity Disorder diagnosis. I also
undertake a case study of trans marriages prior to Bill C-38, and the Ontario Vital
Statistics Act’s reliance on medical proof in change of sex designation requests. Finally, I
analyze seventy-seven texts from The Globe and Mail, The Toronto Star, National Post
and Toronto Sun spanning the 11-years (1998-2008) during which SRS was not funded in
Ontario. The news coverage employs expert knowledge in legitimizing and delegitimizing transsexuality and SRS. Overall, all three fields rely on cisnormative patterns
of knowledge production and reflect the privilege granted to cissexuals in Canadian
society.
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Key Terms
Cisnormativity

Cissexual
Cis-privilege

Those expressions and behaviours that are taken to be natural when
accorded to cissexuals, and the belief that trans bodies and
identities are unnatural or less authentic.
Individuals who have only experienced their felt gender and
physical sex as aligned, and who are not transsexual.
Refers to the taken-for-granted ways cissexuals are privileged
under cisnormativity.

Gender Dysphoria
Hysterectomy

Psychiatric term for extreme discontent with the sex one is born.
The surgical removal of the uterus.

Intersex

The condition of ambiguous or non-congruent sex features,
including those individuals who otherwise deviate from the
sexually dimorphic ‘norm’; such as having the gonadal tissue of
both male and female individuals or external genitalia of one sex
and the gonads of another sex.

Mastectomy
Metoidoioplasty

The surgical removal of the breasts.
The creation of a neopenis from the clitoris through the effects of
androgen hormone treatment. The enlarged clitoris is released from
its position and can serve as a penis. An alternative to phalloplasty.

Orchiectomy
Ovariectomy

The surgical removal of the testes.
The surgical removal of the ovaries.

Phalloplasty

The surgical techniques for penile reconstruction. There does not
exist one single ideal surgical technique for phalloplasty, and
results may vary.

Transgender

An individual who identifies with or expresses a gender identity
that differs from the one that is culturally understood to correspond
to their sex as assigned at birth.
The fear, loathing and discriminatory treatment of those
individuals whose gender identity or expression (or perceived
gender or gender identity) does not match their birth assigned sex.
An individual with an experience of gender incongruence, who
identifies with and/or wishes to live as the sex/gender ‘opposite’ to
the one assigned at birth, and who may desire hormone therapy and
surgery to obtain the physical characteristics of the ‘opposite sex'.

Transphobia

Transsexual

Vaginoplasty

The surgical procedure(s) to create the neovaginal cavity; can
involve the amputation of the penis, the creation of the neovaginal
cavity, lining of this cavity, the reconstruction of the urethral
meatus to control the direction of the urinary stream, and the
construction of labia and clitoris.
IX
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Introduction
“[MJedical case studies do not simply ‘record’, but work to ‘produce’ knowledge" Sally Hines 2007, 68
On December 1st, 1952, Christine Jorgensen made waves in the Western world
when the New York Daily News announced her ‘sex change’, and the front-page story
escalated into a ‘media frenzy’ of international proportions (Meyerowitz 159). Jorgensen,
however, was not the first transsexual to garner news attention. Joanne Meyerowitz
suggests “stories of ‘sex reversals,’ ‘sex changes,’ and ‘sexual metamorphoses’ had
appeared in American newspapers and magazines since the 1930s,” and in European
accounts starting in the late nineteenth century (159). However, it was the explosion of
Jorgensen’s high profile transition and the popularization of the term ‘transsexual’ by
Harry Benjamin and David Cauldwell in the late 1940s and 1950s1, that inspired a
Western fascination with tales of individuals crossing established sex/gender boundaries.
Sensationalized stories questioning an individual’s ‘real’ sex or gender, tales of betrayal,
and medical intervention appear often in a variety of media sources.2 Julie Hollar’s
examinations of the major American network and cable news programs in 2007 found
that coverage of transgender issues are still “plagued with a narrow uniformity of subjects
and a relentless and invasive fixation on anatomy” (n. p.).

Meyerowitz continues, noting that prior to the 1960s and “well before American doctors adopted
the term transsexual, the mass media seem to have played a crucial role in disseminating the concept of
surgically altered sex” (179).
For example, The Jerry Springer Show embodies said narratives, with such episode titles airing in
2009 as: Oops..A Had Sex with a Tranny! (Air date: 11/11/2009); Transsexual Tell-All (Air dale
11/6/2009); Transsexual Takedown (Air date 9/18/2009); Tricked by a Transsexual! (5/13/2009); and,
Brothers' Transsexual Surprise! (Air date: 1/21/2009). Other examples include coverage by the New York
Post (6/13/04, “Tranny RX Sex Scams”), and CNN’s Larry King, which aired four shows concerned with
gender identity between 2005 and 2007. Canadian examples include CBC’s The Fifth Estate feature
Becoming Ay den (October 13 2004), and The Passionate Eve documentary The Third Sex, which focuses on
intersexuality (December 31 2009).
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What is transsexualism? In this thesis, I define transsexualism as the condition
experienced by individuals with a sense of incongruence between their birth-assigned sex
and their felt gender. For many scholars and community members, transsexualism can be
subsumed under the umbrella term transgender.*I*3 Transsexuals comprise the most-studied
trans community (Lawrence 474), and in the last century a wide variety of discourses
have emerged that construct the Western understanding of transsexualism. These
discourses are often concerned with the desire for medical intervention in the form of
hormone therapy and/or sex reassignment surgery (SRS)4, which are considered the
treatment of choice by many transsexuals and medical personnel (De Cuypere et al. 679).
The emphasis placed on trans persons and medical intervention has produced a discourse
that is overtly scientific or theoretical in nature. I employ the broader term ‘trans’ in this
thesis in an attempt to include individuals experiencing gender incongruence, regardless
if they undertake hormone therapy or employ surgical procedures in order to achieve
congruence.

I must highlight that not all scholars, activists and community members agree upon the inclusion
of 'transsexual' under the term ‘transgender’. For a discussion of this argument, refer to the works of
Viviane Namaste. There is also debate regarding the usage o f the term ‘transsexual’ in referring to
individuals who seek - but do not necessary obtain - sex reassignment surgery. For a criticism of this
usage, refer to Jon K. Meyer who proposes to retain the term transsexuals only for those individuals who
undergo, and complete, ‘genital reassignment’. However, Margrit Eichler notes that the process of
distinguishing between pre-operative and post-operative transsexuals stresses the surgical aspect of
transsexualism over the cultural aspect. This distinction assumes that all transsexuals desire and will attain
surgery, emphasizing surgery and a clinical approach to transsexualism (Meyer 527-58; Eichler 281-290).
It should also be noted that within the trans community there is disagreement as to the recognition of a
transsexual’s sex: some transsexuals desire their ‘new’ sex to be recognized by society and the courts,
whereas others - such as Sandy Stone and Kate Bornstein - make arguments for their recognition as
transsexual women.
I use ‘sex reassignment surgery’ because it is the phrase used in the Canadian context by the
majority of activists, medical and legal personnel. In other Westernized countries - such as Australia - the
phrase ‘sex affirmation’ is used to refer to the “rehabilitative hormone therapy and surgical procedures
undertaken to transform the rest of the body to match the sex of the brain, to the fullest extent possible”
(Wallbank n. p.).
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In academic fields such as the social sciences and humanities, psychology, and
law the conceptualization of the relationship between sex and gender continue to be
examined in light of trans subjectivities and identities. Such academic works continue to
engage with the concept of gender as a system, a way of organizing our lives. Gender
permeates our structured world in a variety of ways, influencing legal definitions,
medical concepts and childrearing patterns. In contemporary Canadian culture, it is still
taken as natural that a male body should only signify a masculine gendered identity, and
that a female body only signifies a feminine one. Such truths about gendered expression
and behaviour are constituted in contemporary discourses of gender and problematized
by trans identity. This thesis endeavours to examine three separate but intersecting fields
of knowledge production about transsexuality and sex reassignment surgery through a
Foucauldian discourse analysis of legal, medical and news texts.
As a system of representation, discourses go beyond simply describing our social
world; as a social practice, they reflect and construct the social world. Discourses,
therefore, categorize and give meaning to objects and phenomena. In The Archaeology of
Knowledge, Michel Foucault writes that discourse refers to “a group of sequences of
signs, in so far as they are statements, that is, in so far as they can be assigned particular
modalities of existence” (2005, 121 ).5 Foucault’s conception of discourse can be thought
of as a field in which possible statements about a given topic, area or object can be
produced and become known. Ian Parker provides a working definition of a discourse as
“a system o f statements which constructs an object" (emphasis in original, 252). In

R. Keith Sawyer (2002) argues that Anglo-speaking scholars increasingly began to attribute the
broad usage of the concept ‘discourse’ to Foucault, when it should be attributed to British cultural studies
collectively, to Lacan, or to the French Marxist discourse analysts working in the 1960s and 1970s
(depending on the specific theoretical usage and intended connotations).

»

4

particular, Foucault’s work highlights the role of discourse as producer - and constrainer
- of knowledge (S. Hall 72). For Foucault, “Knowledge is that of which one can speak in
a discursive practice, and which is specified by that fact” (2005, 201). Foucault continues
this thought to conclude,
... knowledge is also the space in which the subject may take up a position
and speak of the objects with which he [sic] deals in his discourse...;
knowledge is also the field of coordination and subordination of
statements in which concepts appear, and are defined, applied and
transformed...; lastly, knowledge is defined by the possibilities of use and
appropriation offered by discourse... (2005, 201).
For example, Foucault’s examination of ‘madness’ notes that “mental illness was
constituted by all that was said in all the statements that named it, divided it up, described
it, explained it, traced its developments, indicated its various correlations, judged it, and
possibly gave it speech by articulating, in its name, discourse that were to be taken as its
own” (2005, 35). A similar argument can be put forth for transsexuality. As a category,
knowledge about transsexuality is constituted through all the various discourses that
articulate it, including psychoanalytical theory, and endocrinological and surgical
practices.
Using a Foucauldian notion of discourse, it is my aim here to analyze texts about
transsexuality and sex reassignment surgery, and explore how they evoke and re-produce
particular meanings.6 I make use of the term ‘texts’ here to refer to groups of statements,
written or spoken, which also find meaning in social practices and conduct. Discourses
are more than systems of representation; they are discursive practices, the basis of actions

This thesis was written with Jacob Hale’s “Suggested Rules for Non-Transsexuals Writing about
Transsexuals, Transsexuality, Transsexualism, or Trans” (1997) in mind. I am aware that my selection of
texts is a social process and reflective of the production system of knowledge and discourses on gendered
and sexed objects. While this project does not aim to speak o f the lived experiences of transsexuals, it is my
hope to move away from the history o f problematic scholarship that reduces trans subjects to the status of
objects by critically engaging with the selected discourses that heavily ‘produce’ transsexuality in Ontario.
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that shape the world and what we can accomplish within it. Discursive practices are
characterized by the “delimitation of a field of objects, the definition of a legitimate
perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of
concepts and theories” (Foucault 1977, 199). As Parker notes, for Foucault, “discourses
and practices should be treated as if they were the same thing, and it is true both that
material practices are always invested with meaning (they have the status of a text) and
that speaking or writing is a ‘practice’” (258). In other words, the various discourses that
I examine within this thesis - feminist, legal, medical and news media - are implicated
within the structures of their institutions. The examined discourses exist in a variety of
texts and practices: in journals and books, in policies and legislations, in editorial
meetings and printing shops, in court and professional council decisions, in women’s
groups, in educational institutions, and in meetings with other members in the field
(feminists, lawyers, doctors or journalists). Hence, I approach trans subjectivity with the
understanding that institutions and discourses are interconnected.
Although discourses work in texts, their meanings “go beyond individual
intentions” (Parker 253). Individual subjects can produce particular texts - as my
examination of Margaret Wente’s Globe and Mail columns in Chapter Three indicates but these texts continue to operate within the limits of the discursive formation7 of a
particular period and culture. A Foucauldian understanding of discourse maintains that
discourses are not static; instead, they are historically located and change and develop

Foucault discusses discursive formations in Part II of The Archaeology of Knowledge. We may
think o f discursive formations as a system o f statements or the historically situated fields of knowledge.
Foucault writes that we can say we are dealing with discursive formations when “one can describe, between
a number of statements, such a system o f dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of statement,
concepts, or thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functioning,
transformations)” (2005,41 ).
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based on their connections to other discourses.
Most importantly, discourses determine who can speak, when they can speak, and
with how much authority. According to Foucault (1990), knowledge and accompanying
statements are the result of the effect of power. In particular, Foucault’s work examines
how power functions, how it is exerted and resisted in society through “institutions,
economic and social processes, behavioural patterns, systems of norms, techniques, types
of classification, [and] modes of characterization” (Foucault 2005, 49). Foucault
approaches power not from a traditional top-down manner - exemplified through the rule
of a sovereign - but, rather, as more than merely repressive. For Foucault, power is
productive, permeating all levels of society and constituting itself through knowledge
(Cheek 1143; S. Hall 77). Power enables particular knowledges to be produced or
constrained, and creates new discourses and discursive regimes; understood otherwise,
power can shape what a society “knows” as truth. Foucault suggests that power is directly
linked to production: “it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of
truth” (1995, 194). Power perpetuates itself through knowledge, which is imposed on
objects through discourse to produce objectivity, or an objective reality. Foucault
proposes that the terms power and knowledge be joined as one (power-knowledge), as
they imply one another: “There is no power relation without the correlative constitution
of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the
same time power relations” (Foucault 1995, 27).
In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault argues that those people who are
deemed experts in society have the ability to speak truth. Such authorities come from
similar institutions - e.g. the government, legal system, and the academe - and maintain
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their authority within these systems. As such, experts tend to become subsumed under
these dominant discursive formations. Similarly, some groups benefit from a particular
discourse and may wish to deny that this specific system of meaning is a discourse, while
others are simultaneously oppressed by the same system of categorizing reality. For
example, discourses that deny the validity of transsexuality - of a felt experience of
incongruence between one’s birth sex and self-identified gender - oppress those persons
who experience the world and their place within it as such. This approach to the
sex/gender relationship benefits cisnormativity which can be understood as those
expressions and behaviours that are taken to be natural when accorded to cis-people (non
trans individuals) and the belief that trans bodies and identities are unnatural or less
authentic. Discourses that diminish the phenomenon of transsexuality are also reflective
of existing localized power relations in the province of Ontario. Using discourse analysis,
I take into consideration both the objects and the subjects that are referred to in the texts,
how they are described and what they can say within the discourse (Parker 254).
In its earliest manifestations, my project was inspired by the changes made in the
coverage delisting (1998) and relisting (2008) of sex reassignment surgery under the
Ontario Health Insurance Policy (OHIP) and was confined to examining news texts
alone. As the project progressed, however, it became apparent to me that mainstream
news texts constitute only one discourse - albeit a decidedly public one - in which
knowledge about transsexuality is circulated and where transsexuality is produced as an
object. This realization was attributed to the Foucauldian notion that knowledge about
transsexuality exists meaningfully within discursive formations about a given topic. I
discovered that transsexuality is also constituted in legal and medical discourses. That is
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not to deny the existence of transsexuality outside such fields, but to argue that
transsexuality takes on meaning and becomes an object of knowledge within discourse,
and transforms into truth when applied in the real world. Stuart Hall writes, “Foucault
argues that since we can only have knowledge of things if they have a meaning, it is
discourse - not the things-in-themselves - which produces knowledge” (73). Therefore,
the knowledge produced in medical, legal and news texts about transsexuality manifest as
truths in social structures, and influence institutional and policy decisions that affect trans
persons. My examination of these discourses about transsexuality was the guided by the
following research questions:
1. Who and what are viewed as ‘normal’ and ‘natural’ within the texts?
2. What narratives are presented as legitimate/illegitimate within the texts?
3. In what ways do expert knowledges appear within the discourses, if at
all?
4. Do the texts contain references to broader societal practices that are
oppressive towards transsexual identities?
5. In relation to the news texts, how are the changes to the OHIP policy
justified by the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care?
6. Is sex reassignment surgery presented as cosmetic/elective or medically
necessary surgery within the texts?
I also draw on Julia Serano’s use of cissexual to refer to “people who are not transsexual
and who have only ever experienced their subconscious and physical sexes as being
aligned” (12), and adopt this term to highlight the naturalization that is traditionally
accorded to those bodies.

o

The Oxford English Dictionary defines the prefix “cis”, from the original Latin, to denote “on this
side o f ’ and “trans-” as a “prefix denoting through, across, or beyond” (OED online 2008). It should be
noted that cis can be conceptualized as a description o f the way that one is perceived by others, rather than
actual differences between cissexuals and trans- persons. Just as it is important to remember that not all
trans persons experience the world in the same way, I also do not perceive all cissexuals to be homogenous
nor for cissexuals to escape other forms of prejudice such as racism, classism, sexism, homophobia or
(dis)ableism.
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In Chapter One, I begin by outlining some of the recent historical shifts in
Western4 feminist theoretical understandings of the relationship between sex and gender,
and the condition of transsexuality. I highlight the shift from a traditional conception of
sex and gender as naturally coupled, to more recent discourses that challenge the claim
that gender identity and biological sex are inherently linked phenomena. I begin with an
examination of Simone de Beauvoir’s 1953 seminal work, The Second Sex. From there, I
move forward and engage with the works of Judith Butler, Toril Moi and Iris Marion
Young. I also examine the arguments of Janice G. Raymond, Marcia Yudkin, Bernice
Hausman and Margrit Eichler. As feminists who view transsexuality and sex
reassignment surgery as problematic, their works complicate the discourse on
transsexuality. Notably, these authors approach transsexuality as pathology, and argue
that transsexuals are victims of an intolerant culture and a threat to “women”. I suggest
that the condition of transsexuality and transsexuals have been represented in a variety of
ways by feminist and queer studies scholars: as pathologized subjects; as victims or
“dupes” of a rigid, binary gender system; as co-conspirators in that system through
stereotypical performances of woman- and man-hood; as gender outlaws; and as
revolutionaries. Overall, this chapter builds a theoretical base for my understanding of
sex, gender and the discourse of transsexuality.
In Chapter Two, I explore the structure of medico-legal apparatuses and their
reliance on cisnormative patterns of knowledge production. I investigate the role of
‘expert knowledge' as professional expertise that orders our social world and organizes

An inherent limitation in my work arises from my focus on Western thought, the majority of
which is written by English speaking theorists and activists. This focus on Western thought is undertaken,
in part, due to linguistic limitations and because American and European theoretical traditions have greatly
influenced the current hegemonic Canadian conception o f gender.
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the social environment in which we live. By considering the interconnected nature of
legal and medical discourses as systems of expert knowledge, I highlight our reliance on
experts as the definers of truth in mediating our understanding of sex reassignment
surgery and transsexuality. Overall, this chapter argues that the American Psychiatric
Association’s Gender Identity Disorder (GID) diagnosis outlined in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) is essential to a legal understanding of
transsexuality in Ontario. I begin the chapter with a historical case study of the
importance of determining sex designation for marriages in Ontario prior to the passing
of the 2005 federal Bill C-38, the Civil Marriage Act. I do so in order to call attention to
the extent of (cis)normative understandings of sex and gender within legal discourses that
have recently been questioned by non-cissexuals and allies. My main argument for this
chapter remains that trans individuals wishing to have their felt sex/gender acknowledged
by the Ontario government must submit themselves to a medicalized system by first
receiving medical acknowledgment of their gender dysphoria through the diagnosis of
GID. Trans individuals must then receive approval for sex reassignment surgery by the
Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH), and finally submit proof of transition
to the Registrar General before they can attain recognition. Under Ontario’s Vital
Statistics Act (R.S.O. 1990, c. V. 4, s. 36), requests for alterations to sex designations on
government documents require proof by means of certification by two medical
practitioners testifying to the results of the surgery. This burden of proof reflects the
guarded systems of expertise that exert influence over trans lives.
In this chapter, I also examine the problematic components of the GID diagnostic
criteria and present the results from Phase I of the Trans PULSE Project, a
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comprehensive community-based research project aimed at documenting the lived
experiences of trans people in Ontario. The Trans PULSE Project’s Phase I’s results,
published in the September/October 2009 issue of the Journal of the Association of
Nurses in AIDS Care, provides a framework for theorization about the social
determinants of health care, social exclusion and sites of erasure. The Trans PULSE
Project underlines emerging new research initiatives that engage consciously with the
concerns of the trans community at every level of research. The members of the Trans
PULSE research project note the real lack of availability and accessibility of information
on issues of concern to the trans community. As such, they aim to produce the types of
information “needed by individuals to make informed decisions; information needed by
care providers to provide the best care, and; information needed by advocates and policy
makers to make decisions that are informed by solid evidence” (Bauer et al. 2007, 3).
This form of knowledge production connotes a shift in the discourse of transsexuality.
Chapter Three includes my discourse analysis of four major Canadian news
producers based in Ontario: The Globe and Mail, The Toronto Star, National Post and
Toronto Sun. Before presenting the results of my findings, I situate my data analysis by
providing some background on the provincial system of health care, the delisting and
relisting of sex reassignment surgery under the SOB-PS, and the main challenge to the
delisting in Hogan v. Ontario (2006). Keeping in line with the argument that news
producers shape and define truth, I analyze a total of 77 articles along tonal and linguistic
dimensions. I provide in-depth analysis of hard news texts, opinion columns and letters to
the editor. I note the role of experts from the medical and legal communities and the
Ministry of Health and Long Term Care in defining transsexuality and sex reassignment
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surgery for the general reading public. This discourse analysis supports the argument that
transsexuality remains marginalized in a cisnormative culture. This marginalization is
due, in part, to the incomprehensibility or misunderstanding by the general population of
the condition of transsexuality as against “the norm”. This misunderstanding is most
notable in negative responses to the relisting of sex reassignment surgery, and the
positing of SRS against other delisted services, and was best observed in the opinion
columns and the letters to the editor.
Overall, this research project makes contributions to the interdisciplinary fields of
trans studies and media studies. As a project solidly concentrating on Canadian
narratives, I address gaps in the study of discourses of Canadian transsexuality by
examining the discursive practices that position trans Canadians as “others” due to their
non-conformity to traditional gender identities. Individuals who transgress accepted
social conventions may struggle in having their subject positions acknowledged as
legitimate and not pathological or abnormal. This struggle can be dangerous and
disruptive. It can also be one way through which change can be achieved in discourse and
social practice by questioning established norms. I believe that an examination of trans
issues not only allows us to work towards social justice, but also allows us to highlight
discursive assumptions about normative gender systems, and their production,
maintenance and reproduction. In total, the various discursive fields and texts that I
explore function as important sites for the positioning and problematization of trans
issues.
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1. Positioning Transsexuality in Feminist and Queer Discourses
“Gender is a key organizing concept of institutions and practices in culture and society”
- Diane Richardson 2008, 3
‘‘[T]he denaturalization of sex, in its multiple senses, does not imply a liberation from
hegemonic constraints... ” - Judith Butler 1993, 133
Gender variance that challenges social norms is a significantly misunderstood
facet of human phenomenon. Discomfort with one’s gender ‘performance’ and/or bodily
manifestations are sensationalized within the media10, and remain a contested terrain
among mental health professions.11 This chapter outlines significant shifts in feminist
discussions of the relationship between sex and gender, and the condition of
transsexuality. I begin with an examination of Simone de Beauvoir’s 1953 work, The
Second Sex, and move forward to the present, engaging with feminists and queer theorist
writings on transsexuality. In particular, I engage primarily with the works of Judith
Butler, Toril Moi and Iris Marion Young. I also examine the arguments of Janice G.
Raymond, Marcia Yudkin, Bernice Hausman and Margrit Eichler, whose feminist
writings view transsexuality and sex reassignment surgery as problematic. Notably, these
authors approach transsexuality as pathology, and argue that transsexuals are victims of
an intolerant culture and a threat to “women”.
The formation of our Western social world through a dichotomous system based
on two - and only two - sexes has the tendency to constrain and police sexual subjects
who deviate from the hegemonic norm(s). This policing may take the form of

Refer to note 2 for an expansion on this point.
Conflicting scientific and social science theories view the ‘cause’ of gender dysphoria to be
acquired biologically (postnatal or parental) or the result of an environmental or social factor, particularly
those occurring in early childhood. Tugnet et al. note that early psychodynamic literature considered the
familial relationship of the boy (sic) with his mother as the cause of GID. Other theories considered surges
of female hormones during key stages of development of the fetus to cause GID (Tugnet et al., 638). [Both
examples here emphasize potential causes for MtF transsexuality].
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pathologizing transgender subjects by medical and surgical institutions, acts of violence
against the deviant subject, or legal troubles stemming from identification documents that
differ from an individual’s gender expression or presentation. Would we require a
medical classification of gender disorders12 if our cultural system of classifying citizens
was conceptualized outside of strict gender binaries? I argue that gender role expectations
reliant on dimorphic sexed subject positions create a social space wherein deviations
from the perceived norm become pathologized. Indeed, as Judith Butler points out,
“insofar as social existence requires an unambiguous gender affinity, it is not possible to
exist in a socially meaningful sense outside of established gender norms” (1986, 41).
Those who transgress established social norms often engage in a daily struggle to have
their subject positions acknowledged and to not be viewed as “abnormal” or pathological
against the “norm”. This struggle can be disruptive, but it is also the means through
which change can be achieved in social and gender relations.
My goal here is not to speak for those who identify as transgender or transsexual,
or to diminish the psychic pain and the social difficulties that transgender and transsexual
individuals face. Instead I am interested in examining how transsexuality and Gender
Identity Disorder (GID) as a medical and social condition are positioned within
hegemonic narratives of gender in Canada. More specifically, I argue throughout this
thesis that hegemonic discourses of gender inform public discourses about sex
reassignment surgery (SRS) through the legitimization of subjects that conform to a
normative gender presentation. I employ the term gender normativity to refer to a system
of social conventions. This standardized system functions by organizing the world,
The diagnostic category o f Sexual and Gender Identity Disorders are outlined in the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual o f Mental Disorders (DSM) published by the American Psychiatric Association,
and used in Canada.
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meaning that it describes and expects the world and its subjects to function in a normative
way. This system maintains that there are only two sexes and genders and that they relate
to each other in a specific manner - maleness and femaleness correspond to masculinity
and femininity, and these modes of being relate to each other within the narrow scope of
reproductive heterosexuality.
I do not believe that an expansion of accepted gender categories (i.e. the call for a
multiplicity of gender positions), will alone overcome the struggle against gender
normativity. Although the incorporation of previously deviant subject positions into the
normative side of a gender taxonomy does influence the everyday lived experiences of
subjects, this alone does not challenge the institutions and life experiences that are
defined and regulated by this gender classification system. I do not claim here to have an
answer to the “trouble” with gender. Nor do I claim to have an answer for the formulation
of a social world beyond the categorization of its citizens through the organizing concept
of gender. I am, instead, interested in examining how gender functions as a system in the
Canadian context: what its rules and structures are and how transgressions against those
rules are dealt with. It is imperative to also note that gender, as a system, intersects with
and responds to other social systems - such as race, class, and physical ability - and
shapes and regulates people’s lives. Gender must also contend with other social
signifiers, which may include class, sexual orientation, age, and ability. I believe that an
examination of trans issues not only allows us to work towards social justice, but also,
allows us to highlight assumptions about normative gender systems.
I will begin with an examination of some recent historical shifts in Western
theoretical understandings of the relationship(s) between sex and gender emerging from

16

Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex (1953). While sex and gender were once thought
to be naturally coupled, more recent discourses challenge the claim that gender identity
and biological sex are inherently linked phenomena. Feminists, in particular, have taken
up the differentiation between sex and gender and have argued for the emancipation of
women (as well as men) from limiting and sometimes detrimental social expectations.13
Some feminists, such as Janice Raymond and Bernice L. Hausman, have viewed
pre-operative transsexuals’ discomfort with their biological sex, and the desire by some
transsexuals for medical intervention, as indicative of a medico-social condition within
strict narratives of sexual dimorphism14 and gendered behaviour. Overall, the condition
of transsexuality and transsexuals has been represented in a variety of ways by feminist
and queer studies scholars: as pathologized subjects; as victims or “dupes” of a rigid,
binary gender system; as co-conspirators in that system through stereotypical
performances of woman- and man-hood; as gender outlaws; and as revolutionaries. I
begin my survey with Simone de Beauvoir, who lays important groundwork for the
progression from the 1950s to the present. It is important to contextualize this
groundwork as it is the foundation of our contemporary approach to bodies. In particular,
this articulation will become more apparent in Chapter Three, where I examine the
representation of trans identity and the delisting of SRS in news media texts.

In contemporary Canadian context, overt forms of discrimination based on sex are prohibited. As
outlined in the Canadian Employment Equity Act, S.C. 1995, c. 44, “conditions of disadvantage” and
inequality in employment opportunities or benefits based on gender, disability and visible minority status
are prohibited (Employment Equity Act, S.C. 1995, c. 44). However, there continues to exist arenas in
which equality is still lacking. For example, the representation o f women in public office is considerably
lower than that of men. Women make up 52% of the Canadian population, but they represent only 22.1% of
the seats in the House of Commons (Cool 2008).
Sexual dimorphism refers to the distinct morphological features of the males and females of a
species. As a biological model, sexual dimorphism views different behaviour between the sexes, and
among each sex, as controlled by sex hormones. Theories o f sex dimorphism, though variable in their
details according to the species, apply to all vertebrates - of which humans are one species (Udry 562).
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Changes in the Twentieth Century: Beauvoir’s “One is not born a Woman”
As feminists have theorized about the relationship between sex and gender in a
variety of ways, it is significant to note that the categories “sex” and “gender” contain a
medley of meanings, which results in a certain level of ambiguity as to the signification
of those meanings. According to Diane Richardson, prior to the 1960s, “gender referred
primarily to what is coded in language as masculine or feminine” (3). Sex was conceived
of in terms of binaries: male/female; man/woman; masculine/feminine. Sexual difference
was conceived of as the natural form, that which biologically grounded gendered modes
of being. This essentialist viewpoint was challenged by social constructionist accounts
that emphasized social and cultural factors, not all of which denied the involvement of
biology. During the 1960s, the Western15 meaning of gender shifted through its partial

My discussion of the distinction between sex and gender is positioned within this historical period
in Western notions of the relationship between the two terms and is not necessarily reflective of other
cultures, historical periods or theoretical positions. For example, Mia Nakamura argues that the Western
concept of “identity” (and by extension gender identity) is not an indigenous concept in Japanese culture
(though the concept “identity” is now used as a foreign loan word). Nakamura reminds us that discussions
o f “gender” and “identity” are culturally specific, and that they do not always translate onto other cultures
with natural ease. As well, it should be noted that at times, non-Western cultures are examined uncritically
through Western theoretical lenses. In particular, discussions regarding the social acceptance of the hijra of
India, or the concept o f “berdache” [sic] among North American First Nations have been employed, at
times nostalgically or in a romanticizing way, as examples o f “other" culture’s acceptance o f gender
variance without much attention to each culture’s social relation to these groups. For a further discussion of
this point, refer to Towel and Morgan (469-497). Alternatively, the contemporary Western discussion of
transsexuality in Iran can also help us to understand how a Western lens has been employed to discuss and
interpret a non-Western cultural practice. Transsexuality in Iran has become a recent media topic both
within Iran and internationally. Two recent documentaries exemplify this interest: Mitra Farahani’s
documentary. Juste une Femme (English title: Just a Woman) (2002), received the Teddy Jury Prize at the
2002 Berlin International Film Festival, while Tanaz Eshaghian’s documentary Be Like Others premiered at
the 2008 Sundance Film Festival - where it was nominated for the Grand Jury Prize and continued on to
win three awards at the Berlin International Film Festival. News coverage of transsexuality in Iran has also
been covered by, for example, BBC News, The Guardian, CBC News and The New York Times. As
Najmabadi notes, the medical practice of ‘sex change’ - through surgery and hormone therapy - has
occurred in Iran since the early 1970s. However, the recent international discussion of transsexuality in Iran
is usually framed around the occurrence of subsidization for SRS by an Islamic state, or in comparison with
discussions of punishments for homosexuals. In some Western perspectives, the increase in GID diagnosis
and SRS is seen as an attempt by the religious state to control same-sex relationships. However, the issue
is more complex than this argument presents, one component of which is the fact that it is sodomy that is
illegal under Iranian law not homosexuality, in and o f itself. Najmabadi maintains that Western coverage of
transsexuality in Iran cannot be reduced to a view that it provides gays and lesbians with a “religiously
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separation from the concept of sex, which became limited to biology and posited against
the social. This sex/gender binary was first outlined in Beauvoir’s seminal work, The
Second Sex (1953), wherein sex is viewed as a biological process with differences
between females and males in terms of the physiology of the body, and gender is viewed
as a cultural phenomenon with “social meanings and value attached to being female or
male in a given society, expressed in terms of the concepts femininity and masculinity”
(Richardson 5). Beauvoir presents the argument that gender is socially constructed; that
“masculinities” and “femininities” should be understood as social constructions rather
than biological determinations. For Beauvoir, gender roles are “the cultural
interpretations of our biologically given sex” (Richardson 6). She writes:
One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman. No biological,
psychological, or economic fate determines the figures that the human
female presents in society; it is civilization as a whole that produces this
creature (Beauvoir 267).
Beauvoir’s act of distinguishing between biological sex and social gender, therefore,
provides scholars, including feminists, with the opportunity to separate social behaviour
and activities within society from biological explanations. As Sally Hines notes, an
understanding of gender as distinct from sex “allows for the recognition of differently
embodied gendered identities and expressions, or of different ways of being women and
men” (Hines 2008, 24). This distinction suggests that gender expectations are socially
constructed and therefore changeable. Beauvoir’s understanding of gender has since been
adopted by other feminists, who have sought to highlight the ways in which individuals
are socialized into gender roles (“sex roles”), and cultural and historical modes associated

sanctioned legal alternative” (25). This situation is further complicated because although in the legal
context o f contemporary Iran, transsexuality is legal and SRS is state subsidized, in the cultural context
transsexuality is understood, overwhelmingly, as shameful (Najmabadi 23-42).
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with women and men.16 Beauvoir’s work presents the sexed body as the material entity
out of which a culturally contextualized gender emerges and is, at the same time, imposed
upon. Beauvoir’s static approach to the body, which situates sex as a constant aspect of
being human, has, since, been contested.17
Beauvoir’s separation of sex from gender is of particular significance in
understanding transsexual narratives of living in the wrong body. It is in the space opened
up between “social gender” and “biological sex” that transsexuals are able to configure a
subject position. Patricia Elliot, in summarizing Trish Salah, notes, “transsexuals locate
themselves within the categories of a binary system in order to establish congruence
between sex and gender and to claim their right to live as men and women” (Elliot 9).
The ability to distinguish between the sexed materiality of the body and
expected/accepted gendered behaviours means transsexuals can lay claim to a gender
identity separate from their biologically sexed body. In the process, such actions can
constitute a resistance to essentialist
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or heteronormative
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assumptions of the

relationship between the body/sex and gender.
Some feminist, queer and transgender theorists - such as Judith Butler and Sandy
Stone - have adopted trans theories in their work, celebrating and pointing to the

O f particular concern has been the ways in which becoming gendered limits women due to gender
role expectations and gender inequality.
For a further discussion on this point, please refer to the section on “Queering Sex/Gender” in
which I outline Judith Butler’s view that our perception of the category sex is influenced by our shared
linguistic norms.
The term essentialist is derived from "essence” and is used here to highlight belief in the assumed
intrinsically or unchanging properties of a phenomenon (such as an unchanging or universal “female
nature”), in opposition to it being a social or ideological construct, or influenced by such fields.
I use heteronormative here to refer assumptions that sustain particular institutions and practices.
Stated otherwise, heteronormativity refers to a normative sexual practice (the boundaries of
heterosexuality) that orders everyday existence in terms of both sexuality and gender, and affecting both
those within and those outside o f its boundaries.
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(perceived) potential for transgressive expressions and lives as examples of how to live
gender variance, or as tools to criticize the sex/gender binary.

Moving Forward from Beauvoir:
In the 1990s, the term transgender emerged as a signifier of those actions and
identities that somehow transgress traditional conceptions of sex and gender. Susan
Stryker describes transgender as “an umbrella term that refers to all identities or practices
that cross over, cut across, move between, or otherwise queer socially constructed
sex/gender boundaries” (Currah 4). Trans is similarly employed here as an inclusive term
for individuals who transgress social conceptions of gender lines and gender expression,
but not necessarily sexual orientation. I include within the larger trans(gender)
community transsexual individuals who have transitioned - or wish to transition - from
their assigned sex/gender at birth to live full-time as a member of another sex/gender.
I make use of Jean Bobby Noble’s argument that although transsexual and
transgender subjects transcend “the discourses of the sex/gender system that ground all
meanings of gender in the appropriately sexed body” (Noble 17), such subjects still find
themselves articulated by gender. They continue to perform gender difference even if the
body that performs that gender is - to borrow Noble’s phrasing - a ‘transnatural’ body
produced through medical and surgical procedures. In some instances, individuals may
self-identify as transsexual even though they have rejected, or been denied access to, the
use of medical intervention. A decision to employ medical aid in bodily transitioning may
depend on a variety of factors, such as financial constraints, access to facilities and
support groups, health concerns, cultural background, and/or religion.
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Overall, how transsexual bodies are situated within a society’s gender system - as
legitimate bodies, as marginalized but acknowledged bodies, or as unacknowledged
bodies - impacts not only those bodies but all bodies caught within the gender system.
Within feminist thought, disassociating gender identity from biological factors has not
been without negative reactions. In particular, some feminist theorists - such as Janice
Raymond, Marcia Yudkin and Bernice Hausman - have been particularly hostile to
transgender practices. Although these theorists approach the condition of transsexuality
from distinct theoretical positions, they all ultimately position transsexuals as victims of
culture, as a threat to “women”, and as pathological. It is to their critique that I now turn.

Feminist Critique of Transsexuality
One of the key detractions of transgendered subjectivity can be found in Janice G.
Raymond’s The Transsexual Empire (1979), which contains two central arguments: first,
that sex and gender are inherently co-dependent categories; second, that “transgender
practices are oppositional to the values and politics of feminism” (Raymond 1979, 29).
Raymond states that it is impossible to separate sex and gender due to the fact that sex is
chromosomally dependent, and therefore, secured at birth and unchangeable. Her
conceptualization assumes that biology determines destiny, that chromosomal sex
dictates socially constructed gender. She argues that while anatomical (genital or
gonadal) sex can be altered with the use of plastic surgery - with endocrine or hormonal
sex also susceptible to alteration through hormonal treatments - it is nonetheless
biologically impossible to change chromosomal sex. If chromosomal sex
is taken to be the fundamental basis for maleness and femaleness, the man
(sic) who undergoes sex conversion is not female (Raymond 1979, 10,
emphasis in original).
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Raymond configures transsexuality as a (genetic) male" practice, created by a patriarchal
and oppressive medical system whose aim is to construct servile women. She views
transsexuals as undergoing “superficial, stereotypical, and artifactual changes that
reinforce socially constructed roles and identities” (Raymond 1979, 188n).
In this way, Raymond suggests that “male-to-constructed-female”21 transsexuals
are used as a means of colonizing feminist identification and politics, and for gaining
access to hard-won female only space (1979, xx). The medical system, therefore,
constructs women from male bodies as an alternative to biological women - making them
obsolete - and penetrating women’s sense of self in every way: “Male-to-constructedfemale transsexuals attempt to neutralize women by making the biological woman
unnecessary - by invading both the feminine and feminist fronts... [while] Female-toconstructed-male transsexuals neutralize themselves as biological women and also their
potentially deviant power” (Raymond 1979, xxv). Ultimately, Raymond views
masculinity and femininity as the “social constructs and stereotypes of behavior that are
culturally prescribed for male and female bodies respectively” (1979, 3). She claims that
transsexuals reject one socially prescribed mode of being masculine or feminine and
gravitate toward the other. Thus, for Raymond, “the First Cause of transsexualism is a
gender-defined society whose norms of masculinity and femininity generate the desire to
be transsexed” (1979, 16).

For Raymond, it is predominantly genetic males who undergo SRS. In her theorization, “femaleto-constructed-males” [sic] are “tokens” of an oppressive patriarchal system, and function to promote the
illusion that transsexuality is a human, instead of a male, problem.
Raymond employs the term “male-to-constructed-female” to indicate the inability of genetic males
to truly change sex, as “[t]he pattern o f sex chromosomes is present and unchangeable in every body cell,
including blood cells” (1979, 7).
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Sandy Stone notes that until the early 1990s, Raymond’s The Transsexual Empire
remained “the definitive statement on transsexualism by a genetic female academic”
(223). Such an extreme feminist position reproduces a binary model of gender as reliant
on biological understandings of sex as fixed. It reads transgender and transsexual
individuals as reproducing gender norms and denies the self-identified gender of
transsexual persons. Raymond’s argument also assumes that the desire to alter one’s body
in order to align it better with one’s gender identity is inherently an antifeminist stance,
and that sex reassignment surgery is required for the expression of all trans identities.
Raymond’s narrative denies the transsexual as a real person with a specific biography
and, as such, has caused political and personal harm towards trans individuals.22
Raymond’s homogenous approach to the category transsexual also denies the
variety of trans expressions and modes of self-identification that exist within the
community, and take for granted the numerous ways in which individuals exist in the real
world. Within Raymond’s theorization, transsexuals are guilty of practicing misogynist
forms of femininity by perpetuating gender essentialism and are hence co-conspirators
with patriarchal oppression (Heyes 1101). I find such claims problematic because they
deny the agency of the transsexual individual and concentrate on MtF [Male-to-Female]
practices for political reasons. As well, Raymond's mode of argumentation grants certain
individuals - mainly herself - as capable of judging “true” femininity or appropriate
gender presentations and feminist goals.
Carol Riddell’s response to Raymond - originally published as a pamphlet within a year of The
Transsexual Empire’s publication - expands on such criticisms from a transgender feminist position
specifically by drawing on her own experiences at the Gender Identity Clinic in London, UK. Riddell
writes: “Ms. Raymond denies my existence as a woman, and believes that the aim o f trans-sexual feminists
is to seek publicity and, as agents o f the patriarchy infiltrated into the women’s movement, to sow
dissention into it. As a trans-sexual woman and a feminist, I neither seek publicity, nor am I an agent of
patriarchy. But my right, and that o f other trans-sexual women and men to exist is threatened by this book”
(145).
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Marcia Yudkin (1978) also questions the definition of MtF transsexuality.
Following Beauvoir, Yudkin asks, “What is a woman?” Specifically, Yudkin questions
whether biological males23 who have undergone genital surgery and hormone therapy,
with cosmetic and behavioural changes to aid in their “passing” as women, can lay claim
to the identity “woman”. Yudkin considers MtF transsexuals as women in so far as she
acknowledges their identification with female sex roles. In Yudkin’s view, a MtF
transsexual identifying as a woman is problematic because of the absence of an
“uninterrupted past social identity as girls or women” (Yudkin 104). Here, Yudkin is
referencing the social identity of “woman” and the accompanying pressures and
limitations of the female sex role (citing such examples as pregnancy, menstruation, and
rape), which, she believes, MtF transsexuals have escaped through their positions as
boys/men prior to transitioning.
Yudkin views the political dimension of transsexualism as one that exists because
of strict social identities. She argues that the “condition” of transsexualism can exist only
if the social identity of “woman” is kept distinct from the social identity of “man,” and
that such identities are deemed incompatible with a biological identity as male (for the
category woman), or female (for the category man) (Yudkin 102). Therefore, transsexuals
are the victims of a cultural system that insists on binary genders - what Yudkin refers to
as sex roles - tied to a presumed dichotomy of the sexes (Yudkin 103). Transsexuals are
then the
victims of our society’s taking sex and sex roles as the center of one’s
private and public identity, victims of society’s insistence that one’s
personality, desires, likes and dislikes, outward appearance, and so on, be
at one with one’s biological and social identity (Yudkin 100).
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Female transsexuals are not explicitly discussed by Yudkin.
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In Changing Sex: Transsexualism, Technology, and the Idea of Gender (1995),
Bernice L. Hausman asserts that, “the development of certain medical technologies made
the advent of transsexualism possible” (1995, 7). Hausman argues that the distinction
between biological sex and social gender is rooted in the development of medical
treatments and practices of the 1950s addressed with intersex conditions.24 In Hausman’s
opinion, such medical advances were not necessarily used to disentangle the false claim
that only two genetic sexes exist. Rather, advances in the scientific field of endocrinology
and plastic surgery provided medical institutions with “the tools to enforce sexual
dimorphism - not only to examine and describe it,” particularly in the ways intersex
infants were re-sexed as either male or female (Hausman 1995, 38).
Hausman postulates that endocrinological advances and improvements in plastic
surgery techniques were central components of the material conditions that allowed for
the conceptualization of the condition of transsexuality in both “making” the transsexual
through sex change, and in “envisioning” transsexuality as a new subjective category. It
is only through the demand for a sex change that the presenting subject is constructed as a
transsexual in Hausman's theory (Hausman 1995, 110). She writes, “by demanding
technological intervention to “change sex,” transsexuals demonstrate that their
relationship to technology is a dependent one” (Hausman 1995, 110). Therefore, for

Hausman accredits the development of the term “gender” to John Money and the Hampsons' work
with intersex infants in the 1950s. She states that Money employed the term “gender” in referring to “the
social articulations o f sexed identity” (Hausman 1995, 196). Money made use o f the term gender in his
academic work as a means of presenting the argument that in medical treatment o f older intersex children,
the child’s gender role and orientation should be given first priority over the appearance of their external
genitalia. This was in support of Money and the Hampsons’ belief that gender awareness is established by
the age o f eighteen months (Hausman 1995, 96). It is important to acknowledge the different subject
positions that adult transsexuals inhabit, and the variety of ways this differs from intersex infants. As well,
I would like to maintain that the early development o f the concept “gender” within medical discourses does
not diminish the significant work that feminists have conducted through the use o f “gender”.
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Hausman, transsexuality is reduced to its relations to the medical technologies and
institutions that she claims produce the transsexual individual.
The above authors approach the condition of transsexuality in a problematic
manner by treating it as a static category. Raymond’s work, in particular, denies any form
of agency in her discussion of transsexuals. For her, the transsexual functions as an
object; a mold upon which a patriarchal medical system enacts violence against ‘woman’.
Raymond and Hausman, although theoretically different, construct transsexuality as
pathology when they claim that trans people lack political perspective by implicitly
positioning themselves within a patriarchal medicalized model. Both authors also argue
that any attempt made by transsexuals - or, indeed, transgender individuals - to
proliferate gendered subject positions ultimately connects back to binary logic. An
understanding of “woman” (or “man”) as a restricted category," as Raymond and Yudkin
postulate, remains contentious because it takes homogeneity for granted in these
categories. In particular, understanding the category “woman” as based on biological
configurations is problematic when taking into consideration Judith Butler’s theorization
that sex is as much about social construction as it is about gender.

Queering Sex/Gender
In Gender Trouble (1990/1999) and Bodies That Matter (1993), Butler challenges
previous theorizations about an oppositional distinction between sex as biological and
gender as social. Warning against biological determinism, Butler questions the
naturalness of the category of sex, particularly in Beauvoir’s theorization. For Butler, the

By restricted category I mean an understanding of “woman” as a stable or closed class whose
membership is limited through specific defining characteristics such as a shared female history, or a
specific chromosomal makeup.
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sexed body does not simply function as the site upon which gender is enacted; the
meaning of sex is always already established and interpreted through cultural
understandings of bodily differences. Unlike earlier feminist articulations, Butler does not
envision biological sex as the foundation upon which social gender is superimposed.
Instead, she suggests, individuals read bodies as differently sexed through the category of
gender. By arguing that the “gender acts"26 - those repeated performances - that we enact
affect our materiality, Butler maintains that our very perceptions of physiological
differences become affected by social conventions and norms. In Butler’s theorizations,
our material reality is constructed and determined by our linguistic constructs. It is,
therefore, impossible to articulate sex beyond a social construct since “there is no
reference to a pure body which is not at the same time a further formation of that body"
(Butler 1993, 10).
Accordingly, under Butler’s theory of gender performance, it is impossible to
differentiate between sex and gender. She writes that sex is “not simply what one has, or
a static description of what one is: it will be one of the norms by which the ‘one’ becomes
viable at all, that which qualifies a body for life within the domain of cultural
intelligibility” (Butler 1993, 2). Therefore, the articulation of sex as a historical
phenomenon that is socially constructed functions to destabilize the notion of biological
materiality as static.
Although transsexualism demonstrates that a person’s gender identity does not
need to be determined by one’s biological sex assigned at birth, the desire to make
congruent one’s biological sex with their self-identified gender requires the retention of
Butler writes: “Gender ought not to be construed as a stable identity or locus o f agency from
which various acts follow; rather, gender is an identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an
exterior space through a stylized repetition o f acts” (emphasis in original 1999, 190).
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the analytical categories of gender and sex. For theoretical positions such as Butler’s, this
refusal to abandon sex and gender as distinct categories can be problematic (Elliot 9).
In light of Butler’s theory of gender performance, transsexual narratives of
“existing in the wrong body”

appear fallacious. If “there is no gender identity behind

the expressions of genders...[and]... identity is performatively constituted by the very
‘expressions’ that are said to be its results” (Butler 1999, 34), can a transsexual desire for
sex reassignment be legitimated through a claim to a distinct gender identity separate
from biological fact? Butler’s theory indicates that gender is a performance that is done
by the individual rather than a stable presentation of who the individual is. As such,
transsexual claims of experiencing a particular gender identity not connected to a
biological sex can both fit and be rejected within Butler’s notion of gender performance.
Transsexual gender identities align with Butler’s theories of performance' in that as a
performance, gender is not reliant on an essentialist notion of binary masculinity and
femininity tied to physiological makeup. However, Butler’s performance theory can also
be hostile towards transsexual gender identities because a free-floating notion of gender
challenges claims of a ‘true’ or ‘felt’ identity.

Kate Bornstein, in her book Gender Outlaw (1995), articulates a personal response to the myth of
the trans person trapped in the wrong body by noting, “I understand that many people may explain their
preoperative transgendered lives in this way, but I’ll bet that it’s more likely an unfortunate metaphor that
conveniently conforms to cultural expectations, rather than an honest reflection of our transgendered
feelings. As a people, w e’re short on metaphors, any metaphors, and when we find one that people
understand, we stop looking. It's time for transgendered people to look for new metaphors - new ways of
communicating our lives to people who are traditionally gendered” (1995, 66).
Butler makes use of the performative to discuss the production of gender. She argues that gender
is a reiterated performative process that begins with the act of pronouncing a child is “a boy” or “a girl”
(1999).
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The transsexual desire to live as men and women can, therefore, be seen to both
align with queer9 politics, and to fall short of it. If queering is understood as challenging
assumptions about hegemonic understandings of a fixed gender, then transsexuals queer
such understandings through their desire for congruence, and through their challenge to
the traditional associations of gender and sex as immutable. However, transsexuals may
also be seen as falling short of queer politics through their reliance on - or their inability
to transgress - the categories of sex and gender entirely.
Butler’s desire to understand gender as unstable, as always fluctuating, contradicts
a key component of the transsexual desire for alternative embodiment that is often
achieved through medical intervention. Sex reassignment surgery is not to be undertaken
lightly, and the real effects of it can be seen in the way the human body resists attempts at
changes to its materiality, particularly present in surgical recovery time. I argue that
Butler’s call to engage in gender play30 that undermines a sense of stable identity is
incompatible with efforts to attain extensive, and painful, sex reassignment surgery. The
same sense of gender play could be achieved through the ability to pass or shift between
signifying a sex (or no sex) by manipulating external presentations of the body.'^1

Annemarie Jagose articulates queer as: “those gestures o f analytical models which dramatise
incoherencies in the allegedly stable relations between chromosomal sex, gender, and sexual desire....
Institutionally, queer has been associated most prominently with lesbian and gay subjects, but its analytic
framework also includes such topics as cross-dressing, hermaphroditism (sic) gender ambiguity and
gender-corrective surgery. Whether as transvestite performance or academic deconstruction, queer locates
and exploits the incoherencies in those three terms which stabilise heterosexuality. Demonstrating the
impossibility o f any 'natural’ sexuality, it calls into question even such apparently unproblematic terms as
‘man’ and ‘woman’’’ (Jagose 3).
Gender play refers to instances or acts of gender bending or gender ambiguity that are often
intentional and deliberate. I comprehend gender play as similar to the notion of ‘genderfuck,’ viewed as an
intentional disruption o f gender norms achieved through manipulation of behavioural patterns or
performances.
In most situations, we do not expose our genitalia as a means of legitimizing our sexed subject
position when we come into contact with others. Rather, it is through secondary characteristics that we
present ourselves as possessing a certain identity. Such characteristics can include the (presentation of)
bodily manifestations such as breasts, hips, Adam’s apple, voice pitch, and/or outwardly and culturally
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Although some gender variant individuals are able to live manageable lives with unstable
gender identities, for many transsexuals, “the search for a gender home is paramount”
(Elliot 22).
Although Butler’s theory of gender as performance has been greatly influential, I
agree with Toril Moi’s suggestion that such arguments become increasingly abstract and
removed from specific bodies and their lived materiality. Moi laments the loss of the
body, or embodiment, in current discussions of the sex/gender binary, and she challenges
the usefulness of the concept of gender.32 Instead, Moi calls for the reconstitution of the
body through Beauvoir’s framework of lived experience (drawn from her understanding
of existential phenomenology) and the view of the lived body as a situation33 in order to
guard against biological reductionism or gender essentialism. Moi argues that the concept
of the lived body, while referring to specific physical attributes of the lived body34, does
not restrict theoretical discussions to a dimorphic categorization of sex or heterosexual
normativity. The lived body does not trap itself within the nature/culture argument with
which the sex/gender approach must contend because the body exists within a specific
socio-cultural structure and history. Moi writes,
[although our biology is fundamental to the way we live in the world,
biological facts alone give us no grounds for concluding anything at all
about the meaning and value they will have for the individual and for
society. At the same time, however, biological facts cannot be placed
outside the realm of meaning [emphasis in original] (Moi 69).

inscribed manifestations such as clothing, makeup and hair that are taken as external representations of the
perceived sexed body beneath.
Moi variously refers to gender as social norms, ideology, power and regulatory discourses.
The lived body as a situation refers to the materiality o f the individual's body in relation to
specific environments and culturally specific processes that ground the individual’s project (what s/he
wishes to achieve) (Moi, 65-66).
Here, Moi is referencing other markers o f differentiation- such as race - that alongside sex/gender
situate the body within an environment, but which are experienced by each individual differently and
which, therefore, escape abstract generalizations.
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I find Moi’s emphasis on the meanings accorded to bodies within society
significant and reflective of my own interest in gender systems. Although Moi questions
the usefulness of gender as an analytical category, I wish to retain it. The concept gender
remains useful for a discussion of discourses and social structures, and their connotations
for individuals. Gender can provide a way of speaking of social structures and their
normalizing processes. In order to retain gender as an analytical category, I propose to
incorporate Iris Marion Young’s approach to gender. Young maintains that gender is one
way of socially positioning lived bodies in relation to one another and within historically
specific institutions. Institutions, such as education and the law, may privilege and
provide benefits to some persons while constraining others. Young argues that such
institutions and social processes influence the way individuals act and reproduce power
relations (Young 422). Therefore, an individual’s subjectivity is comprised and
conditioned, in part, by socio-cultural facts and expectations beyond their control. At the
same time, the individual may act in response to such facts in their own manner (Young
418). In this manner, Young does not deny that each person “is a distinctive body, with
specific features, capacities, and desires, that are similar to and different from those of
others in determinate respects” (Young, 417).
The individual, and their body, is then comprised of both the very real materiality
of their existence and the social systems in which they exist. For trans persons the desire
to alter their bodies has real effects not only on individual bodies but also on how those
bodies are signified and read by others. Therefore, if the condition of transsexuality is
understood, in part, as the desire to live as a member of the “opposite” sex, sex
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reassignment surgery can be viewed as an attempt to address the body’s social position.35
The body is the site that is made to become congruent with an individual’s gender
identity through sex reassignment surgery. The confusion or disordered mode of being
associated with transsexualism arises from the individual’s behaviour that confronts
socially prescribed modes of being their sex. It is here that ambivalence regarding the
clinical diagnosis of Gender Identity Disorder (GID) emerges.36 By this ambivalence, I
mean that a clinical approach to GID must contend with an understanding of gender that
is - for the most part - static. The desire to physically transform from one sex to the other
takes for granted the underlying assumption that one gendered mode of being (masculine)
corresponds, naturally, to only one sexed body (the male). This desire to be “the opposite
sex” presupposes a mutually exclusive definition of what each sex is like. The question
remains whether sex reassignment surgery is envisioned as a policing tool for the
normative gender system, or as a tool that can be used strategically to transgress binary
understandings of sex and gender, or both.

Trans Voices
The desire to alter one’s body also affects how others perceive and read trans
bodies. The notion of “transgressing” binary understandings of sex and gender, therefore,
combines both actions on the parts of the trans person and the actions of others. Feminist
scholars, such as Judith Butler and Janice Raymond, have engaged in significant debate
about whether transsexuals “challenge” or “reinforce” gender norms, and there is a
The DSM states that adult subjects who suffer from GID may present preoccupations that manifest
as “an intense desire to adopt the social role of the other sex or to acquire the physical appearance of the
other sex through hormonal or surgical manipulation” (DSM-IV-TR, 2000). The DSM also outlines the
diagnostic features of GID in children and adolescents.
In Chapter Two, I examine in greater detail this ambivalence surrounding gender discomfort as a
potential disorder, and those issues surrounding a clinical diagnosis of gender variance as potentially
pathologizing.
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plurality of positions within trans scholarship and activism concerned with the topic of
“transgressing the gender binary”. In this section, I highlight some of the ongoing debates
between trans writers, including texts by Kate Bornstein, Riki Wilchins, Julia Serano and
Viviane Namaste. Not all trans writers agree about the expression of trans identity, and
how - or even whether - it challenges the traditional gender binary. There are particular
disagreements amongst those writers who advocate for transgender politics and the
disruption of gender as a system through the ambiguity or fluidity of gender expression
and identity, and those writers who wish to challenge the institutional framing of
transsexuals, including the dominant ways transgender scholarship presents transsexuals
and their desires.
In a response to Janice Raymond’s discussion of deception undertaken by
transsexuals Kate Borstein notes, “personally, I agree that hiding, and not proclaiming
one’s transsexual status is an unworthy stance, more heinous if one’s invisible status is
maintained with the purpose of gaining power” (1995, 76).

Such a sentiment - that of

“passing” and/or failing to highlight one’s transsexual status is unworthy - works to
regulate how transsexuals should live their lives. It is a judgment statement in alignment
with a particular transgender political cause, which may not be in agreement with how
some transsexuals wish to live their lives as men and women. As Julia Serano notes, “the
word ‘pass’ is used to shift the blame away from the majority group’s prejudice and
toward the minority person’s presumed motives and actions” (177). This definition of
passing explains why, upon discovery, those individuals who are able to “pass” are often
accused of “deception”. As well, such sentiments highlight one way of living as a trans

I would like to draw attention to the fact that not every trans person can (a) “pass” and (b) afford
to be “read” as a transsexual, or (c) want to outwardly identify as transsexual in every situation.
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person, with a particular emphasis placed on dismantling the dominant gender binary.
The desire to “shatter the gender binary” is described by some activists and theorists such as Bornstein - as the end goal of trans activism. Bornstein claims that lesbian and
gay men are also excluded by culture for their violations of gender codes - which occur
in the public domain in contrast to private sexual practices - and hence share a similar
stigma with transgendered people: “the stigma of crimes against gender” (1995, 134). In
order to overcome patriarchal oppression and permit a “true revolution of sex and
gender” (135), Bornstein calls for the reclamation of the word transgendered to be more
inclusive and to mean “transgressively gendered”; only then will there be a healthy-sized
“group of people who break the rules, codes, and shackles of gender” (135).
Although Riki Wilchins states in her book, Read My Lips (1997), that she is not
interested in being part of a transgender or transsexual movement based on identity
politics, she goes on to argue in Queer theory, Gender Theory (2004) that those people
who are most interested in the issues of gender expression and identity are transgendered:
Transpeople are still the only community who will readily identify the
problems around gender. Almost everyone else is too ashamed to do so, or
chooses to reinterpret issues with the gender system through sex or sexual
orientation. But for transpeople, having issues with gender is the basis for
common identity. Transpeople have no choice but to attack gender norms,
because their very existence is in itself a challenge to gender norms, no
matter how well they might visually conform to them (2004, 142).
However, both Julia Serano and Viviane Namaste argue that the belief that trans
experience and existence automatically functions to challenge gender is not universally
shared. In her 2007 book, Whipping Girl: A Transsexual Woman on Sexism and the
Scapegoating o f Femininity, Serano aims to debunk misconceptions about gender and
transsexual women by showing that trans persons are “ridiculed and dismissed not merely
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because [they] ‘transgress binary gender norms,’ as many transgender activists and
gender theorists have proposed, but rather because [they] ‘choose’ to be women rather
than men” (4). Serano proclaims the problematic nature of the sentiment that those who
reject gender are more politically progressive due to their more transgressive position as the most “gender-radical” - against other trans individuals who are comfortable within
more traditional genders. Such a view disparages those who fail to be seen as rejecting
traditional gender. As Serano notes, it becomes problematic
when we move beyond simply claiming that ‘transgressive’ genders are
just as legitimate as any other gender, and into the realm of arguing that
‘transgressive’ genders are better than ‘non-transgressive’ genders. In
other words, it is the value judgments often placed on ‘transgressive’
gender identities and expressions (rather than those specific identities and
expressions) that [she aims to critique in her work] (383n).
In exploring the history of gay rights movement in the 1970s, Serano focuses on the
emphasis that gay activists placed solely on sexual orientation.
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Serano positions the

narrowing of 1970s activism in the separation of “sexuality-queers” from “cross-gender
queers” (355). She views the queer and transgender movements that came into their own
in the 1990s as a response to the unified “sexuality-queers” of the previous mainstream
gay rights activism. However, Serano expresses concern with the trend within the
transgender/queer community'

to praise certain gender and sexual expressions and

identities based on their nonconformity (346). Serano refers to this trend as
“subversivism”. As a trans author, she argues
The more inclusive the word ‘transgender’ becomes, the more thoroughly
the voices of transsexuals and other cross-gender/cross-living individuals
Riki Wilchins also draws on the history of gay rights activism, and the historical separation
between “gayness” and gender. She argues, “Transcending gender stereotypes had always been a subtext
for gay rights” but gay rights advocates began to back away from issues o f gender, to the point that gender
is no longer discussed as a gay issue (2004, 21).
Serano specifically notes that this point o f view is not applicable to all queer/trans folks.
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are drowned out by those who do not share our perspectives and
experiences. This ‘cissexualization’ of transgenderism has taken a
devastating toll on the ability of transsexuals to articulate our own
perspectives and visions for gender activism. Rather than being listened to
and appreciated on our own terms, we are instead forced to adhere to
lesbian/gay rhetoric and values in order to have a voice within our own
community. One can see this ... in the way that queer theorists, ignorant
of their own cissexual privilege, nonconsensually ungender us (or blur the
distinctions between us and other queers) in order to artificialize genders;
claim that ‘all gender is drag’ without recognizing how dismissive that is
to the transsexual experience; and ignorantly apply the ‘gay rights’ tactic
of calling for the all-out demedicalization of transgenderism without
considering the effects this would have on transsexuals’ ability to access
and afford hormones and sex reassignment procedures (356).
Instead of focusing on “shattering the gender binary,” Serano argues for the challenging
of all forms of “gender entitlement, the privileging of one’s own perceptions,
interpretations, and evaluations of other people’s genders over the way those people
understand themselves” (emphasis in original, 359).
Similarly, Viviane Namaste disagrees with the strong emphasis placed on
transgender political activity within Anglo-American scholarship.
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Her work highlights

the shortcomings of feminist concerns with questions of identity, particularly those
questions about “whether or not transsexual women are women” (2005, 127). She argues
that many feminist and queer scholarship and political actions concerned with identity
fail to properly take note of transsexuals of colour by excluding racial and ethnocultural
diversity in their analysis. She writes, ’’when we restrict ourselves to the identity of sex
change, we simultaneously limit our understandings of social change” (2005, 19).
Namaste says that current feminist and queer scholarship and activism fail to consider
“the circumstances of the everyday lives and working conditions of most transsexual
prostitutes, prisoners, and drug users” (2005, 127). She proposes to move away from
Viviane Namaste is referencing the production of theory that takes place in English, and which is
dominantly located in the US, UK, English Canada and Australia.
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issues of identity and instead focus on institutional questions that frame transsexuals.
Namaste calls for a commitment to language requirements outside of English, which she
views as integral to both academic endeavours to gather, interpret, and analyze data, and
to ground-level engagement with communities and the offering of services in activist
work. She writes, “research that does not consider studies on transsexuals and
transvestites written in languages other than English misses important theoretical and
methodological insight concerning the everyday social world for [transgendertranssexual] people” (2000, 66). Specifically, she critiques queer theorists and
transgender theorists who reproach transsexuals for failing to challenge normative
gender, who are able to change sex and live undetected as transsexuals. She goes on to
argue,
it seems to me that on a very fundamental level, transsexuality is about
individuals who change our physical bodies because we want to move
through the world on all levels in a sex and gender other than the one
assigned to us at birth. Transsexuality is about the banality of buying some
bread, of making photocopies, of getting your shoe fixed. It is not about
challenging the binary sex/gender system, it is not about starting the
Gender Revolution (2005, 20).
Ultimately, this is what Namaste views the failure of identity debates to be. She
articulates a reality that she views affecting thousands of transsexuals who do not make
sense of their lives in a lesbian/gay framework. Namaste cites the works of Leslie
Feinberg, Kate Bornstein and Riki Ann Wilchins, noting “all three elaborate at great
length on the value of a coalition between lesbians/gays and the transsexual/transvestite
movement” (2005, 51). While a coalition is not, in and of itself, problematic, in
Namaste’s view it is a problem that lesbian (and gay) scholars come to “stand in for an
entire transsexual community” (2005, 51), particularly in the framework of transgender
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political activity within Anglo-American contexts (2000, 62).41 Drawing on her own
involvement and observations within transsexual communities, spanning over 10 years,
Namaste argues, “most transsexuals do not want to have any formal association with the
lesbian/gay communities” (2005, 51).
In addition to a lesbian/gay frame of reference, in Namaste’s view, “An additional
problem is that these debates actually prevent us from engaging in any kind of broad
social analysis of how [trans] lives are managed by institutions” (2005, 22). Namaste
presents the political works of Wilchins in relation to transgender bodies and identities
that are positioned in a broader process of social change, of a call to disrupt the
sex/gender binary. In Namaste’s view, Wilchins’s lobbying for the delisting of Gender
Identity Disorder from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders poses
problems for state/provincial or private insurance company funding for SRS (2005, 7-8).
Margrit Eichler42 views the allocation of resources - such as medical personnel’s
limited time and expert training, and hospital and clinic resources - towards reassignment
surgeries in the twentieth century as indicative of Western culture’s “extreme intolerance
of sexual ambiguity” (Eichler 281). Eichler sees this as suggestive of the acceptance of
dominant sex role ideology. Indeed, a reliance on sex-appropriate behavior, of limited
legitimated forms of femininities and masculinities, contributes to transsexual
individual’s understanding of appropriate behaviour. At the heart of Eichler’s
Similarly, Henry Rubin contends that the majority of Anglo-American scholarship promotes
transgendered people aligned with queer politics or who define themselves as queer. Such an action works
to exude those transgendered or transsexual people whom identity as otherwise, such as heterosexual FTM
or MTF transsexuals. “Queer appropriations and the new movement among some transgenders to resignify
themselves in a queer registrar carry an implicit critique of transsexuals who choose not to queer their
identities” (1998, 276).
Eichler is currently with the Department o f Sociology and Equity Studies in Education, at the
Ontario Institute for Studies in Education/University o f Toronto. Her work focuses on the examination of
the arbitrariness of sex and gender dichotomies. She views sex reassignment surgery as a medical way of
supporting the traditional gender role dichotomy.

39

conceptualization of sex reassignment surgery is the association of certain behaviours and
character traits with specific anatomical manifestations. She views sex reassignment
surgery as a way for the individual to bring their body in alignment with their preferred
behaviour patterns. If certain sets of behaviours are restricted for certain bodies, and if the
individual wishes to continue to act in way that is not congruent with their sexed body,
the body is made to align with the desired set of behaviours.
Medical support for sex reassignment surgery, Eichler argues, shows us that
physicians agree that certain behaviour patterns are appropriate only for a member of one
sex and not the other. She writes,
Performing the operation ... reinforce[s] the idea that behavior and
character traits are legitimately determined by one’s body, in the face of
the evidence that suggests that our sex identity is imposed on a sexually
largely or entirely undifferentiated character structure and that, therefore,
sex identity is a social rather than a biological product (Eichler 289).
For Eichler, there is a logic in the patient and physician approach to surgery, which reads
as follows: If gendered characteristics and patterns of behaviour are viewed as being
determined by biological sex, it follows that in instances in which biological sex and
gender identities are not congruent, biological sex must be altered in order to uphold
accepted modes of behaviour. In her view, existing power relations (what Eichler calls
“social pathology”) are able to overcome threats to its (ideological/discursive) dominance
by treating transsexualism not as the result of the imposition of restrictive sex structures
but by treating transsexualism as individualized.
I approach sex reassignment surgery from a less cynical perspective. I agree with
Eichler that a gender system that monitors and restricts gender behaviour is highly
problematic. I also acknowledge that reassignment procedures remain contentious due to
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its very real effects on bodies. As a medical procedure sex reassignment surgery should
not be undertaken lightly. Caring and committed medical staff must be involved. As I
discuss in greater detail in the following chapter, I believe that the clinical diagnosis of
Gender Identity Disorder presents more challenges than the procedures of sex
reassignment surgery, in part because the categorization of Gender Identity Disorder
presupposes normative gender practices and behaviours and can function to identify
gender variant practices and identity as disorders.43 I do not wish to romanticize the
difficult process of attaining access to sex reassignment surgery, nor do I think all gender
clinics and regulatory bodies are free of harmful components. As Vancouver-based
psychotherapist Christopher Shelley notes, although some gender clinic personnel are
trans advocates, others can, and have at times, been complicit in regulating or gate
keeping access to treatment and surgeries based on an essentialist view of “authentic”
gender performances or a personal aim to produce conformity to “acceptable norms” (4).
Shelley outlines a range of four positions for those upholding the aims of normative
adjustment. First, there is an “outright denial of the authenticity of all claims to being
mis-sexed and an associated rejection of sexual reassignment surgery” (Shelley 4).
Patients are expected to conform to their assigned birth sex. Second, there is a willingness
to accede to the idea that sex reassignment surgery is the only solution for individuals
with persistent “delusions” about being mis-sexed. Third, there is a “parsimonious
acceptance that a small number of subjects are genuinely mis-sexed, with authorization of
SRS contingent on the patient’s agreement to cross into stereotypical sex/gender
conformity”, and finally, an acceptance of the legitimacy of transsexual claims to being

Alternatively, I view the procedures of sex reassignment surgery as attempts to alleviate psycho
social pain.
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mis-sexed, “accompanied by rejection of TG [transgender] requests for partial surgeries
or hormone treatment alone, eliminating acceptance of border-crossing and in-between
ness as legitimate” (Shelley 4-5). Here, there is a binary that plays out in which the
clinician is the “sane” expert, capable of curing the “insane” deviant. Indeed, attempts to
either discontinue treatment full stop, to regulate access based on the assumption that
certain individuals can better “pass” in their desired gender, or to proceed with the notion
that anyone who requests sex reassignment surgery be granted access all pose ethical
concerns.
In my next chapter, I examine in greater detail the clinical definition of Gender
Identity Disorder and highlight key problematic components of a medical diagnosis of
gender dysphoria. I explore arguments for the continuation of SRS alongside calls for the
reformulation of the GID diagnostic criteria in medical discourses. As well, I examine the
contribution of Canadian legal cases, alongside medical discourses, in constructing and
reflecting an official discourse on transsexuality. Finally, I comment on the results from
Phase I of the Trans PULSE Project to indicate sites of informational and institutional
erasure with regards to trans health issues.
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2. Expert Knowledge and Cissexual Privilege: The Legalization and Medicalization
of Trans Identity
“It is not enough to claim that human subjects are constructed, for the
construction of the human is a differential operation that produces the more and
the less ‘human’, the inhuman, the humanly unthinkable” - Judith Butler 1993, 8
We are able to speak of the ‘pathological ’ only in relation to a pre-established
‘normal’: “Every conception of pathology must be based on prior knowledge of the
corresponding normal state, which is, inevitably, value-laden ” - George Canguilhem, 51
In this Chapter, I consider three intersecting fields of expertise related to
transsexuality. These three forms of discourse are an essential component of the ways we
think of the relationship between sex/gender and transsexuality. These discourses reflect,
produce and disseminate knowledge and truth about transsexuality and sex reassignment
surgery. In the next two chapters, I build the argument that medical and legal discourses
intersect to legitimate one another, and, that such discourses become re-inscribed in news
media coverage of transsexuality. In this chapter, I examine the Canadian legal discourses
that regulate transsexual subjects in relation to national and provincial systems and take
civil marriage as a case study; the medical discourses as outlined by the American
Psychiatric Association’s Gender Identity Disorder diagnosis in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM); and the Trans PULSE Project44 currently
underway across Ontario. These official legal and medical discourses intersect, inform
and work together to provide an understanding of transsexuality and sex reassignment
surgery that is taken up by the four Canadian newspapers examined in the next chapter:
The Globe and Mail, National Post, The Toronto Star and Toronto Sun. In this chapter, I

The Trans PULSE Project is a comprehensive project aimed at documenting the lived experiences
o f trans people in Ontario. The purpose of the Trans PULSE Project is aimed at “Promoting health and
wellness in trans communities through Understanding our diverse experiences and Lives and using this
knowledge to help improve the health of trans communities through better Services and genuine Equality”
(emphasis added, Trans Pulse n. p.).

43

maintain that trans individuals wishing to have their affirmed subject position
acknowledged by the Ontario government must submit themselves to a medicalized
system by first receiving acknowledgment of their gender dysphoria by being diagnosed
with Gender Identity Disorder, then through the approval for sex reassignment surgery by
the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH), and finally the submission of proof
of transition to the Registrar General before attaining recognition. Trans individuals are
hence often thought of in medicalized terms. While access to health care remains only
one aspect of transsexual lived experiences, it remains a significant factor. As the
research conducted by the Trans PULSE Project aims to highlight, the social
determinants of health and health care remain of significant concern within the trans
community. The research conducted by the Trans PULSE Project and the results from
Phase I of the project (published Sep/Oct 2009) highlight sites of trans erasure. As
Viviane K. Namaste notes, “erasure is a defining condition of how transsexuality is
managed in culture and institutions, a condition that ultimately inscribes transsexuality as
impossible” (Namaste 4-5). Erasure, therefore, influences experiences with health care
and other service systems wherein the trans individual is seen as an anomaly as the result
of informational and institutional erasure (Bauer et al. 2009, 348).
Before an examination of the legal and medical discourses can take place, it is
important to return to the concept of discourse. Foucauldian discourse can be thought of
as a field in which possible statements about a given topic, area or object can be produced
and become known. As a system of representation, discourse has the power to convey
meanings about a given topic, allowing - or excluding - particular ways of speaking or
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thinking at a given historical period (Cheek 1142).45 Discourse “influences how ideas are
put into practice and used to regulate the conduct of others” (S. Hall 72). It is in this
manner that discourses determine who can speak, when they can speak, and with how
much authority. In The Archaeology o f Knowledge, Foucault writes: “Medical statements
cannot come from anybody; their value, efficacy, even their therapeutic power, and,
generally speaking, their existence as medical statements cannot be dissociated from the
statutorily defined person who has the right to make them” (2005, 56). Those who are
deemed experts have the ability to speak of truths (Foucault 2005). Health care
professionals - such as psychiatrists, psychologists and other mental health care providers
- demonstrate this aspect of discourse through the authority they assume in speaking
from an expert position about trans-related health concerns. The authority accorded to
health care professionals reflects the effects of power, which constitutes itself through
knowledge (Cheek 1143; S. Hall 77). Power enables particular knowledge to be produced
or constrained, as well as the creation of new discourses and discursive regimes;
understood otherwise, power can shape what a society “knows” as truth.
The types of gendered expressions and behaviours that are taken to be natural or
normal provide us with glimpses of truth about gender. Gender permeates our structured
world in a variety of ways, influencing legal definitions, medical concepts and
childrearing patterns. In contemporary Canadian culture, it is taken as natural that a male
45
In The History o f Sexuality: Volume 1, Foucault explores how ‘the homosexual’ as a specific kind
of subject was produced through fields of expert knowledge in the nineteenth century. Foucault writes:
“The nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in
addition to being a type o f life, a life form, and a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a
mysterious physiology. Nothing that went into his (sic) total composition was unaffected by his
sexuality.... It was consubstantial with him, less as a habitual sin than as a singular nature.... The sodomite
had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species” (1990, 43). A similar argument can
be put forth for the creation o f the transsexual as a specific kind of subject during the early twentieth
century within psychoanalytical theory, and with advancements in endocrinological science and surgical
procedures.
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body should only signify a masculine gendered identity (and that a female body only
signifies a feminine one). This naturalized understanding of gender is conceived as
‘authentic’ against alternative modes of enacting gender. Understood otherwise, the body
functions as a point of reference, which is used to signify the unspoken privilege granted
to those “coherent” bodies that are easily read and identified based on the coherency of
their gender presentation and assumed sexed materiality. In other words, coherency is
comprehended to reside through the body and the social signifiers that communicate
cohesiveness. This coherency is attained partly in contrast to groups of individuals who
do not conform to established patterns (Rottnek 4).
As Talia Mae Bettcher notes, gender presentation is “taken as a sign of sexed
body, taken to mean sexed body, taken to communicate sexed body” (emphasis in
original, 52). Individuals whose gender presentation appears ambiguous, who engage in
cross-sex or gender non-conformist expressions and behaviours, are denied the status of
full humanity granted to those who experience life in accordance to cisnormativity46 - the
belief that trans bodies and identities are unnatural or less authentic - and who are
encompassed within the paradigm of cissexual privilege. Cissexual privilege thus refers
to the taken-for-granted ways in which society grants legitimacy to cis people (non
transsexuals) in social and legal spheres.
The denial of full humanity can be seen in the ways that parents and medical
personnel attempt to regulate gender variant behaviour and expression through the
medical category of Gender Identity Disorder (GID). Canadian mental health
professionals (including psychiatrists and psychologists) and social workers - among

I use ‘cisnormativity’ to draw attention to those expressions and behaviours that are taken to be
natural.
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other health care providers - use the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) as a common nomenclature for the
diagnosis of emotional or psychological diseases and illnesses.47 The GID diagnosis in
the DSM complicates our understanding of trans- identities and sex/gender because of the
ways in which it situates non-cissexual and non-traditional gender identities as
disordered. I return to a more detailed examination of the GID diagnostic criteria below.
The GID diagnosis is also used by medical personnel to authorize access to
medical options such as therapy, hormone treatments and surgeries, which the Canadian
legal system then employs, in part, as required proof for change of sex designations.
Canadian law requires individuals to fit within the definitions and parameters that define
its rule. Such definitions and parameters are structured with an unchanging, static
narrative of the self in mind. Therefore, legal attempts at changing the biographical
narrative of the self, such as a change of sex designation, can prove challenging. In
particular, sex designation plays an important role in jurisdictions that define marriage
strictly in a heterosexual manner, as between one ‘woman’ and one ‘man’.
In the following section, I outline the historical importance of determining sex
designation for marriages in Ontario prior to the passing of the 2005 Bill C-38, the Civil
Marriage Act. This federal decision radically altered the discursive landscape of marriage
in Canada, and is an example of the intersection that exists between trans and gay rights.
Considering the conflation of gender, sex and sexuality that often occurs in discussions of
marriage and civil rights, the definition of civil marriage must take into account both
issues of queer and trans rights. I do not wish to draw an arbitrary line between queer
In Europe, the World Health Organization’s International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10) is
more commonly used. Under section F64 - Gender identity disorders, the ICD retains the term
‘transsexualism’ (F64.0) and ‘Gender identity disorder of childhood’ (F64.2) (ICD-10, ch. 5, F-64).
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and trans activism - in fact, I maintain that there is significant crossover between the two
categories and a strict binary delineation is unattainable, and perhaps even undesirable.

Legal Implications of Defining “Sex”: Marriage Prior to Bill C-38, a Case Study
Transsexual individuals are implicated in jurisdictions where civil marriage is
conceptualized as legal only between heterosexual partners (defined by a sex designation
at the time of birth). I make use of the historical debates within Canada surrounding
same-sex marriage rights to highlight how transsexual individuals are influenced by legal
discourses concerned with a definition of marriage. The issue of marriage serves as an
accessible example of the consequences legal approaches to sex/gender have for
Canadians - including trans Canadians - as civil marriage laws are applicable to anyone
who lives, or decides to get married, in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration n. p.).
Through an examination of marriage prior to Bill C-38, it is possible to explore the
ongoing Canadian approach to both queer and trans rights.
Let us then suspend for the moment the current Canadian legal recognition for
marriage as between two persons, regardless of their sexual orientation or birth-sex
designation. If the courts understand sex as an unchanging biological fact, marriage may
be denied to a transsexual individual based on the makeup of the relationship. If, for
example, the partnership is considered a same-sex union prior to a partner’s transition, a
marriage license may be denied; however, if the post-opt sex of the transsexual partner is
accepted as their legal sex, wherein the new legal sex of the transsexual would not result
in a same-sex union, a court might find such a union to be legally recognizable. If a
partner in a marriage makes the decision to transition - thereby causing the status of the
relationship to change from different-sex to same-sex - the marriage might be void for
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the purposes of divorce or family law. Therefore, how the courts approach the issue of
civil marriage and how they legally define the sex and gender of a trans- individual - i.e.
whether a post-opt transsexual is recognized in their new sex/gender - will impact
whether a previous marriage is annulled, or a future marriage is recognized by the
government. This recognition or denial also impacts the legal benefits accorded to the
individual, to the couple or, in the case of separation.
In Canada, sections VI. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 to 1982, configure
the distribution of legislative powers. The Act designates s. 91(26) Marriage and Divorce
under the exclusive legislative authority of parliament, with s. 92(12) Solemnization of
Marriage under the exclusive powers of provincial legislatures. Therefore, under the
Constitution of Canada, the legal capacity for civil marriage falls under the rule of the
federal government.
Under Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, the Canadian government referred draft
marriage legislation48 to the Supreme Court of Canada in July 2003. The draft bill
proposed a definition of marriage not reliant on opposite-sex designations and addressed
the issue of religious freedom. The government requested that the Court consider
whether:
(1) the draft bill fell within Parliament’s exclusive legislative authority; (2)
the bill’s extension of the capacity to marry to persons of the same sex was
consistent with the Charter; and (3) the Charter’s freedom of religion
guarantee shielded religious officials from being forced to perform samesex marriages contrary to their religious beliefs (Hurley, n. p.).49
Proposal for an Act respecting certain aspects of legal capacity for marriage for civil purposes,
Order in Council P.C. 2003-1055, Preamble, ss.1,2. ("Proposed Act").
Later, an additional fourth question was put to the Supreme Court: “4. Is the opposite-sex
requirement for marriage for civil purposes, as established by the common law and set out for Québec in
section 5 of the Federal Law -C ivil Law Harmonization Act, No. 1, consistent with the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms'? If not, in what particular or particulars and to what extent?” The Court exercised its
discretion to not to answer Question 4 (Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, 2004 SCC
79).
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The 9 December 2004 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada (Re Same-Sex Marriage)
upheld that the draft bill was within Parliament’s exclusive legislative authority over
legal capacity for civil marriage, that same-sex marriage was consistent with the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and that religious freedom for religious
officials would not be compromised under subsection 2(a) of the Charter (Hurley n. p.).
Bill C-38, or the Civil Marriage Act (based on the 2004 draft bill), was first read
in the House of Commons on 1 February 2005, and reached Royal Assent on 20 July as
Chapter 33 of the Statues of Canada for 2005. The bill codifies, for the first time, a
definition of marriage in Canadian law.50 It expands on traditional common-law
understanding of civil marriage reliant on heterosexual partnering, defining civil marriage
as ‘“the lawful union of two persons to the exclusion of all others,’ thus extending civil
marriage to conjugal couples of the same sex” (Hurley n. p.).
Prior to the Civil Marriage Act and without a statutory definition of marriage, the
two leading cases in Canadian law (prior to 200151) concerned with same-sex marriage
turned to British precedents. The first is the 1866 British ruling in Hyde v. Hyde and
Woodmaitsee, which concerned whether a man could obtain a divorce from his wife in
As well, “the Civil Marriage Act, S.C 2005, c. 33, amended s. 2(1) of the Divorce Act to redefine
spouse as "either o f two persons who are married to each other’ rather than ‘either of a man or woman who
are married to each other’. It also amended several other federal statutes. In February 2005, the Ontario
legislature passed the Spousal Relationships Statue Law Amendment Act, 2005. It amended numerous
provincial statues in light of the recognition o f same-sex marriages” (Hovius and Maur 95, en. 4).
Between 2001 and 2005, 11 of 12 provincial and territorial courts to have considered Charter
challenges dealing with same-sex marriage reworked the traditional common-law definition of marriage
between opposite-sex persons. In July 2002, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Divisional Court) found
that the [then] common law definition of marriage defined between one ‘man’ and one ‘woman’, was in
violation o f section 15 o f the Canadian Charter o f Rights and Freedoms. The 10 June 2003 unanimous
decision of the Court o f Appeal for Ontario in Halpern v. Canada, [2003] O.J. No. 2268, upheld the
Divisional Court’s decision (Halpern v. Canada (Attorney General) (2003), 36 R.F.L. (5th) 127 (Ont. C.A.),
affirming [2002] O.J. No. 2714 (Q.L.), (Ont. Sup. Ct. Justice (Div. Ct.)). Legislators in British Columbia,
Québec. Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Newfoundland and Labrador, Yukon, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia,
also enacted a wide range o f legislative measures relating to same-sex entitlements prior to the passing of
Bill C-38.
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England on the grounds of adultery. The petitioner and respondent were married in a
Mormon ceremony in Salt Lake City in 1853, where polygamy was part of the Mormon
doctrine. After three years the husband left Utah, and was subsequently excommunicated
by the Church, thereby allowing the wife to remarry. The petitioner's request in the
English Court for a dissolution of the marriage based on adultery was denied on the
grounds that the marriage had taken place in a country where polygamous relationships
were accepted, but which was not accepted as a valid marriage under English (Christian)
matrimonial Courts (Mossman 85; Hyde v. Hyde & Woodmansee (1866), L.R. 1 P&D
130). In relation to polygamy, Lord Penzance of the English Court defined the institution
of marriage “as understood in Christendom, ... as the voluntary union for life of one man
and one woman, to the exclusion of all others” (Hurley n. p.). The Court’s decision in
Hyde, in particular Lord Penzance’s statement, has been cited as the precedent for the
requirement of heterosexuality for a valid marriage in Canada (Hurley n. p.).
The second British precedent is 1970 British decision in Corbett v. Corbett, which
concerned the validity of a marriage between April Corbett, a male-to-female (MtF)
woman, and her husband Arthur Corbett. Arthur Corbett sought to annul the marriage on
the grounds of “non-consummation” (Mossman 110). The court decided that the marriage
was void because April Corbett was categorized as a man for the purpose of marriage,
based on a three-point test using chromosomal, gonadal and genital features at the time of
birth. This view of sex as fixed at birth removed the possibility of a change of designation
through alternations by medical and surgical means (Whittle 1998, 49).“ The court

Stephen Whittle problematizes the case further by noting that the judgment o f Ormrod LJ “mixed
the notions of ‘male and female’ with those of 'man and woman’. For example, [Ormrod LJ] states in
conclusion... ‘the respondent is not a woman for the purposes of marriage but is a biological male and has
been so since birth’ (Corbett at 49)” (Whittle 1998, 50).
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determined that as marriage is a heterosexual union, biological sex is an “essential
determinant of the relationship called marriage” (Corbett v. Corbett (otherwise Ashley),
[1970] 2 All E.R. 33, p. 48 (P.D.A.)). The court’s decision in Corbett v. Corbett has been
followed until recently in numerous common law jurisdictions, in South Africa, the
United States, and Europe, among others.53 As Greenberg points out, “[l]egal institutions
must explore whether the law should continue to rely on traditional sex criteria such as
chromosomes, genitalia, and gonads to define a person’s legal sex or whether these
factors should be subordinated to self-identified sex” (Greenberg 63).54
In two Canadian cases, C.(L.) v. C.(C.) (1992) and B. v. A. (1990), Ontario courts
following the doctrine in Corbett v. Corbett (1970), ruled that FtM transsexuals were held
to not be spouses/husbands for the purposes of marriage and family law, if hysterectomy
and bilateral mastectomy were the only SRS procedures undertaken (Whittle 1996).55 In
C.(L.) v. C.(C.) (1992), 10 O.R. (3d) 254, a woman applied for her marriage to be
annulled on the grounds that the applicant had married her partner after she had
undergone hormonal treatment, a hysterectomy and mastectomy, but had not followed
through with the planned genital reconstructive surgery as promised to the applicant.
“The courts held that the parties were both female at the time of the marriage, so that it
was a nullity” (Mossman 112-113).

In recent years, courts in Australia have rejected the English decision in Corbett v. Corbett
([ 1970]2 WLR 1306). The Australian courts “have rejected the notion that ‘sex is determined at birth' in
favour of a story o f ‘psychological and anatomical harmony’ whereby transsexual persons who have
undergone sex reassignment surgery have been granted legal recognition” (Sharpe 1998, 28).
An alternative, but relevant question to ask concerns the very necessity of sex designation
requirements on legal documentations.
The applicants were held to not be spouses/husbands for the purposes of marriage and family,
though the surgeries undertaken qualified them as men for other purposes, such as legal name changes
(Whittle 1998, 52).
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In B. v. A. (1990), an Ontario court refused to grant a motion of spousal support
even though the parties had lived together for 20 years. The court deemed that although
the female-to-male partner had changed birth records from female to male, the
requirements for surgery of the Registrar General were not the same in deciding if the
relationship was of husband and wife (Whittle 1996, n. p.). The court stated that surgery
must be irreversible for the purposes of financial support under the Family Law Act. As
the applicant had not had what the court defined to be “radical and irreversible surgical
intervention with all the fundamental reproductive organs, more than their simple
removal, and independent of exterior continuing circumstances” (B. v. A. (1990), 29
R.F.L. (3d) 258 (Ont. Master)), the court expressed concern with the potential for a
reversal in gender expression (to female) should B cease taking hormones. “Since B's
genitalia have not been altered and B would revert to a female appearance without
continuing hormone therapy, B is not a ‘man’ within the meaning of the Family Law Act,
1986” (fi. v. A. (1990), 29 R.F.L. (3d) 258 (Ont. Master)). Here, the absence or presence
of phalloplastic surgery is upheld to determine the sex designation requirement for
understanding a conjugal relationship between a (otherwise coherent) man and woman.
This ruling is reflective of traditional jurisprudence that requires individuals to be
classified into a binary categorization on the basis of sex. Court rulings and legislation
that makes use of the term sex (male/female) rely on an implicit assumption that only two
biological sexes exist. Stemming from this is also the assumption that individuals fit
neatly into one or the other of these two categories.56 However, a variety of factors -

John Money and Patricia Tucker write: “The assumption is that there are two separate roads, one
leading from XY chromosomes at conception to manhood, the other from XX chromosomes at conception
to womanhood. The fact is that there are not two roads, but one road with a number of forks that turn in the
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biological, social and self-proclaimed - must be considered and contribute to the process
of defining an individual as male or female in legal documents.57 Sex reassignment
surgery often plays a role as a requirement for gender recognition for those requesting a
change of sex designation on legal documents. As the ruling in B. v. A. (1990) indicates,
however, even within legal discourses what qualifies as sex reassignment surgery remains
contested. In Ontario, documented proof of sex reassignment surgery is required for the
Registrar General to make alterations to birth certificates (and subsequent legal
documentations). Below, I examine the requirements for such amendment requests as set
out under the Ontario Vital Statics Act (1990).

Obtaining Change of Sex Designation: The Ontario Vital Statistics Act
Ontario’s Vital Statistics Act (R.S.O. 1990, c. V. 4, s. 36), allows for amendments
to be made on the registration of birth regarding the sex designation. Section 36 (1) —
“Changes Resulting from Transsexual Surgery” (Appendix A) - of the Act notes:
Where the anatomical sex structure of a person is changed to a sex other
than that which appears on the registration of birth, the person may apply
to the Registrar General to have the designation of sex on the registration
of birth changed so that the designation will be consistent with the results
of the transsexual surgery.
Subsection (2) notes that an application made under subsection (1) must be accompanied
by three requirements. Clause 2 (a) requires a certificate signed by a medical practitioner

male or female direction. Most of us turn in the same direction at each fork” (quoted in Greenberg 55 original in: Sexual Signatures: On being a man or a woman Boston: Little, Brown, 1975, 6).
Some of the biological and social factors include chromosomal sex, gonadal sex, external genitalia
or morphologic sex, internal morphologic sex, phenotype sex, assigned sex, and self-identified sex. For
many people, these factors are all congruent, therefore the assumption that the terms ‘male’ and ‘female’
are fixed and unambiguous prevails even when medical literature has shown this to be false. Melanie
Blackless et al. conducted a recent survey of the medical literature from the second half of the twentieth
century. The authors estimate that approximately 2 percent of live births may be intersex, with individuals
displaying either ambiguous or non-congruent sex features, or who otherwise deviate from the sexually
dimorphic norm.
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who performed the “transsexual surgery”, certifying their role, and the results of the
surgery for the designation of sex change on the registration of birth of the applicant.
Clause 2 (b) calls for a certificate of a medical practitioner who did not perform the
transsexual surgery certifying that he or she has examined the applicant and that the
results of the examination substantiate that transsexual surgery was performed upon the
applicant. The secondary medical practitioner must also indicate that due to the results of
the surgery, the designation of the sex of the applicant should be changed on the
registration of birth of the applicant. Finally, under clause 2 (c), evidence supporting the
identity of the applicant must be provided to the Registrar General (Vital Statistics Act
(R.S.O. 1990, c. V. 4, s. 36)).58
The Act notes that birth certificates issued after notation under this section will be
issued “as if the original registration of birth had been made showing the [changed]
designation of sex” (Vital Statistics Act (R.S.O. 1990, c. V. 4, s. 36)). The reissued birth
certificate can then be used to apply for amendments to be made to other legal
documents, such as an application to change a legal name, or to attain other government
issued identifications such as an Ontario Health Insurance Policy (OHIP) card59.
Though the Vital Statistics Act (1990) adopts recognition for post-operative
individuals, it remains unclear what constitutes transsexual surgery under the Act.
Transsexual surgery may or may not include hormone therapy, the removal of internal

The Act also outlines alternate medical evidence that can be submitted in the event that it is not
possible to obtain the medical certificate referred to in clause 2 (a) or (b).
Changes to the sex designation on official health-related documents, such as OHIP cards, continue
to impact the type of health care provided to the patient. Bauer et al. note that billing systems in
jurisdictions such as Ontario are often “set up with an assumption of concordance between listed sex and
body parts and allow billing for sex-specific procedures only to individuals of that designated sex” (Bauer
et al. 2009, 355).
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reproductive organs (hysterectomy and ovariectomy60), mastectomy61, phalloplasty62 or
metoidoioplasty63, among other surgeries for trans men. Similarly, transsexual surgery
may or may not include hormone therapy, orchiectomy64, or vaginoplasty65, among other
surgeries for trans women. As such, the ‘sex reassignment surgery’ requirement may
cause inconsistency and unpredictability in its application (Tobin 415).

, ____

Additionally, the medical certificates required under the Vital Statistics Act
(R.S.O. 1990, c. V. 4, s. 36) are reflective of the reliance on medical expertise to give
recognition and validity to trans bodies. As Sally Hines writes, “[o]ne way of gaining
social recognition is through the sanction of the ‘expert’. Thus, the construction of a
transgender identity frequently relies upon medical intervention” (2007, 58). The overt
reliance on a medical model of care, with expert knowledge and approval, depends on a
cissexual system that conceives of ‘gender dysphoria’ as problematic and in need of the
appropriate ‘treatment’. Hines continues by noting, “A diagnosis of ‘gender dysphoria’
enables access to surgery, which is understood within medical discourse and practice as
the appropriate ‘treatment’ for ‘gender dysphoria’” (2007, 169). Surgery can then be used
to apply for legal recognition of the individual under a new sex designation. It is this

Hysterectomy is the surgical removal of the uterus, while ovariectomy is the surgical removal of
the ovaries.
61
Mastectomy is the surgical removal of the breasts.
Phalloplasty refers to surgical techniques for penile reconstruction. There does not exist one single
ideal surgical technique for phalloplasty, and the results may vary greatly (Sohn and Boniski 1201-1208).
Metoidoioplasty involves the creation of a neopenis from the clitoris through the effects of
androgen hormone treatment. The enlarged clitoris is released from its position and can serve as a penis.
Sohn and Boniski note that metoidoioplasty remains “the method of choice in FM-TS patients who are in
doubt about their need for phalloplasty” (1201).
Orchiectomy is the removal of the testes.
The surgical procedure(s) to create the neovaginal cavity outlined under the term vaginoplasty can
involve the amputation o f the penis, the creation of the neovaginal cavity, lining of this cavity, the
reconstruction of the urethral meatus to control the direction of the urinary stream, and the construction of
labia and clitoris.
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“seizing” on the body, as Butler (2001) argues, that aims to bring the inconceivable into
alignment with a socially coherent, normative vision of gender.
As my examination of the historical influence of sex designation upon civil
marriage in Canada reveals, trans and queer issues often overlap and inform each other.
This overlap is also apparent in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mentnt
Disorders (DSM) published by the American Psychiatric Association (APA). Although
the Board of Trustees of the APA voted, in 1973, to delete homosexuality as a mental
disorder from the seventh printing of the DSM-II (K. Wilson 1998, n. p.), both sexual
orientation and gender identity share similar elements, such as social stigma, perceptions
of distress, disadvantage and disability. I will first briefly outline the removal of
homosexuality as a disorder before moving onto my examination of the problematic
nature of the Gender Identity Disorder diagnosis in the DSM. Prior to its removal,
homosexuality was seen as being an inherent impairment. As I argue below, the GID
diagnosis raises similar concerns previously leveled against the diagnosis of
homosexuality.

The DSM: From Homosexuality to Gender Identity Disorder
By the mid-twentieth century, homosexuality was seen as innately pathological,
with distress and impairment inherent within the classification itself. Otherwise stated,
homosexuality itself was seen as an impairment causing distress, instead of the
understanding that an intolerant social structure causes the impairment and distress
experienced by homosexuals. “This conclusion followed two basic threads: that deviance
from what was presumed biologically natural constituted disability, and that
homosexuality was inevitably associated with other pathologies” (K. Wilson 1998, n. p.).

57

The deletion of homosexuality in 1973 presents the rejection of an inherent distress and
impairment associated with being homosexual. However, the same issues continue to
plague transvestic fetishism (which I am unable to explore here but which is defined as
distress or impairment felt by heterosexual males based on sexual arousal from cross
dressing66) and gender identity disorder. With the DSM-IV (1994), the APA decided to
merge the previous diagnosis (in DSM-III-R APA, 1987) of Transsexualism with the
diagnosis of Gender Identity Disorder of Childhood (GIDC) and Gender Identity
Disorder of Adolescent or Adulthood, Nontranssexual Type (GIDAANT) into one
diagnosis: Gender Identity Disorder (GID), with specifications as to “in children” or “in
adolescents or adults” (Pleak 35; K. Wilson 1998, n. p.).
Katharine K. Wilson notes that due to broad criticism of psychiatric classification
(refer to Thomas Szasz 1961) the definition of mental disorder in the DSM-IV (APA
1994, xxi) placed distress and impairment67 central, with the addition of a clinical
significance criterion (Table 1, Criterion D) added to the diagnostic criteria for all Sexual
and Gender Identity disorders. The DSM-IV outlines the definition of “mental disorder”
as follows:
In the DSM-IV, each of the mental disorders is conceptualized as a
clinically significant behavior or psychological syndrome or pattern that
occurs in an individual and that is associated with present distress (e.g., a
painful symptom) or disability (i.e., impairment in one or more important
areas of functioning) or with a significantly increased risk of suffering
death, pain, disability, or an important loss of freedom (APA 1994).

Refer to Ray Blanchard (2010).
It remains that specific definitions of distress and impairment (in one or more important areas of
functioning) are not provided in the diagnosis. However, relationship difficulties and impaired function at
school or work are listed as examples of distress and disability in the supporting text (DSM-TV-TR 577).
Katherine K. Wilson notes that no reference is made here to the role of societal prejudice as the cause of
such distress (K. Wilson n. p.).
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The formulation of the GID diagnosis, places significant emphasis on gender identity and
expression that differs from assigned birth sex as inherently disordered. This
pathologization of nonconformity to assigned birth sex disregards the definition of mental
disorder associated with distress and impairment. The focus on gender nonconformity,
particularly identification with the “other sex”, is problematic as it does not take into
consideration the happiness of the individual with that identification. For example, many
adults are capable of living gender-unconventional lives without experiencing a
significant sense of unhappiness or distress. The GID diagnosis assumes that gender
dysphoria is symptomatic of mental illness, that femininity expressed by males and
masculinity expressed by females is pathological. However, ‘deviant’ gender behaviour
should not necessarily be conflated with a distressed mode of being dysphoric. As well,
distress and impairment experienced can be the result of stigma, or social prejudice,
which is not made clear in the diagnosis.
I believe the clinical approach to gender identity disorder functions with several
implicit assumptions. First, there is an understanding of gender that is, for the most part,
static. The adolescent or adult desire to physically transform from one sex to the other,
according to the GID diagnosis, takes for granted the underlying assumption that one
gendered mode of being (feminine) corresponds, naturally, to only one sexed body (the
female). This desire to be “the opposite sex” presupposes a mutually exclusive definition
of what each sex is like (Eichler 285). Alongside an understanding of gendered behaviour
as fixed is also a perception of the body as fixed, more or less, after puberty. Our bodies
continue to change, however, particularly in response to our behaviours: “[n]ot only do
[our bodies] generate behaviors, but they in turn are generated by behaviors” (Fausto-
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Sterling 56). We must stop thinking of the body as something that is unchanging, and as
merely the base on which cultural signifiers work to reveal an assumed materiality. I now
turn to my analysis of the DSM-IV-TR’s diagnostics criteria for Gender Identity
Disorder.

The GID Diagnostic Criteria
The GID diagnosis retains ambivalence as it provides us with both negative and
positive readings. To outline the dual nature of the diagnosis, I first begin with an
analysis of the problematic components of the criteria and then move on to discuss how
the diagnosis functions to facilitate strategic access to medical care for some trans
patients. Criterion A - a strong and persistent cross-gender identification, outlined in
Table 1 - highlights the desire to be treated as, or the “frequent passing as,’’ the affirmed
gender as pathological. Under this criterion, gender expressions and behaviours that are
taken to be natural for cissexual children, adolescents and adults are stigmatized when
expressed by individuals who transgress their natal gender/sex designation. Similarly,
Criterion B defines the distress of gender dysphoria as discomfort or inappropriateness in
the gender of assigned sex. The diagnostic criterion for children, in particular, obfuscates
clinically significant distress by emphasizing non-conforming behaviour to the gender
stereotypes of the assigned birth sex. Children need only to meet four of the five
“disturbed”’ manifestations. The child's expressed “desire to be, or the insistence that he
or she is, the other sex” - evidence of gender dysphoria - is not a necessary requirement
for a GID diagnosis to be made. For children, both Criteria A and B overwhelmingly
stress masculine or feminine expression in clothing, play, games, toys, and fantasy as
symptoms of mental ‘disturbance’. Therefore, childhood play is perceived as disordered
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if it transgresses activities associated with assigned birth sex stereotypes. As Eve
Kosofsky Sedgwick (1991) notes, in the diagnosis of GID in children, gender is re
naturalized, with differential diagnostic criteria offered for boys and girls (20-21). For
example, Criterion A (2) outlines a “preference for cross-dressing or simulating female
attire” in boys, indicating that this preference can be sporadic or occasional (DSM-IV-TR
581). As Criterion A (2) pertains to girls, however, it requires the “insistence [of] wearing
only stereotypical masculine clothing,” indicating that such actions are more consistent
(emphasis added, DSM-IV-TR 581).
In discussing children with gender dysphoria, Richard R. Pleak notes that most
children diagnosed with GID do not grow up to be transsexual (35), which raises the
question why a diagnosis is needed for non-transsexual gender dysphoric children. 68
Pleak goes on to argue that parents who bring their children to mental health practitioners
for treatment “often make the assumption that their child is prehomosexual, and believe
or hope that alteration of the child’s gender-role behavior will diminish the likelihood of
later homosexuality” (43). Some therapists, such as Zucker69 (Zucker and Bradley 1995)
do not claim that treatment alters later sexual orientation, but they justify treatment on the
grounds of “social ostracism and peer rejection the child may endure if cross-gender
behavior persists, especially as the child enters school and early sex-segregated play

Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s 1991 article, How to Bring Your Kids Up Gay, addresses the
problematic works of Richard Green and Richard C. Friedman, which focus on the psychopathology of
effeminate boys. As Sedgwick argues, “The reason effeminate boys turn out gay, according to [these]
accounts, is that other men don’t validate them as masculine” (1991, 22). According to Sedgwick, the
theoretical move of distinguishing gender from sexuality has resulted in a denaturalization of “sexual
object-choice” and the re-naturalization and “enforcement of gender assignment” in what she calls the new
psychiatry of gay acceptance. Sedgwick argues that “the presiding asymmetry of value assignment between
hetero and homo goes unchallenged everywhere” and that associated therapeutic strategies and institutions
which aim to “prevent the development of gay people” support the wish that gay people not exist (23).
Kenneth J. Zucker is with the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH), in Toronto, and is
also the chair o f the DSM-V workgroup on Sexual and Gender Identity Disorders.

61

ensues” (Pleak 44). Pleak advises that therapy with gender-dysphoric adolescents should
focus on or be directed towards “forestalling or preventing inappropriate, premature, and
potentially harmful behavior by the adolescent, such as suicidality, self-castration, taking
street or mail-order hormones, and sharing needles to inject hormones” (Pleak 47). At the
same time, other mental health care providers, such as psychologists George Rekers and
Mark Kilgus, actively promote “treatment” practices that praise and reward the child in
response to “appropriate sex-typed play and behavior mannerism” (Rekers 281) while
ignoring or redirecting cross-gender behaviour. 70
Table 1. D S M - I V - T R Diagnostic Criteria for Gender Identity Disorder
A. A strong and persistent cross-gender identification (not merely a desire for any
perceived cultural advantages of being the other sex).
In Children, the disturbance is manifested by four (or more) of the following:
(1) repeatedly stated desire to be, or insistence that he or she is, the other sex
(2) in boys, preference for cross-dressing or simulating female attire; in girls,
insistence on wearing only stereotypical masculine clothing
(3) strong and persistent preferences for cross-sex role in make-believe play or
persistent fantasies of being the other sex
(4) intense desire to participate in the stereotypical games and pastimes of the other
sex
(5) strong preference for playmates of the other sex
In adolescents and adults, the disturbance is manifested by symptoms such as a
stated desire to be the other sex, frequent passing as the other sex, desire to live or
be treated as the other sex, or the conviction that he or she has the typical feelings
and reactions of the other sex.
B. Persistent discomfort with his or her sex or a sense of inappropriateness in the
gender role of that sex.
In children, the disturbance is manifested by any of the following: in boys,
assertion that his penis or testes are disgusting or will disappear or assertion that it
In their discussion o f differential diagnosis and rationale for the treatment of GID and
transvestism, Rekers and Kilgus write: “[I]t is not inappropriate for a given society, such as American
society, to teach girls to clothe their upper torso in public and to prohibit males from regularly wearing
skirts and dresses in public; this form of arbitrary assignment o f sex-typed clothing does not, in fact,
necessarily impose any unfair restriction upon individual development... Therefore, a boy who prefers
wearing dresses, lipstick, and eyeliner, or the boy who puts on his mother’s apron to wash the dishes while
fantasizing that he is a woman, is exhibiting problematic behavior in need of intervention for the child’s
own adjustment” (Rekers and Kilgus 266).
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would be better to not have a penis, or aversion toward rough-and-tumble play
and rejection of male stereotypical toys, games, and activities; in girls, rejection
of urinating in a sitting position, assertion that she has or will grow a penis, or
assertion that she does not want to grow breasts or menstruate, or marked aversion
toward normative feminine clothing. In adolescents and adults, the disturbance is
manifested by symptoms such as preoccupation with getting rid of primary and
secondary sex characteristics (e.g., request for hormones, surgery, or other
procedures to physically alter sexual characteristics to simulate the other sex) or
belief that he or she was born in the wrong sex.
C. The disturbance is not concurrent with a physical intersex condition.
D. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social,
occupational or other important areas of functioning.
Specify if (for sexually mature individuals) Sexually Attracted to Males, ...
Females, ... Both, ... Neither.
Adapted from APA, 2000, 581_______________________________________________

Criterion C of the diagnosis, which functions to exclude those with physical
intersex conditions, is ignored under the category Gender Identity Disorder Not
Otherwise Specified (302.6), wherein intersex conditions and ‘accompanying gender
dysphoria’ (First et al. 313) are listed as examples. Included here are hormonal disorders
such as partial androgen insensitivity syndrome and congenital adrenal hyperplasia.
Partial androgen insensitivity syndrome affects individuals bom with XY chromosomes
and normally functioning testes, but who have a receptor defect causing their bodies to be
unable to process the androgens produced by the testes. Congenital adrenal hyperplasia
affects individuals with XX chromosomes, female internal structures, and ovaries, but
who were exposed to an abundance of androgen production in utero, resulting in more
masculinized external appearance (Greenberg 59-60). It is unclear how intersex
conditions which would otherwise exclude diagnosis based on the very principal criterion
of GID, can function for otherwise not classifiable gender identity disorders.
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Criterion D, which outlines the requirements for clinically significant distress or
impairment as established in the definition of mental disorder, fails to distinguish the
source of such distress and/or impairment. It is unclear whether the distress and/or
impairment arise from an intrinsic psychological impairment of gender dysphoria or is
caused by external factors such as prejudice and social intolerance. The “associated
descriptive features” for the diagnosis lists isolation, low self-esteem, and relationship
difficulties as examples of distress and disability (APA 2000, 577). Prostitution, self
treatment with hormones or self-performed surgeries, increased risks for HIV infection,
suicide attempts and substance abuse are also described as associated features of GID. In
other words, it is not made clear in the DSM that such actions are by definition
impairments resulting from gender dysphoria rather than as the consequence of social
discrimination against gender variant individuals. Judith Butler makes a similar
argument, noting diagnosis does not take into consideration the gender norms it presumes
to be fixed and “whether these norms produce distress and discomfort, whether they
impede one’s ability to function, or whether they generate sources of suffering for some
people or for many people” (2004, 95).
It is for these reasons that the status of the DSM diagnosis of Gender Identity
Disorder is questioned by activists, theorists (see Judith Butler 2006), and even among
professionals (see Heino F. L. Meyer-Bahlburg 2010). On the other side of the debate is
the argument that maintaining the diagnosis functions to facilitate access - for
adolescents and adults - to medical and surgical technologies required for transitioning.
As well, the diagnosis provides the certification for medical coverage by governmental or
third party insurance groups by establishing SRS as medically necessary. Alternatively,
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some activist psychiatrists and theorists, such as Kelley Winters71 and Judith Butler,
argue against pathologizing or labeling atypical gender identity and behaviour. As Butler
argues in Undoing Gender (2004), “even if the diagnosis is approached as an instrument
or vehicle for accomplishing the end goal of transitioning, the diagnosis can still (a)
instill a sense of mental disorder on those whom it diagnoses, (b) entrench the power of
the diagnosis to conceptualize transsexuality as a pathology, and (c) be used as a rationale
by those who are in well-funded research institutes whose aim is to keep transsexuality
within the sphere of mental pathology” (83). Therefore, we can note that the diagnosis
can be used strategically as a way of gaining funding for procedures and for alleviating
suffering, while at the same time, the diagnosis can intensify the very suffering that
requires alleviation (100). Richard R. Pleak writes: “One compromise would be to
eliminate the GID diagnosis as it relates to children, and retain it only for those
transgendered adolescents and adults who wish to alter their bodies and are requesting
therapy, hormones, and/or surgery” (Pleak 37). Alternatively, another compromise may
be to narrow the definition to dysphoria and to remove the designation disorder from the
diagnosis.
While Gender Identity Disorder’s role within the DSM is to provide mental health
care professionals with diagnostic tools to aid in their treatment of patients, the diagnosis
has far reaching influence apparent in the ways it influences broader discourses regarding
gender dysphoria. Cissexual policy makers and service providers must become more
aware of the imbedded assumptions within the diagnostic approach to gender identity and
expression. An approach to gender variance as pathology is not sufficient. As the authors
Kelley Winters is the founder of GID Reform Advocates and an Advisory Board Member for the
Matthew Shepard Foundation and TransYouth Family Advocates.
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of the Trans PULSE Project indicate, we must continue to examine the systematic nature
of trans marginalization in broader cultural and political contexts, and aim to provide
answers that move beyond the attribution of marginalization as just a consequence of
transphobia.

Trans PULSE Project
The Trans PULSE Project - funded in part by the Canadian Institute of Health
Research72 -

is a comprehensive community-based research project aimed at

documenting the lived experiences of trans people in Ontario. The objectives of the
project are to examine the social determinants of health and basic healthcare of the trans
community, and how social exclusion affects health. The project is partnered with
Wilfred Laurier University and The University of Western Ontario, The Ontario HIV
Treatment Network, Sherbourne Health Centre, Rainbow Health Ontario, the 519
Community Centre and TGStation.com.
The Trans PULSE Project is organized in three phases. Phase I involved
qualitative research and community soundings (meetings), held in Toronto, Ottawa and
Guelph in summer 2006 to discover what health issues were of concern to trans people in
Ontario. Overall, 89 participants took part in the seven soundings that took place in trans
only spaces (the meetings were facilitated by trans investigators from the research team).
In addition to the community soundings, an online sounding for peer and professional

The project’s development stage was funded by the Wellesley Institute and The Ontario HIV
Treatment Network (OHTN). In February 2007, the Canadian Institute of Health Research awarded the
Trans PULSE Project $288,400 for continued research over the next three years.
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service providers73 serving trans clients or patients in Ontario was also held. Of the 63
providers who participated, 59% provided services in the Greater Toronto Area and were
from a variety of professional backgrounds. The authors of the Trans PULSE Project note
that, overall, service providers felt that their formal training was inadequate for the work
they do:
43% reported they had no formal training about trans people and their
needs, 22% had training that was ‘not comprehensive,’ and an additional
21% reported their training was ‘somewhat comprehensive.’ In lieu of
training, some providers reported that they had learned much from their
trans clients directly... (Bauer et al. 2007, 10).
As well, the peer and professional service provider soundings revealed that providers did
not always have the information needed to best serve their patients or clients, and often
experienced difficulty in finding services to meet their client’s needs. “Specialized
services for trans youth of colour or disabled trans clients or those with extensive health
needs were cited as lacking. Referral networks for all types of services outside of Toronto
were sparse and not stable” (Bauer et al. 2007, 11).
In their discussion of the results from Phase I of the project, published in the
September/October 2009 issue of Journal of the Association of Nurses in AIDS Care,
Bauer et al. theorize a framework for how erasure functions in relation to interactions
with health care systems. They outline two key sites of erasure: informational erasure and
institutional erasure. Though phase I of the project covered a broad range of topics, the
focus remained on experiences within health care systems. The authors discovered that
informational erasure exists in both the lack of knowledge regarding trans people and

Peer and professional service providers who participated in the soundings included health care
personnel, mental health care and counseling providers, legal service providers, and those involved in
community development and formal or informal support services (Bauer at al. 2007).
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trans issues, and in assuming that such knowledge does not exist at all.74 Institutional
erasure functions through the lack of health, education or hiring policies that
accommodate trans bodies, and issues, “including the lack of knowledge that such
policies are even necessary” (Bauer et al. 2009, 354).75 Such processes of erasure
contribute to an overall sense of social exclusion and community invisibility, such that
trans people are perceived as isolated cases rather than members of a community. The
authors attribute cisnormativity as underlying all these processes of erasure.
Bauer et al. also point out that for mental health care professionals, the primary
source of information on trans people exists in the Gender Identity Disorder diagnosis of
the DSM. The authors note, however, that a lack of understanding still remains in the
relation between mental health and gender identity: “although research results have
shown that transsexual people are no more likely to suffer from psychopathology than
cissexual people ... providers may perceive unrelated mental health issues to stem from a
person’s gender identity” (Bauer et al. 2009, 352). The authors note that care providers
are, at times, inclined to link what may be unrelated issues, or to discount an issue due to
a mixing of information presented to them. “This erasure reflects the priorities, biases,
and oversights of writers and publishers who function in a cisnormative system, one in

Bauer et al.’s findings here reflect Viviane K. Namaste’s findings gathered in the summer of 1995.
Namaste notes that “the transgendered people [she] interviewed stated that they did not receive sufficient
information from the Clarke GIC about transsexuality, hormones, and how transition would affect their
lived” (213).
The systemic unpreparedness of health care providers for addressing trans needs is seen in the
disparity between estimated number of trans individuals and the reality of trans persons in Ontario. Bauer et
al note, “Given oft-cited estimates from the Netherlands o f 1 in 30,400 born females and 1 in 11,900 born
males being transsexual... there would be approximately 615 such people in Ontario, including children
and infants. Although actual numbers are unknown, one publically funded community health centre in
Toronto, which is mandated to provide primary health care services to LGBT communities, currently has
more trans clients than should exist in the entire province, given these estimates. Moreover, this agency
serves a local catchment area, and many trans people in Toronto (and all trans people in the remainder of
the province) do not receive health care there” (Bauer et al. 2009, 354).
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which people are assumed to be cissexual” (Bauer et al. 2009, 353). When information
has been produced and incorporated into health care protocols, educational curricula, etc.,
gender identity is often conflated with sexual orientation.
Phase II of the project was launched in November 2007 with data collection
begun in May 2009. This phase draws on the findings from Phase I to inform a
comprehensive survey aimed at 1000 trans people in Ontario age 16 and older (Bauer et
al., June 2009). Instead of relying on sex reassignment surgery as the defining criteria for
survey participants, the Trans PULSE research team is adopting a broad definition of
what it means to be trans with the intention to include a full range of identities, such as:
transgender, transsexual, two-spirited trans, MtF, FtM, trans man, trans woman, gender
queer, bi-gendered, t-girl, boi, as well as those who have transitioned and identify as
women or men (Trans PULSE n. p.).
Phase II’s survey76 employs a respondent-driven sampling (RDS) method - in
which respondents recruit other participants from their network77 - in order to generate
accurate population-based statistics that include individuals who are not in clinical care,
or who do not participate in specific trans community organizations or venues. The
survey includes questions about healthcare access, including primary care, emergency
care, mental healthcare for both trans-related and non-trans-related issues, HIV/AIDS
related healthcare, as well as questions regarding employment, income, housing, social
support, emotional wellbeing, sexual health, substance use and more (Zanin n. p.). The

The survey, which is conceived of being the largest survey o f trans people ever conducted in
Canada, is made available online, as a paper-and-pencil survey, or through a telephone interview.
The RDS process was seeded with 16 primary respondents (members of the project’s community
engagement team) to initiate recruitment.
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forthcoming Phase III aims to conduct follow-up interviews in order to build a deeper
understanding of health concerns.
Overall, the results of the full Trans PULSE Project promises to provide a more
detailed understanding of the variety of lived experiences of trans Ontarians, and will
contribute significantly to trans discourse. Specifically, the involvement of trans persons
at every level of the project signifies a shift from previous research approaches
dominated by cissexual privilege and a cisnormative approach to transsexuality.

Conclusion
The position of transsexual bodies within a society’s gender system - as
legitimate bodies, as marginalized but acknowledged bodies, or as unacknowledged
bodies - impacts not only those bodies but all bodies caught within that system. Naomi
Scheman writes,
As our (modern Western) world is now, failure to conform to the norms of
gender is socially stigmatizing to an unbearable extent: to be human just is
to be male or female, a girl or boy, a man or a woman. Those who cannot
be readily classified by everyone they encounter are not only subject to
physically violent assaults, but, perhaps even more wounding, are taken to
be impossible to relate to humanly, as though one cannot use the pronoun
“you” with anyone to whom one cannot with total assurance apply either
“she” or “he”. Those who are not stably, unambiguously one or the other
are, as Susan Stryker puts it (1994, 240), “monsters” (Scheman 68,
emphasis in original).
Such assumptions contribute to the organization of our social world. There exists an
embodied privilege for those individuals who are considered “normal” within the system.
Such persons are seen as legitimate through the erasure or denial of legitimacy accorded
to trans people (alongside various “others” in the social realm). This erasure is also
sustained by the assumptions of cissexual policy makers and service providers both
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within legal and medical realms. Court rulings, official documents such as the Ontario
Vital Statistics Act (1990), and the GID diagnosis all contribute to the discursive
formation of transsexuality. The circulation of such expert knowledge through the
legalization and medicalization of trans identities conveys truth about transsexuality and
trans experiences at this particular historical moment. Such discourses both allow and
limit what can be said about transsexuality in Canadian culture.
In this chapter, I examined the current structuring of medico-legal apparatuses and
their reliance on cisnormative patterns of knowledge production that function to
invalidate - or at times authenticate - gender experiences and identities. As well, I
considered the significant work being undertaken by the Trans PULSE Project. In the
following chapter, I expand on the argument presented here using a discourse analysis of
major Canadian newspapers. My examination of news texts aims to uncover the ways in
which official legal and medical discourses explored in this chapter - including the GID
diagnosis - appear in the service of authenticating or invalidating identities and
experiences that fall outside of cisnormativity.
The aim of my analysis is not to present the definitive discursive approach to
transsexuality, but to present and analyze the dominant discourse of major Canadian
newspapers. In order to achieve this, I will employ a qualitative discourse analysis to
examine articles from the National Post, The Globe and Mail, The Toronto Star, and
Toronto Sun.™ This type of analysis, John Muncie explains, is the “detailed exploration
of political, personal, media or academic ‘talk’ and ‘writing’ about a subject, designed to
reveal how knowledges are organized, carried and reproduced in particular ways and

Due to linguistic limitations, only English languages sources will be examined. The above
newspapers were selected because of their national reach.
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through particular institutional practices” (74). 1 maintain that such media texts function
as important sites that both reflect upon and contribute to the discourse regarding trans
issues.
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3. News Text Coverage of the Delisting and Relisting of SRS
The nature o f reflective thought can be defined as “active, persistent, and careful
consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that
support it and the further conclusion to which it tends” - John Dewey 9
In my previous chapter, I claimed that a medical diagnosis of Gender Identity
Disorder (GID) - though problematic - is essential to a legal understanding of
transsexuality in Ontario. Trans Ontarians must subject themselves to a medical model in
order to gain access to legal recognition of their affirmed gender and sex. A diagnosis of
GID, and approval for surgery from the Gender Identity Clinic at the Centre for
Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH), provides a small number of trans Ontarians with
access to public funding for sex reassignment surgery. Under Ontario’s Vital Statistics
Act (R.S.O. 1990, c. V. 4, s. 36), certification by two medical practitioners testifying to
the results of the surgery is required as proof in requests for alterations to sex
designations on government documents. Medical and legal discourses - as systems of
expert knowledge

- are, then, significant frameworks through which the Canadian

approach to transsexuality is mediated. Such expert systems also function, in part, to
validate each other. This chapter builds on this argument by exploring the integration of
such knowledge systems with news media texts.
My approach in this chapter is twofold. In the first section, I begin with a brief
overview of Canadian health care and the Ontario Health Insurance Policy (OHIP). I
proceed to outline the delisting - the ceasing of public funding - for sex reassignment
surgery (SRS) in 1998, the key challenge to this ruling in Hogan v. Ontario (2006), and
the relisting of SRS in 2008. In the second section of this chapter, I outline the

We come to rely on expert knowledge producers as the definers of truth about a given topic within
a discourse.
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methodology used for the investigation and focus on my analysis of The Globe and Mail,
The Toronto Star, National Post, and Toronto Sun. 80
Finally, both sections are brought together through the analysis of the findings.
Following the argument that news media shape and define truth, a total of 77 articles
were analyzed along two dimensions. First, articles were analyzed based on the attitude
or emotional content, what I have termed their ‘tone’. Second, articles were analyzed
based on the recurrence of key phrases and provocative word choices, what I call a
“language” dimension. In general, I found that the news texts revolve around three major
events: the delisting of sex reassignment surgery, coverage of the key human rights
complaint and the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal’s ruling in Hogan v. Ontario, and the
relisting of sex reassignment surgery. I found that hard news texts remained the most
neutral in tone - keeping in line with the narrative of journalistic neutrality - while
opinion columns and letters to the editor varied in their tone between positive support for
sex reassignment surgery and negative misunderstanding of the requirement of or the
desire for surgery by trans subjects. Negative columns and letters to the editor
overwhelmingly positioned sex reassignment surgery against other services, particularly
those delisted during the research time frame (1998-2008), such as physiotherapy, care
for autistic children and eye exams. Such bifurcation remained congruent with the
Ministry of Health and Long Term Care’s (Ministry) claim that the removal of public
funding for sex reassignment surgery was not a politically motivated decision, but a

Although the Toronto Sun is regarded as a daily tabloid newspaper, I have chosen to incorporate it
into the data set for two reasons. First, while the Toronto Sun is a Toronto-city publication it maintains
mass circulation and is available across the province o f Ontario. The paper’s high circulation numbers is
significant in its reach to Ontarians. And second, as a result o f its availability and distribution, I feel that it
is important to examine its contribution to the discourse o f transsexuality. The Toronto Sun’s coverage of
trans issues continues to exert influence over its readers and affects other news publishers and online
columnists and forums responding to its coverage.
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reflection of the Ministry’s commitment to the re-allocation of funds to “life-and-death”
priorities like cardiac and cancer care. Ministry officials and medical personnel were
mostly called upon to lend authority to surgery as a legitimate action. In certain instances,
the texts called upon medical personnel to provide counter arguments for the removal of
public support for surgery. I explore the use of this tactic in my discussion of four
columns by Margaret Wente from The Globe and Mail. In summary, the news texts under
examination reflect the troubled nature of the representation of transsexuality and sex
reassignment surgery. The news texts are permeated by cisnormative assumptions about
the relationship between sex and gender and the role of surgery in addressing feelings of
incongruence felt by transsexuals. As a form of discourse analysis, this project then sheds
light on the muddled discourse of transsexuality and sex reassignment surgery in Canada.

Background on Canadian Health Care, and SRS Delisting
As outlined in Section VI (Distribution of Legislative Powers) of the Constitution
Acts (1867 to 1982), the “Establishment, Maintenance, and Management of Hospitals,
Asylums, Charities, and Eleemosynary Institutions in and for the Province, other than
Marine Hospitals” are the exclusive powers of provincial legislatures (The Constitution
Acts, 1867 to 1982, Subsection 92(7)). In the place of a single national plan, Canada’s
publicly funded health care system - known as medicare - functions as a set of
‘interlocking’ provincial and territorial health insurance plans. This interlocking system
is framed by the federal legislation for publically funded health care insurance known as
the Canada Health Act (CHA). The primary objective of the Canadian health care policy
as outlined by the CHA is “to protect, promote and restore the physical and mental well
being of residents of Canada and to facilitate reasonable access to health services without
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financial or other barriers” (Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6 [CHA]). The CHA
requires all Canadian provinces and territories to publically fund “medically necessary”
hospital services and “medically required” physician services81 (Flood and Erdman 2).
The CHA works to ensure that all “eligible residents of Canada have reasonable access to
insured health services on a prepaid basis, without direct charges at the point of service
for such services” (Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6 [CHA]). The provinces and
territories must meet the established criteria and conditions established by the CHA in
order to receive the full federal cash contribution under the Canada Health Transfer
(CHT) payment programme (Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6 [CHA]).82 The
federal government is, therefore, responsible for setting and administrating the national
standards for health care and in assisting in the financing for provincial care services
through fiscal transfers. The federal government is also responsible for fulfilling other
health-related functions such as disease prevention and health promotion, and the
delivery of direct health care to specific groups such as veterans, First Nations People
living on reserves, inmates of federal penitentiaries, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
and military personnel. The roles and responsibilities of Canada’s health care system are
shared between the federal and provincial-territorial governments. However, the latter are
responsible for the management, organization and delivery of health services to the
general public (Health Canada n. p.).
The Act defines “physician services” as any medically required services rendered by medical
practitioners. However, the CHA does not contain a definition of “medical necessity,” therefore, it is left to
the discretion o f the provinces to establish a definition. As Baker and Bhabha note: “Disputes about
medical necessity can arise when services that had previously been listed are de-listed, whether based on
‘evidence-based’ analysis, physician-government negotiations designed to respond of financial constraints
or the political viewpoint o f the government of the day” (25).
The CHT is the largest major transfer from the federal government to the provinces and territories.
It provides “long-term predictable funding for health care, and supports the principles of the Canada Health
Act which are: universality; comprehensiveness; portability; accessibility; and, public administration”
(Department of Finance Canada n. p.).
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The Ontario Ministry of Health and Long Term Care (Ministry) is responsible for
all public sector provided health care funding, and for publishing a “Schedule of
Benefits-Physician Services” (SOB-PS), which regulates the fee schedule for physicians’
services, thereby indicating the benefits that are insured under the Ontario Health
Insurance Policy (OHIP).83 The SOB-PS lists information regarding some 4,800 insured
physician services, including any applicable conditions or restrictions (Flood and Erdman
4). What health care services are publically funded by the province is ultimately
determined through a variety of decision-making layers.
The Ontario Ministry of Health and Long Term Care (Ministry) has
historically consulted and negotiated with the Ontario Medical Association
(OMA) , representatives of the medical profession in Ontario, regarding
the ‘tariffs’ or fees paid to physicians for the provision of publicly-funded
services. It is this process that indirectly determines what services are
deemed ‘medically necessary’ and thus publicly funded (Flood and
Erdman 2).
The OMA functions as the bargaining agent for Ontario physicians (Agreement between
OMA and Ontario Minister of Health and Long-Term Care). Prior to 1995, the OMA and
the government negotiated through “Framework Agreements”. In 1995, newly elected
Ontario Progressive Conservative Party expressed concern with increases in the rate of
medical service utilization, and concluded that this increase was driven by physician
behaviour. In 1996, the government passed Bill 26, the Savings and Restructuring Act,
allowing the government to bypass the OMA to negotiate with physician groups either on
“a specialty-specific or interest basis” (Flood and Erdman 3). This decision created
instability when the Ministry failed to respond effectively or quickly enough, with the
The current SOB-PS available is provided at:
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/english/providers/program/ohip/sob/sob_mn.html
The Ontario Medical Association (OMA) represents the province’s medical profession and
membership is available to practicing physicians, residents, and students enrolled in Ontario faculties of
medicine.
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newly established groups threatening reduced services. In 1997, the government
negotiated a new four-year agreement with the OMA in order to avoid further threats.
The 1997 Agreement also established the Physician Services Review Committee (PSC).
Membership in the PSC is restricted to representative members of the OMA and
representatives of the Ministry. The PSC in Ontario functions both as a medium for
labour relations between the government and the medical profession - in determining
which physician services are publically funded and in deciding what services are de-listed
or no longer eligible for public funding under OHIP (Flood and Erdman 3). The PSC
relies on a variety of subcommittees in reviewing services. Under both the 1997
Agreement and the 2000 Agreement, the Ministry and the OMA agreed to create annual
savings of (at least) $50 million dollars in the existing SOB-PS (Flood and Erdman 5).85
However, while the PSC reviews and recommends potential changes to the SOB-PS, it is
Cabinet that makes the final decision regarding which services to delist (Polansky 23).
On August 26, 1998, the Cabinet of the Government of Ontario proceeded to
remove sex reassignment surgery from the SOB-PS without consultation with the PSC
(Hogan v. Ontario, 2006 HRTO, 32). On December 24, 1998, the Ontario government
sent out OHIP Bulletin #4330, outlining the changes to the regulations regarding SRS,
effective as of October 1, 1998 (OHIP Bulletin #4330). Ontario patients who had
completed the Gender Identity Clinic at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health
(CAMH) and who had been “recommended for surgery by the Clinic prior to October 1,

The Physician Services Framework Agreement governs the relationship between the OMA and the
Ministry (2004-2008 Physician Services Framework Agreement, OMA and the OMHLTC). The most
recent Agreement is dated 2008.
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1998” were still eligible for out-of-country approval (OHIP Bulletin #4330).86 This
decision marked the first time since the 1970s87 that the Ontario government removed
public funding for SRS for individuals who completed - and were subsequently
recommended for surgery by - the Gender Identity Clinic program at the CAMH
[formerly the Clarke Institute of Psychiatry] (Ontario Human Rights Commission 1999).
Between 1980 and September 1998, the Gender Identity Clinic at the Clarke/CAMH
recommended an average of seven to eight surgeries per year at a combined cost of
$122,000 annually (Polansky 1). They only recommended for surgery those transsexuals
suffering from profound GID.
Two components for the identification of GID are outlined in the American
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSMIV-TR). First, there must be evidence of strong and persistent cross-gender identification,
with the desire to be or the insistence that one is of the ‘other sex’. Second, this cross
gender identification must be more than any desire for perceived cultural advantages of
being the other sex. As well, in order for a GID diagnosis to be made, there must be
evidence of persistent discomfort about one’s assigned sex or a sense of
inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex (DSM-IV-TR). Similarly, the World
Health Organization’s International Classification of Disease (ICD-10) classifies

There are no hospitals in Ontario that perform SRS. Patients from Ontario are generally sent to
The Centre Métropolitain de Chirugie Plastique in Montréal, Quebec. Under special circumstances, OHIP
may fund procedures received out of country. Refer to footnote 91 for an expansion on this point. Patients
that are able to fund their own surgery and are not reliant on public-sector approval, can access procedures
at the Menard Clinic in Montréal. The Menard clinic is the only private clinic in Canada specializing in sex
reassignment surgery.
In 1978, the Ministry started to provide financing to the Clarke Institute (now known as CAMH),
and added SRS to the SOB-PS (Polansky 26). Some news sources indicate 1969 as the year Ontario
coverage of SRS begun while others list the year as 1970 or 1971 (Ferguson); (Egale Canada, 2004).
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transsexualism as a mental or behavioural disorder. The ICD-10 defines transsexualism
as
A desire to live and be accepted as a member of the opposite sex, usually
accompanied by a sense of discomfort with, or inappropriateness of, one’s
anatomic sex, and a wish to have surgery and hormonal treatment to make
one’s body as congruent as possible with one’s preferred sex (ICD-10, ch.
5, F-64).
The Gender Identity Clinic at CAMH recommends patients to surgery as a last resort.
The Clinic makes use of the criteria for sex reassignment surgery outlined in the World
Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH), Standards of Care (2001),88
which includes and affirms the diagnostic category of GID provided by the DSM and the
category of Transsexualism by the ICD-10 (Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, n.
P-).
The deleterious effect of the Cabinet decision to delist SRS was that some patients
who had already started the transition process at the Gender Identity Clinic at CAMH
prior to the delisting were, in effect, stranded mid-transition if they were unable to
personally supplement their upcoming surgical fees. This led to several human rights
complains to be lodged with the Ontario Human Rights Commission, including those by
filed by Michelle Hogan, Martine Stonehouse, AB89 and Andy McDonald.90 On
December 16, 2002, the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario received the referral of the

The WPATH was formerly known as the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria
Association. (The Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association’s Standards of Care for
Gender Identity Disorders, Sixth Edition, February 2001). The WPATH maintains that sex reassignment
surgery is proven to be beneficial for individuals with gender identity disorder (WPATH 2009, n. p.).
Complainant is identified as A. B. only.
In April 1999, Josef, a Canadian musician and MtF transgender activist, initiated a Charter
Application to challenge the delisting of sex reassignment surgery as discriminatory against trans
individuals. J o sefs lawyer, Cynthia Petersen, put forth the arguments that the Charter protects trans people
from discrimination based on gender identity and that the delisting violates the equality rights of
transsexuals (Egale Canada 2004). The lawsuit claims that the decision to delist the procedure “runs
counter to the rights of all citizens to obtain medically necessary treatment under the Canada Health Act”
(Daly).
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four complainants from the Ontario Human Rights Commission and requested that the
cases be combined (Hogan v. Ontario (Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care) (No. 3)
[2005], (CHRR Doc. 05-702, 2005 HRTO 49). The Ontario Human Rights Tribunal
released an interim ruling on November 9 2005, with a Final Order released on
November 28, 2006. The four complainants argued before the three-member panel of the
Tribunal that the government’s decision “amounted to discrimination with respect to
services because of sex and/or disability” (Ontario Human Rights Commission 2007).
Michelle Hogan, Martine Stonehouse, and AB had begun participating in the Gender
Identity Clinic at CAMH the same time the regulation changes were taking place. The
Tribunal dismissed the fourth complainant, Andy McDonald, as the complainant had not
started the CAMH GIC program by October 1, 1998. Hogan vs. Ontario (2006 HRTO,
32) notes that the Cabinet included the following ‘grandparent’ clause [24(1) (3)] in their
delisting announcement:
SRS and any supporting services for such surgery would be insured
services only if performed on a person who, as of October 1, 1998, had
completed the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health in Toronto
(‘CAMH’) Gender Identity Disorder (‘GID’) Clinic Program ‘operated
by’ that Clinic, and had been recommended for surgery by that Clinic,
upon completion of the programme (Hogan v. Ontario, 2006 HRTO, 32,
emphasis in original).
However, the majority of the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal (OHRT) ruling in Hogan
vs. Ontario (2006 HRTO, 32) concluded that the grandparenting clause was inadequate,
even if the delisting of sex reassignment surgery itself was not discriminatory, per se,
against transsexuals (Polansky 2). The Tribunal noted that the decision to cut funding for
sex reassignment surgery was discriminatory on the grounds of disability and sex against
patients who had started medically supervised transitions before October 1, 1998.
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The Final Order upheld the Interim Order and Decision. The Ontario government
was ordered to fund only the surgeries of the three complainants as the guidelines prior to
the delisting on October 1, 1998 outlined. The decision states, in part:
2. Ontario is to cease this contravention of the Code and refrain from
committing the same or similar contravention.
3. When considering requests for funding for sex reassignment surgery,
Ontario must apply the applicable parts of Regulation 552 and the SOBPS as they stood immediately prior to October 1, 1998, for persons
diagnosed with GID who have completed the program run by the Gender
Identity Clinic at CAMH and who have been recommended by it for sex
reassignment surgery (Hogan v. Ontario (Health and Long-Term care),
2006 HRTO 32 (CanLII), 164).
Although not a direct result of the OHRT Final Order, in 2008, Liberal Ontario
Health Minister George Smitherman confirmed the re-listing of sex reassignment surgery
as an insured benefit under the Ontario Health Insurance Policy. The Ministry of Health
and Long-Term Care distributed OHIP Bulletin #4480, dated June 20, 2008. The bulletin
notes the amendment of the Health Insurance Act, effective June 3, 2008, to include sex
reassignment surgery as an insured service under OHIP. The following surgical
procedures were listed as insured services under OHIP for approved sex reassignment
surgery: Vaginoplasty in MtF (the removal of male genitals, construction of vagina, labia
and clitoris); in FtM, Mastectomy (removal of breasts and chest reconstruction), option
between Metoidioplasty (“freeing of the clitoris and construction of testes”) or
phalloplasty (“removal of female genitals, construction of male genitals”), and
Hysterectomy (removal of uterus and ovaries, upon recommendation from CAMH)
(Sherbourne Health Centre). OHIP does not provide public funding for the following
procedures: breast augmentation, electrolysis, neck or vocal cord surgery, facial surgeries
(such as lip augmentation, jaw shortening, and rhinoplasty), hair transplants, and male
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chest contouring (unless part of a mastectomy procedure) (Sherbourne Health Centre).
Similarly, hormones are treated like other prescription medication, paid for by the patient,
a company health insurance, or an assistant government program such as the Ontario
Drug Benefit Program for those patients who qualify. Patients meeting eligibility
requirements for surgical procedures are directed to The Centre Métropolitain de
Chirurgie Plastique in Montréal, Québec, or may seek treatment option outside of
Canada.91 Smitherman has suggested that an expected average of 8 to 10 Ontarians per
year will make use of the coverage after undergoing extensive psychological evaluation.
He estimates the cost to be $200,000 yearly out of a health budget of $40.2 billion
(Ferguson). It is unclear whether these estimates take into consideration the ten-year
backup of patients awaiting sex reassignment surgery.
To review, transsexuals are required to submit themselves to a medical diagnosis
in order to access public funding for sex reassignment surgery and to have the
government legally recognize their affirmed sex and gender. Therefore, the Cabinet’s
decision to delist sex reassignment surgery from the SOB-PS is situated in an
environment of cissexual privilege, wherein Ministry and medical experts act as
gatekeepers. The delisting of SRS acts as a restricting mechanism for low or middleincome trans individuals who wish to access surgery, and denies them the path towards
legal recognition. The delisting decision enacted material influence over everyday lived
experiences of trans persons including, but not limited to, searches by the police, medical
coverage, employment security, emergency and long-term care, and housing or shelter

Only under exceptional circumstances will OHIP cover the cost of Out of Country services. This
change in procedures occurs only where the service is insured under OHIP but not available within Ontario,
or “delay in accessing services would result in medically significant irreversible tissue damage or death”
(Sherbourne Health Centre).
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access. As part of my research intention, I set out to find if this environment of cissexual
privilege is also reflected in news media texts.

Discourse and Data
In order to uncover how identities that fall outside of cisnormativity are
positioned in news texts, I employ a Foucauldian discourse analysis in my examination of
the data set gathered from the National Post, The Globe and Mail, The Toronto Star, and
the Toronto Sun. I chose these news producers for two reasons. As Bill Kovach and Tom
Rosentiel note, news is “the material that people use to learn and think about the world
beyond themselves” (38). Then, in accordance with a Foucauldian understanding of
discourse, news media shape and define the types of knowledges that are understood as
truths. I chose to examine newspapers as they have the capacity to feature longer stories
and the potential for substantive coverage of issues, drawing on a variety of sources and
re-presenting them to a broad audience. In this manner, news texts contribute to the
production or constraining of particular knowledges. The four news producers I selected
represent the major English Canadian news sources aimed at an Ontario urban audience.
The four papers are also constituted as agenda setters " through their distribution power
and influence over discussions and coverage of issues in other Ontario-based news
mediums, including discussion forums such as blogs. According to the Newspaper

Reese and Danielian (1991), and McCombs, Einsiedel and Weaver (1991) have illustrated that
American news publications, such as The New York Times and Time Magazine, function as agenda setters
for other American news publications. Although significant studies have not been conducted in relation to
the agenda setting phenomena in Canada, the prevalence o f articles appearing in smaller news publications,
as well as materials posted online, that draw from the major Canadian dailies provides some room for the
adoption of a similar use of agenda setting theory.
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Audience Databank’s 2009 study, these news sources have a combined weekly readership
of 5,041,100 93
Second, the incorporation of the letter to the editor column - a unique feature of
newspapers - provides an opportunity to examine the reader responses (though this claim
must be nuanced by acknowledging that these texts are chosen and edited by each paper’s
editors). While I do not aim to deconstruct individual speech acts, I do take certain
individual voices as significant to this analysis. In particular, I use as case studies four
Globe and Mail columns by Margarete Wente and five letters to the editor responding to
these columns. Wente’s columns are significant because they allow us to observe a
dialogue. The interaction occurring between columnist and reader responses published in
the letter to the editor section allows for a variety of responses to be viewed back to back.
Alongside Wente’s texts, David Frum of the National Post and Christina Blizzard of the
Toronto Sun remain the only columnists to write on trans related issues during the
research time frame. Each of the columns express deeply personal opinions, and tend
towards conservative points of view. Letters to the editor published in response to such
columns by nature also express personal opinions, but range in their tone and discussion
of transsexuality and sex reassignment surgery. The variety of opinions articulated within
the columns and letters to the editor also produce and evoke the discourse of
transsexuality and sex reassignment surgery in Canada.
I undertake this examination because discourses often reflect power relations. An
analysis of how transsexual subject positions are situated and discussed reflects broader

The breakdown o f the audience weekly readership of the four newspapers is as follows: Toronto
Star 2,331,400; The Toronto Sun 1,078,200; The Globe and Mail 1,066,400, and National Post 565,100
(NADbank Study, n. p.).
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assumptions about the relationship between sex and gender, and the role of expert
knowledge systems as authoritative makers of truth.
Each of the news sources I examine call into being a different presumed audience,
and function to produce knowledge that is disseminated to an Ontario urban audience.
While there are differences that reflect each news producers’ editorial stance and news
values, this project is not so concerned with what these specific differences are or how
they are managed. Rather, this project is concerned with the production of an Ontarian
discourse regarding transsexuality and the OHIP coverage of sex reassignment surgery
that uses expert knowledge systems.

Methodology
I incorporated documents produced over an 11-year period (1998-2008) into the
dataset. Articles were obtained using a guided phrase search of the LexisNexis Academic
database, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., ProQuest LLC database, and the Canadian
Business Current Affairs (CBCA) database, published by Micromedia, Inc. I pre
identified the following key phrases to be relevant to the search: trans, transgender,
transsexual, sex reassignment surgery, sex change, gender surgery, gender switch, gender
identity, gender identity disorder, and gender dysphoria. In all, I retrieved 283 articles
through an exhaustive database search. In order to narrow the field, including reducing
the number of duplicate articles and those produced by newswires intended only for
journalists, I modified the search field by identifying and using the following key words:
Canada, Ontario, OHIP, delisting/relisting, and CAMH/Clarke Institute. I excluded
documents from the modified search if they mentioned SRS or transsexuality but were
not concerned with it. For example, a significant number of such documents only list sex
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reassignment surgery in a discussion of services delisted from the SOB-PS. I determined
that such documents, though they employed one or more of the key phrases, were
superficial in discussing the subject matter and were, therefore, removed from the
sample.
I also excluded texts concerned with transsexuality or SRS that made references
to three particular events: inmate Synthia Kavanagh’s complaint against the Correctional
Service of Canada, Sergeant Sylvia Durand’s transition while employed by the
Department of National Defence, and the case of Kimberly Nixon versus the Vancouver
Rape Relief Society. Texts that reference or were concerned with federal regulations,
such as those involving the Correctional Service of Canada, and the Department of
National Defence and Canadian Forces were removed. In the case of the Correctional
Service of Canada, inmate Synthia Kavanagh94 filed a complaint with the Canadian
Human Rights Commission based on her placement in a men’s prison, restrictions on her
hormone therapy and the denial of her requests for sex reassignment surgery. In 2001
Kavanagh won her case when the Federal Court of Canada ordered the Correctional
Service of Canada to pay for her sex reassignment surgery and to remove her from a
men’s prison to a women’s facility. The decision ruled that it is discriminatory for prisons
to maintain a blanket prohibition on access to sex reassignment surgery and the
Correctional Service of Canada was ordered to modify its Health Service Policy
{Kavanagh v. Attorney General of Canada (2001)). In the case of the Department of
National Defence and Canadian Forces, the Canadian military agreed to fund Sergeant
Sylvia Durand’s sex reassignment surgery. Durand was diagnosed with Gender Identity

Kavanagh was conditionally preapproved for SRS prior to her 1989 conviction for second-degree
murder (Kavanagh v. Attorney General o f Canada (2001)).
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Disorder on January 20, 1998. She transitioned while serving, “with the full support of
the Department of National Defense,” becoming the first soldier in the world to do so
(Forrester v. Regional Municipality of Peel - Police Services Board (2006) HR0583/584-04 HRTO 13, at 126). Texts that predominantly reference these two cases are
concerned with the federal government and, therefore, I deemed them inappropriate for
the purposes of this project and its focus on the Ontario provincial health insurance
coverage.
Similarly, I excluded texts primarily concerned with Kimberly Nixon and her
interactions with the Vancouver Rape Relief Society. I arrived at this decision, in part,
because the case began in British Columbia, and because the focus was not provincial
funding for sex reassignment surgery. In the case of Nixon v. Vancouver Rape Relief
Society, Nixon, a post-operative MtF transsexual, first filed a human rights complaint
against Rape Relief in 1995, arguing that Vancouver Rape Relief had discriminated
against her on the grounds of sex. Nixon had attempted to volunteer with the organization
as a helper, but was turned away. Vancouver Rape Relief argued that Nixon did not meet
the occupational requirements of the organization as she lacked life-long social
experience as a woman.

95

The BC Human Rights Tribunal sided with Nixon, but two

higher courts later agreed with Vancouver Rape Relief, overturning the original decision.
In 2007, after various court decisions spanning almost 12 years, the Supreme Court of
Canada refused to hear Nixon’s appeal (Nixon v. Vancouver Rape Relief Society [2002]
B.C.H.R.T.D. no. 1 (Q.L.); Perelle n. p.).
Vancouver Rape R e lie fs line of argumentation is in alignment with theorists who argue for life
long experience o f being a woman. In Chapter One, I presented a similar argument put forth by Marcia
Yudkin (1978). Similar to Vancouver Rape Relief, Yudkin finds the absence of an “uninterrupted past
social identity as girls or women” to be problematic for a MtF transsexual’s claim to a social identity as
“woman” (104).
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Overall, I incorporated a total of 77 texts into the dataset, with the following
breakdown: 17 texts appear in The Globe and Mail, 22 texts appear in The Toronto Star,
25 texts appear in the Toronto Sun; and 13 texts appear in the National Post. Each text
was numbered, divided by publishing source and arranged in order of publication date.
Appendix B catalogues all of the articles analyzed in the study, and it suggests that
coverage was sporadic over this period, often arising in response to particular events or in
reference to developments in ongoing cases. I identified and categorized the section of
the paper the text appears in - news, editorial, opinion column, feature, etc. - to code the
visibility of the text and the authority with which it speaks. I present this information in
Table 2 “Section and Tone”. In my analysis of the texts, I approach hard news articles
separately from those appearing in columns and letters to the editor sections. I explore the
tone and variety of ways in which hard news articles approach transsexuality and sex
reassignment surgery versus those in other sections of the newspaper.
Table 2. Section and Tone
News Source

National Post
1

The Globe and Mail

Section
Column: 2
Feature: 1
News: 1

Editorial: 2
Letters: 6
Opinion: 1

Total Texts: 13

Focus: 3
Column: 4
Letter to the Editor: 5
News: 4
Report on Business: 1

Tone
Negative: 7
Neutral96: 1
Positive: 5*
*3 were positive towards
TS but negative to articles
they referenced
Negative: 4
Neutral: 9
Positive: 4*

This neutrality is assumed - wherein the text attempts to convey information without prejudice.
This is a facet of hard news writing. Many of these articles still make use of problematic phrases, or phrases
with negative connotative meanings (such as “sex change”). Articles coded as neutral take into
consideration the attempt at neutrality in conveying relevant information, even though I acknowledge that
neutrality, as such, is a highly problematic notion.
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Total Text: 17

The Toronto Star

Toronto Sun

Letter: 5
Life: 5
National Report: 1
Letter of Day: 1

News: 8
Other: 2

Total Texts: 22
Cartoon: 1
News: 13
Comment: 1
Editorial-Opinion: 1
Letter of the Day: 2
Letter to the Editor: 7
Total Texts: 25

*1 Positive text, 3 Letter to
Editors that were positive
towards TS but negative
towards article of reference
Negative: 2
Neutral: 14
Positive: 6

Negative: 10
Neutral: 13
Positive: 2*

.

,

* 1 Positive text that was
negative towards article
referenced

I also catalogued and documented all quoted or attributed sources within the texts.
As well, I paid particular attention to locating the use of expert knowledge in the framing
of each text. I noted references to legal cases, the DSM or the diagnostic category of
Gender Identity Disorder, expert knowledge producers such as psychiatrists and
academics, and the relation of trans identity or the ‘trans movement’ to gay identity and
the LGBTQ movement. I have made this information available in Table 3 “Key
References” for each news-producing source.
Table 3. Key References97

National Post

*DSM/APA: 6
*SRS in other provinces
*Clarke/CAMH: 3
^Ministry personnel: 4
*CHA: 1
*Hu man Rights/Criminal Code: 1
*Transsexuality in relation to ‘gays’: 2
* SRS positioned against other services:

*Reference to Taxes: 3
*Ray Blanchard: 2
^Medical Personnel: 7
*WHO: 1
*MPs: 2
*OHRC: 2
2

This column refers to the consultation of expert knowledge: the sources texts draw upon to claim
authority.
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The Globe and Mail

The Toronto Star

Toronto Sun

*GLQ Journal
*J. Michael Bailey: 2
*Academics referenced: 1798
*Ray Blanchard: 2
*Paul McHugh of John Hopkins: 3
*CHA: 2
*GID: 4
*SRS in other provinces: 3
*Charter: 2
*OMA: 1
*Clarke-CAMH: 7
*WHO: 1
^Medical Personnel: 5
*Ministry personnel: 2
*Montreal Clinic: 3
*Kimberly Nixon: 3
*OHRC-Code-Tribunal: 7
*Egale Canada: 1
*Government ID: 1
*BC HRC: 1
*Keith Norton: 1
*George Smitherman: 2
*Harry (once quoted as “Henry”) Benjamin: 2
*Cost and Number of Procedures Performed: 8
*CHA: 5
*Clarke/CAMH: 9
^Charter:
3
*OMA: 3
*GIC: 5
*GID: 5
*MPs: 6
*Medical personnel: 6
*Ministry officials: 9
*Ray Blanchard: 3
*WHO: 2
*APA/DSM: 2
*OHRC/Tribunal: 12
* Montréal Clinic: 2
*Martine Stonehouse: 4
*George Smitherman: 4
*Michelle Josef/AB: 4
^Government ID: 3
*Rainbow Health Networks: 2
*SRS positioned against other services: 3
*Cost and Number of Procedures: 14
*Clarke-CAMH: 3
*Charter: 3
*CHA: 1
*References to Taxes: 3
*Elizabeth Witmer: 4
*Michelle Josef: 4
*Human Rights: 2
*Ray Blanchard: 1
*Keith Norton: 1
*Martine Stonehouse: 5
*Health Insurance Act: 1
*OHR Tribunal: 6
*George Smitherman: 6
*Marilyn Churley: 3
*MPs: 6
*Egale Canada: 1
*Stonehouse-Hogan-AB: 2
*OHRC: 5
*OHRC Discussion paper: 2
* Montréal clinic: 2
*SRS positioned against other service: 9
*Cost and Number of Procedures: 23

I divided and analyzed the documents under examination along two dimensions:
tone and language. I made use of the tone dimension to determine the attitude or

Academics referenced are: Susan Stryker, C. Jacob Hale, Henry S. Rubin, Jay Prosser, Alice
Dreger, Paul McHugh, J. Michael Bailey, Henry Benjamin, John Money, Olive Johnson, Diane Watson,
and Ray Blanchard.
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emotional content of the texts in question. Each article was coded as negative, neutral or
positive in tone. I borrow the concept of “tone” from Tina Fetner who employs a
bifurcated (and admittedly crude) measure of emotional expression present within her
data set (417). The language dimension refers to the recurrence of key phrases and
provocative words to describe situations, individuals and ideas. This bracket was also
used to categorize the texts’ overall approach to transsexuality and sex reassignment
surgery and therefore contributes to the overall tone of the text. I coded the language
dimension using two separate categories and this information is presented in Table 4
“Repeated Title Motifs,” and Table 5 “Key Phrases”.
Table 4: Repeated Title Motifs
National Post

The Globe and Mail

The Toronto Star

Toronto Sun

*Sex-Change
*Medical need or a
lifestyle?
*Human Rights
Issue
*Misunderstood
Transsexuals
*Gender Dysphoria
*Gender Confusion

*Sex Change
Surgery
*Mutilation is Not
Therapy
*Transsexuals as
Political
^Rights and
Discrimination
*Sex Reassignment
- a Misdirection of
Psychiatry?

* Free the Woman
Within
*Gender Gap
*Slippery Slope
*Sex-Change
Operation
*‘Real-Life’ Test
* Delisting
Prejudiced
^Priorities all
Wrong
*Few Surgeries
Approved
*‘Very Serious
Medical Condition’

*Transsexual
Surgery
*Sex Change
*Gender Switches
*Sex OPs
*Sex Swap
*Gender
Reassignment
*Gender Surgery

Table 5: Key Phrases - Language used to frame the issue

National Post

* ‘Lifestyle’ choice vs. psychiatric disorder. Meaningless to say it
is a lifestyle choice if a psychiatric disorder
^Cosmetic procedure
*‘Weird fetishware’ associated with ‘the Transgendered’
*‘Sickness of the mind’
*Gender confusion syndrome
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* ‘Nothing more than genital mutilation’
*Pseudo ‘sex-change’
*GID is an artificial construct
*‘Mafia of transsexual academics’
*GID serious medical condition
*Gender essentialism: biology determines gender
* SRS versus other delisted services
* ‘Pseudo-vagina’
*Transphobia
*Minorities
* ‘Chromosomes cannot be changed’
*Autogynephilia
The Globe and Mail *‘Medically unnecessary treatment’
*Gender dysphoria as psychiatric disorder
’'‘Netherlands survey: ratio of transsexual persons
’“Interviews with TS/TG
*Physical descriptors of TS/TG subjects: clothing, makeup, hair,
jewelry, secondary sex characteristics
*Psychiatric Disorder
*Discrimination
*Medically necessary treatment
*‘Lifestyle’ operations
’H‘Life-saving surgery’
The Toronto Star
*‘Matter of dollars and cents’
*Conflation between GI and sexuality
* SRS versus other delisted services
’“OHIP should pay only for ‘vital’ health-care treatment that
‘benefit all of society’
*Not medically necessary
*‘Lifestyle operations’
*Transsexuals ‘lashing out’ at the government
*SRS versus ‘priority programs’ and ‘life-and-death’ care (cancer
Toronto Sun
and cardiac care)
*‘We should not pit one illness against another’
*‘Open all women’s washrooms to all men who think they’re
women’
*Transsexuality and Gender Identity not about sex/or sexual
orientation
*‘Sex-change operation is simply not in tune with the priorities of
most people in Ontario’
*‘Freak’ / plastic surgery
*‘Pay yourself’
*‘Liberals cave into demands’
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Overview of Findings: Tone and Language
I found that “Sex Change” was the most frequent catch phrase under the language
dimension. “Sex change” appears a total of 128 times within the texts, and was
incorporated into 19 article titles. In comparison, “sex reassignment surgery” appears a
total of 60 times within the texts, and was used in only 3 article titles." I noted a shift in
the appearance of SRS in the timeline: overwhelmingly, earlier texts rely on “sex change”
in discussions of transsexuality and OHIP coverage, whereas texts dated closer to 2008
tend towards the use of SRS alongside “sex change,” which remains in prominent use in
article titles and in Letters to the Editor.
References to sex reassignment surgery as a “lifestyle choice,” medically
unnecessary or as “mutilation,” also appear in each news producing source. In response
to such claims, expert medical personnel appear to validate both those in favour of and
those against public funding for sex reassignment surgery. Psychiatrists were quoted most
often in favour of Gender Identity Disorder and sex reassignment surgery as a legitimate
illness and as a medically needed procedure. In certain instances, medical personnel, such
as Paul Fedoroff, and Paul McHugh of the Johns Hopkins University, were called upon to
diminish the legitimacy of GID and sex reassignment surgery. Overall, I found that texts
that diminished the medical necessity of sex reassignment surgery viewed the procedure
as cosmetic or elective surgery.
Texts discussing the 1998 removal of sex reassignment surgery from the SOB-PS
justify the government’s unilateral delisting through a discussion of “reprioritizing
health-care dollars” (Rapahel, National Post, 25 Nov 1998). Then Health Minister
Elizabeth Witmer and members of the Ministry of Health were quoted in seven articles
99

“Gender reassignment surgery” also appears a total of 19 times within the texts.

94

spanning all four news producers arguing the decision was not politically motivated while
reaffirming the re-allocation of funds from sex reassignment surgery to cardiac care,
cancer treatments and other “life-and-death priorities” (Lee-Shanok, The Toronto Sun, 20
June 1999). Tory MPP Marcel Beaubien is quoted in The Toronto Star acknowledging
the limited cost-saving benefits of delisting sex reassignment surgery in comparison to
cardiac care. However, he positions his argument in such a manner as to morally compel
the reader to choose a father’s heart transplant over a selfish desire for “sex change”:
‘It’s a matter of dollars and cents. If your father needed a heart transplant
but you wanted a sex change operation, which would you choose?’
Beaubien admits the ‘dollars and cents’ in question did not add up to a lot
of money. ‘It was not a large amount of money, but $122,000 would do a
bypass surgery,’ he says (Volmers, The Toronto Star, 19 Jan. 2001).
This argument, however, does not take into consideration personal actions such as diet
and exercise in contributing to the need for cardiac care or the post-operative costs of
complications from bypass surgery. Overall, this positioning of sex reassignment surgery
against other health services is problematic as it is reliant on an assumed ranking of
priority. I return to this discussion of situating sex reassignment surgery against other
OHIP services - including those delisted between 1998 and 2008 - in my discussion of
letters to the editor. Before arriving at that analysis, however, I first begin with a
discussion of hard news texts to highlight the differences between the texts based on the
paper section they appear under.

News Texts
A total of 28 texts appear as hard news pieces within the dataset: 1 in the National
Post, 4 in The Globe and Mail, 10 in The Toronto Star, and 13 in the Toronto Sun. These
texts are distinguished from those appearing under other sections of the newspapers -
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Life/Feature, Opinion Columns and Letters to the Editor - based on their tone and
attempt at neutrality. Hard news texts function within the paradigm of objective
journalistic writing, which aims to convey factual information without prejudice by only
providing the facts of a given situation or event without commentary (Media Awareness
Network n. p.). As Bill Kovach and Tom Rosentiel state, journalistic concerns, with the
concept of objectivity are present in the discipline of verification. “Practices such as
seeking multiple witnesses to an event, disclosing as much as possible about sources, and
asking many sides for comment are, in effect, the discipline of verification” (71). The
news texts under examination overwhelmingly tend toward this approach by providing
information for the reader, resulting in a tendency for the text’s tone to appear neutral.
This neutrality is assumed to a certain respect as many of the articles still make use of
problematic phrases, or phrases with negative connotative meanings. Such problematic
phrases include the reliance on using “sex change operations” in article titles and in the
text. In my coding of articles as “neutral”, I have taken into consideration the attempt at
neutrality in conveying relevant information, even though I acknowledge that neutrality,
as such, is a highly problematic notion. This hegemonic discourse finds parallels in the
appearance of neutrality with the legal and medical discourses examined previously. The
hard news texts’ employment of an objective journalistic framework is similar in manner
to the philosophical basis of orthodox modern science as a field in which objective
knowledge of and about the world is attainable. In both instances, this objectivity is an
ideal.100

Ian Mitroff writes, “objectivity in science is due not to the fact that each individual scientist is
objective (i.e., emotionally disinterested, impersonal in the testing of his (sic) and his fellow scientists’
ideas), but rather, objectivity is due to the fact that scientists differ in the degree and kind of their subjective
‘biases’” (B-615). Donna Haraway’s 1998 article, ‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in
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The majority of the hard news texts cover the major developments related to the
issue of public funding for sex reassignment surgery during the research time-frame. If
we conceptualize the delisting and relisting of sex reassignment surgery under the SOBPS as a story with particular developments, the hard news texts then act as signposts
guiding the shifts in the tale. I found that three major events define the news texts’
narratives. As Jeff Harder’s 1998 Toronto Sun article ‘Sex-change surgery gets axe’ (pg
1) suggests, the story begins with the delisting announcement. The narrative proceeds
with the Charter challenges and the human right complaints filed against the province
(Gill, ‘Ontario decision to halt sex-change surgery payment challenged.’ The Globe and
Mail. 4 May 1999. A10). The coverage of the human rights complaints, and the Ontario
Human Rights Tribunal’s interim ruling and final decision regarding Hogan v. Ontario
presents the second major turn of events in the narrative of SRS coverage in Ontario. A
2005 article from The Toronto Star provides this summary: “[t]he Ontario government
has been ordered to cover the costs of sexual reassignment surgery for three transsexuals
left stranded when the previous Tory government delisted the service in 1998. ... The
tribunal found that delisting the surgery had a disproportionate adverse impact on the
complainants” (‘Ontario must pay for sex-change surgery.’ A14). Articles covering the
lead up to the Tribunal’s interim decision situate the discussion within a narrative of
human rights, wherein Ontario’s delisting is positioned against other provinces that (at
the time) publicly funded SRS. The articles note the history of Ontario providing
coverage for SRS prior to the delisting announcement in 1998, and make note of the
internationally recognized nature of GID and SRS.

Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective,’ provides a critique of constructivist feminist
deconstruction of scientific rhetoric and the concept of objectivity.
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As exemplified by Alan Findlay’s 21 April 2005 article, ‘Sex swap near ok,’
debates about the potential relisting of sex reassignment surgery appear alongside the
Tribunal ruling within the narrative (Toronto Sun. pg 3). The 10 articles that cover the
human rights challenges position the Ontario government’s stance as willing to follow
through with the ruling of the Tribunal, including reinstating full funding for sex
reassignment surgery if the Tribunal had ruled that the delisting process was
discriminatory. In ‘Help eyed for sex changes’, New Democrat MPP Marilyn Churley is
quoted in dialogue with Premier Dalton McGuinty:
‘If the tribunal rules in favour of reinstating funding, will you ensure that
your government respects the ruling and reinstate(s) the funding
immediately?’ ... ‘I want to be very, very direct to the member’s question:
Yes,’ McGuinty said (The Toronto Star, 21 April 2005. A07).
As I discussed earlier, the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal’s Final Order in Hogan v.
Ontario (2006) only prescribed compensation for three of the complainants, and did not
find the delisting itself discriminatory against transsexuals. Therefore, the McGuinty
government was not compelled by obligation to reinstate public funding for SRS.
The final turn of events in the narrative concerns Health Minister George
Smitherman’s May 2008 announcement of the relisting of sex reassignment surgery
under the SOB-PS. All four news producing sources cover the reinstatement of sex
reassignment surgery, including the National Post, which had the lowest number of hard
news texts dedicated to the issue (Huber. Ontario to resume funding for sex-change
operations. National Post. 16 May 2008. Al). Overall, the news articles function to
connect the different elements of a story - actors and actions, sources, background
information and quotes - into a cohesive whole. For example, Palmer’s Toronto Star
article ‘Sex-change delisting ‘prejudiced” (Palmer, 7 December 2002, A08) outlines the
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Ontario Human Rights Commission’s recommendation of four complaints to the Ontario
Human Rights Tribunal [Hogan v. Ontario]. Similar to a significant number of other hard
news articles, Palmer makes reference to the [6 to] 10 surgeries funded yearly by the
province prior to delisting, which cost an annual average of about $120,000. The motif of
referencing the average number of patients approved for surgery and the annual cost
occurs in 18 of the 28 hard news texts. Palmer’s article also provides background
information on sex reassignment surgery, drawing on the expertise of Dr. Ray Blanchard
from the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, Susan Ursel, a human rights lawyer,
and Maxine Petersen, a psychological associate from a private Montréal clinic
specializing in SRS. In the text, Blanchard is paraphrased as stating,
the sexology program [at CAMH] has always viewed surgery as a
treatment of last resort for patients diagnosed with gender dysphoria, a
clinical illness characterized by a desire to be, or insistence that one is, of
the opposite sex. However, Petersen [states] that for some transsexuals,
surgery is seen as the only option (Palmer, 7 December 2002, A08).
Here, the reliance on a medicalized model of transsexuality and the strong emphasis on
the experts at CAMH and other medical institutions as gatekeepers of surgery are made
explicit. In total, of the 28 hard news texts, 13 articles explicitly referenced the Clarke
Institute of Psychiatry/Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, while 8 articles made
direct references to Gender Identity Disorder or gender dysphoria. This reliance on expert
knowledge producers is also reflected in the editorial columns and letters to the editor.

Opinion Columns and Letters to the Editor
Expert knowledge appears within opinion columns to both support public funding
for sex reassignment surgery, and to argue against it. To discuss the use of expert
knowledge in justifying a particular approach to transsexuality and sex reassignment
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surgery, I take as a case study four columns by Margarete Wente101 from The Globe and
Mail, and five letters to the editor published in response to them. The Wente articles were
published on 2 November 1999, 22 February 2000, 14 December 2000, and 25 August
2007. The letters to the editor in response to the columns appear within a week of the
original article’s publication. Each of Wente’s four columns makes specific reference to a
trans individual: Michelle Josef, Sylvia Durand, Kimberly Nixon, and Deborah Bershel.
She does not reference any FtM transsexuals. Wente’s texts make use of an essentialist
framework wherein anatomical or chromosomal sex is understood as the ‘real’ definer of
an individual’s gender. In writing about Kimberly Nixon, Wente states: “To the untutored
eye, she looks a bit like a man in a dress, which is not surprising in that she is equipped
with a full set of XY chromosomes” (14 Dec 2000). Her texts make clear indications as
to an individual’s birth-assigned sex with specific references to the status of the
individual’s “penis”.102 Although Wente does use the correct or preferred gendered
pronoun when she discusses specific individuals, she references original birth names which are in contradiction to the gender appropriate name each individual has adopted and gives detailed physical descriptors of each trans individual. She writes about Sylvia
Durand: “She used to be named Sylvain. She’s a 37-year-old sergeant in the Canadian
army, a strapping six-footer with squared shoulders, spit curls, pearl-drop earrings, and
chic maquillage, as they say in Québec” (Wente 22 Feb. 2000). Wente’s texts make
references to other physical descriptors, such as secondary sex characteristics and

Wente is a conservative columnist with The Globe and Mail, and has similar counterparts in her
tone and approach to transsexuality and sex reassignment surgery during the research time frame in the
form o f National Post columnist David Frum and Toronto Sun columnist Christina Blizzard.
Wente also conflates gender identity with sexual orientation, noting “transgendered people now
share equal billing with gays, lesbians and bisexuals in the ever-expanding panoply of sexual minorities”
(27 Aug 2007).
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signifiers of gender for each trans subject: high cheekbones, slim hips, fluffy bangs, gold
hoop earrings, owning dozens of pairs of high heels, dark skirts and teal tops, etc.
Cissexual individuals, however, are not treated in the same manner. Rape Relief worker
Suzanne Jay receives no physical descriptors, neither do Paul McHugh and an unnamed
YMCA worker.
Most notably, Wente calls on elements of the medical system in order to lend
legitimacy to her arguments. She uses medical classifications such as autogynephilia103
and cites research undertaken at Johns Hopkins University, including references to
psychiatrist Paul McHugh (who does not support sex reassignment surgery). Such tactics
elevate the level of authority with which Wente speaks, as her arguments are supported
with the use of expert knowledge in line with her views. Readers unfamiliar with such
expert systems may be inclined to accept Wente’s presentation of the issues without
undertaking further examination. This acceptance is reflective of the tendency within
news discourse wherein expert opinion is viewed as inherently valid, particularly when
spoken in the name of scientific truth or from within the academy. This tendency is
visible in Wente’s use of academic/scientific experts and in the way perspectives from
actual trans persons are diminished in relation to non-trans experts.
In a letter to the editor in response to Wente’s Dec 14 2000 article (Who Gets To
Be a Woman?), Kenneth J. Zucker, psychologist-in-chief at the Centre for Addiction and
Mental Health, writes:
Ms. Wente leans on Paul McHugh, psychiatrist-in-chief at Johns Hopkins
University in Baltimore, a man with a sharp tongue, but little in the way of
either clinical or academic credentials in the area of psychosexual
development and its disorders. It is astonishing to me that Ms. Wente
Ray Blanchard defines autogynephilia as “a man's paraphilic tendency to be sexually aroused by
the thought or image of himself as a woman” (1989).
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knows nothing about the work of the gender-identity specialists at the
Clarke Institute of Psychiatry (now the Centre for Addiction and Mental
Health) who, for 30 years now, have made careful clinical and scientific
contributions to the understanding and treatment of both children and
adults with gender dysphoria, including empirical documentation of the
efficacy of sex-reassignment surgery for adults (15 Dec 2000).
This letter to the editor is of particular interest as it highlights a rupture within the
academy that may not always be advertised to outsiders. Even within the medical
approach to sex reassignment surgery and transsexuality, there are a variety of factions:
those against transsexuality as a legitimate subject position, those in favour of reparative
therapy, and those who call for an end to the pathologization of non-cisnormative subject
positions. This rupture is visible in responses from members of the academy to Wente’s
texts. Although Zucker is critical of Wente’s work, Ray Blanchard, who works at CAMH
alongside Zucker, refers to Wente’s 2007 article as “otherwise excellent” (27 Aug 2007).
Overall, of the five letters to the editor The Globe and Mail published in response to
Wente’s columns, two are from citizens without any specified qualifications, while three
are from those in expert knowledge systems: Kenneth J. Zucker, Ray Blanchard and
Alice Dreger.104 Unlike letters to the editor of the other news producers, letters to the
editor published in The Globe and Mail remain predominantly neutral or positive in tone,
and exist within a framework of expert knowledge. This is reflective of the emphasis
placed on the medicalized nature of transsexuality in Ontario, specifically in health and
legal sectors. Below, I provide closer analysis of the letters to the editor appearing in the
four news producing sources.
I found that letters to the editor that diminished the medical necessity of sex
reassignment surgery often position public funding for the procedure(s) against other
Alice Dreger is associate professor, clinical medical humanities and bioethics at Northwestern
University.
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delisted OHIP services - such as eye exams, physiotherapy and funding for parents of
autistic children. Such texts were the most negative in tone, using inflammatory language
and were at times fallacious in their arguments. The majority of such texts appear in the
letter to editor columns:
WELL, NOW I have heard it all! (“Sex swap OK near,” April 21.) OHIP
will no longer pay for my eye examination but they are considering paying
for sex change operations. Hmmm ... maybe I should give them a call to
see if they can make me into a man with better vision (Mario Martin,
Toronto Sun, 22 April 2005).
[S]ex changes, elective plastic surgery and the like have no criteria and
justification for the allocation of public funds. It behooves each citizen to
foot his own bill in case the need for non-medical, non-life-threatening
remedies arise. The services of OHIP were introduced for genuine medical
expenses and not to soothe thrill-seeking desires at the expense of maybe
having to forgo otherwise needed assistance of higher priority (Herbet
Misik, Toronto Sun, 4 July 1999, C2).
I have worn glasses for 50 of my 55 years. I know that I need a new
prescription. I cannot, however, afford the cost of the exam and new
glasses for this legitimate and chronic medical condition. But it’s nice to
know that should I need gender reassignment surgery, I’m covered (Rob
Cowan, The Toronto Star, 19 May 2008, AA07).
Better the money be used for cancer research or something that would
benefit all of society. If people decide they want to be another sex, they
should pay for it themselves. This is not a health issue. Smoking, obesity,
diet and other factors are. Nobody ever died as a direct result of not being
the sex they want (William Mellor, The Toronto Star, 17 May 2008
AA05).
Until OHIP agrees to pick up the tab105 on obvious life-saving medicine,
like my insulin, I cannot agree to tax dollars being spent on SRS (Elliot
Skierszkan, National Post, 19 June 2008 A. 21).
Interestingly, The Globe and Mail was the only news source that did not contain letters to
the editor that expressed such views, perhaps suggesting a different editorial stance
aiming at more balanced reporting. However, as stated previously, Margaret Wente’s
105

OHIP does not cover prescription medication. Each patient pays for prescription drugs.
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columns are quite hostile towards trans persons. As well, conservative MP Pierre
Poilievre is paraphrased in one article as stating, “[T]he province [should] pay only for
‘vital’ health-care treatments, and not sexual reassignment surgery” (20 May 2008). Five
negative responses to such problematic sentiments and letters to the editor are also
available in the dataset. For example, Geoffrey McLarney writes:
Many readers seem intent on perpetuating the myth that sex reassignment
surgery is a trivial, elective procedure. Many trans-individuals experience
profound psychological distress if their incongruous bodies are not treated.
For many, the alternative is suicide. Are there other procedures OHIP
should be insuring? Of course. But to pit trans-Ontarians against autistic
children or medical marijuana users is unfair and irrational (The Toronto
Star, 20 May 2008, AA07).
As McLarney points out, positioning sex reassignment surgery against other medical
services makes little sense. This bifurcation process functions to further create an
Us/Them divide, wherein transsexuality and sex reassignment surgery are diminished and
demonized in comparison to “worthy” and “life-saving” health care. In a cisnormative
culture such as ours, those who attempt to live as the “opposite sex” often encounter
ridicule, brutalization, degradation, attacks, or become the subjects of study or
fetishization. The problematic components of the diagnostic category of Gender Identity
Disorder aside, it remains that sex reassignment surgery is one venue through which a
minority of trans Ontarians are able to live comfortably in society and acquire access to
legal recognition.
Likewise, Ray Blanchard notes, the notion of transsexualism as a ‘life-style
choice’ is absurd. “The ‘choices’ confronting transsexuals are whether to endure a
lifetime of frustration and misery, kill themselves, or risk - and often lose - their
families, friends, and jobs in the hopes of finding a happier life as the opposite sex”
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(Blanchard and Fedoroff 4). The reality remains that sex reassignment surgery is offered
as the last resort treatment to trans patients. Although the World Professional Association
for Transgender Health, Standards o f Care (2001) recommends that an individual
considered for surgery live in the preferred gender for 12 months, the CAMH Gender
Identity Clinic requirements call for a two year period of successful cross-living in the
preferred gender before a patient is even considered eligible for sex reassignment surgery
(Centre for Addiction and Mental Health). In alignment with the historical yearly number
of seven or eight patients who were recommended for surgery prior to the 1998 delisting,
and George Smitherman’s estimated eight to ten since the relisting in 2008, we can note
that access to surgery is not a casually granted procedure. The process of “changing sex”
is a difficult one, and is a potential reality for only a handful of trans Ontarians. The
Gender Identity Clinic at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health is the Ministry
mandated clinic for public sector funding for sex reassignment surgery in Ontario.
Therefore, trans individuals who wish to access surgery supplemented by OHIP must
submit to the regulations and criteria set out by CAMH, including relocations to Toronto
were the clinic is located. This reflects the strong hold that CAMH has over publically
funded sex reassignment surgery in Ontario. Letters to the editor that make light of the
ease with which one can access public funding for sex reassignment surgery do not
reflect the reality of the difficulty in accessing such funds.

Final Comments
In the same manner as the legal and medical fields I have examined, news texts
function through discourse, which “brings about a process of categorization, of ordering
and normalizing, which generates knowledge about ourselves, and about the events we
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are living” (Martin-Rojo 51). Trans subjects are articulated on two axes in the news
discourses: first, through a perceived sense of diminished capacity that requires expert
medical knowledge to “call into being” the experience of gender dysphoria and to
approve access to surgery; and, second, through the process of exclusion based on
Us/Them binaries. Here, I draw upon Luisa Martin-Rojo’s Foucauldian notion of
exclusion,106 and argue that trans subjects are excluded in Canadian newspapers through
the processes of dividing, and rejecting. In the process of dividing, there is an Us/Them
binary that is employed: the sane and normal “Us” (the cissexual107) are posited against
the insane or abnormal “Them” (the transsexual). In the process of rejecting, a
segregation or marginalization takes place wherein a negative image is produced of the
trans subject as posited against the cohesive “Us” (Martin-Rojo 50). This process of
dividing and rejecting is noticeable in news texts in the categorization of individuals into
groups (as cissexuals or transsexuals), and through the positioning of sex reassignment
surgery against other delisted services.
Discourses that speak of transsexuality and sex reassignment surgery as a
“lifestyle choice” or as elective surgery diminish the lived experience of gender
dysphoria in relation to cisnormativity. Arguments against public funding for SRS aim to
delegitimize the reality of trans subjectivity and needed support; transsexuality and sex
reassignment surgery become coded as mentally unstable, morally ambiguous and selfcentered actions against other deserving ailments and persons. In comparison, the trans

Although Martin-Rojo’s work does not contend with trans subjects I find her theoretical
frameworks to be transferable to my discussion here.
Though I continue to use the term ‘cissexual’ none of the articles employ this terminology to refer
to non-trans individuals. 1 argue that this lack of critical awareness is due to existing power relations in
Canadian society that perceive cissexuals as the norm, perpetuating the belief that ‘norms’ do not require
examination or justification. Transsexuality, then, comes to be defined as abnormal only in relation to the
perceived normality of cissexuality.
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individuals and the allies who appear within the news texts strive to legitimize
transsexuality and to provide “worthy” arguments for funding sex reassignment surgery.
Although the opinion columns and the letters to the editor are secondary to the
hard news texts, together they all function to expose and re-produce primary narratives
about transsexuality to the general Canadian population. As Vincent et al. indicate,
“[T]he mass media are one of the most powerful institutional forces in society” (282) and
“newspapers remain one of the most prevalent media forms” (283). The myth of news
objectivity hides the fact that news texts - even those labeled here as hard news - are
interpretations rather than reflections of affairs (Martin-Rojo 53). Each of the four papers
under examination give - to varying degrees - the impression of being objective
newspapers seeking truth. One method of increasing the appearance of truth in news is to
make use of other reliable sources, such as authorities and professionals. Although trans
subjects are referenced and quoted within the texts examined above, the general social
hierarchy is reproduced through the reliance on medical opinions and legal cases, which
reflect the knowledge systems in which transsexuality is officially discussed in Ontario.
Therefore, as systems of hegemonic norms, the legal, medical and news discourses
present a normative understanding of transsexuality - one where expert knowledge is
required to substantiate a transsexual subject position.
Overall, the above news texts reveal the divided status of sex reassignment
surgery and transsexuality in Ontario. Particularly, the positing of sex reassignment
surgery against other delisted OHIP services serves to highlight the misunderstood nature
of transsexuality. The Ontario Cabinet’s decision to delist sex reassignment surgery
without consultation of the OMA, members of CAMH or individuals from the affected
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community requires further examination. Then Health Minister Elizabeth Witmer and
members of the Ministry of Health and Long Term Care maintained that the 1998
delisting was part of cost-saving efforts in the aim of reprioritizing the SOB-PS and not a
political move. Although the diagnosis of Gender Identity Disorder poses problems, it is
the only venue for trans persons to have their affirmed sex/gender recognized by the
province of Ontario. It remains that transsexuality and the procedures of sex reassignment
surgery challenge deeply held beliefs about the relationship between sex and gender.
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Afterword
The public opinion and lived experiences of trans people are affected by at least
two distinct but interrelated epistemic discourses: legal frameworks and medical
literature. At present, there is an opportunity to enact institutional change within each
discourse. The first opportunity concerns the ongoing revisions to the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and the diagnostic category of Gender
Identity Disorder (GID) in preparation for the publishing of DSM-V. The second
opportunity presents itself in NDP MP Bill Siksay’s proposed Bill C-389, which aims to
incorporate explicit protection for gender identity and gender expression in the Canadian
Human Rights Act (CHRA) and the Criminal Code of Canada. Although these proposals
are currently under examination and the ultimate outcome is unknown, I feel that they
reflect the pressing need to work towards addressing the concerns of the trans community
and the discourse of transsexuality.
In 1999, the process of revising the DSM began with leaders from the American
Psychiatric Association (APA), the World Health Organization, and World Psychiatric
Association involved in the research planning of specific diagnostic areas (APA 2010a, n.
p.). In 2006, Dr. David J. Kupfer was announced as chair and Dr. Darrel A. Regier as
vice chair of the task force to oversee the development of DSM-V. Additional members
of the APA were nominated to the task force to review the literature and scientific
advancements associated with the 13 work fields to develop draft diagnostic criteria for
DSM-V. In July 2007, Kenneth J. Zucker (Psychologist-in-Chief at the Centre for
Addiction and Mental Health) was elected as the chair of the DSM-V workgroup on
Sexual and Gender Identity Disorders. The gender committee of the DSM - announced in

109

May 2008 - is composed of Drs. Jack Drescher, Heino F. L. Meyer-Bahlburg, and
Friedemann Pfafflin and chaired by Dr. Peggy Cohen-Kettnis.10x The first proposed draft
criteria for changes to the GID diagnosis took two years to announce, and must still pass
through a variety of tasks - including Phase 1 and II pilot testing, field trials and revisions
- before it is adopted. The APA expects the final, approved DSM-V to be released in
May 2013.
In Chapter 2, I outlined the complicated relationship of trans individuals and the
pathologizing nature of the GID diagnostic criteria. Without advocating for a
declassification or complete removal of GID unescorted by another system to be
implemented in its place, I maintain that the upcoming revision to the DSM provides a
concrete opportunity to address some of the most problematic grievances of the GID
diagnosis. The medical community is faced with the opportunity to address and effect
positive change in the discourse of transsexuality and gender variance. As the APA’s
website indicates, while continuity between the DSM-IV-TR and DSM-V is desirable,
“there has been no pre-set limitation on the nature and degree of change that work groups
can recommend for DSM-V' (APA 2010a, n. p.). This transitional time for the DSM
allows the APA to announce, officially, that gender variance is not in and of itself a
mental illness, and to remove the stigma associated with it. Gender incongruence or
gender dysphoria only becomes a mental disorder when it causes the individual
significant problems, much of which can be the result of prejudiced social practice and
discriminatory institutions.

The DSM-V workgroup on Sexual and Gender Identity Disorders also includes Irving M. Binik,
Ray Blanchard, Lori Brotto, Martin Kafka, Richard B. Jrueger, Niklas Langstrom, and Robert Taylor
Segraves. The members o f the workgroup come from the United States, Canada, The Netherlands, The
United Kingdom, Sweden, and Germany.
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However, as the first release of the DSM-V development proposed revisions
indicate,
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the APA has not embraced the opportunity to enact significant change. The

gender work group’s DSM-V proposal has widened the definition of Gender
Incongruence (the new name replacing GID) to include intersex individuals, or those
born with physical Disorders of Sex Development (DSD) (APA 2010b, n. p). As well, the
DSM-IV-TR’s Criterion D, which outlined distress and/or impairment in social,
occupational or other areas of functioning, has been removed in the proposed DSM-V.
The work group proposes that distress and/or impairment be evaluated separately and
independently from the implementation of the GI diagnosis (APA 2010b, n. p). This
proposed change is positive in that it no longer assumes adolescents and adults diagnosed
with GID/GI function in an universally impaired manner. However, it remains unclear
whether anyone with a non-traditional gender identity would receive a diagnosis of
GID/GI if experiencing “A marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed
gender and assigned gender, of at least 6 months duration” even if they are functioning
well and are happy (APA 2010b, n. p.). The proposed revisions remain in a state of flux
as they continue to be tested in field trials, and may indeed undergo significant changes
prior to the publishing of DSM-V in 2013. It remains to be seen how the APA and
medical community respond to the various challenges posed to the DSM-IV diagnosis of
GID in light of inherent versus social and institutional distress and disability.
As the Ontario Human Rights Commission has noted, “there are, arguably, few
groups in society today who are as disadvantaged and disenfranchised as the
transgendered community. Transphobia combined with the hostility of society to the very

Proposed Draft Revisions to DSM Disorders and Criteria are available online at the APA’s DSM5
development website: http://www.dsm5.org/Pages/Default.aspx
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existence of transgendered people are fundamental human rights issues” (2000, 2). Yet,
neither gender identity nor gender expression is an enumerated ground in the Ontario
Human Rights Code or the Canadian Human Rights Act. In Canada, The North West
Territories is the only province or territory to explicitly recognize human rights protection
for trans persons by including gender identity as prohibited grounds (Northwest
Territories Human Rights Act S.N.W.T. 2002, c. 18).110
In June 2000, the Ontario Human Rights Commission released its Policy on
Discrimination and Harassment because o f Gender Identity. The Commission’s Policy
resulted from a discussion paper on the issue of gender identity published in October
1999, and states that complaints of discrimination or harassment based on gender identity
are to be accepted by the commission under the grounds of sex and/or disability.
However, implicit protections at the federal and provincial-territorial level for trans
persons in the fields of sex, disability or sexual orientation, may not be applicable in all
cases, are subject to interpretation, and, as such, remain inadequate. In light of this
inadequacy, New Democratic Party MP Bill Siksay111 (Burnaby-Douglas) introduced Bill
C-389, titled An Act to Amend the Human Rights Act and the Criminal Code (Gender
Identity and Gender Expression) during the 40th Parliament - 2nd Session (Jan. 26, 2009 Dec. 30, 2009). The private members’ bill addresses the lack of explicit federal
protections for transgender and transsexual people in provisions of the Canadian Human
Rights Act (CHRA) and the Criminal Code of Canada.

The jurisdictions o f Vancouver, Toronto and Ottawa have also adopted policies to protect
transgender and transsexual people.
111
Siksay is the New Democrat critic for Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transgender and Transsexual
Issues. Siksay is also an activist with Affirm United, the organization o f gay, lesbian, bisexual and
transgender United Church members and adherents (NDP website n. p.).
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Bill C-389 proposes to add gender identity and gender expression as prohibited
grounds for discrimination to the Human Rights Act. Under the Criminal Code, gender
identity and gender expression would also be added as distinguishing characteristics to be
protected under subsection 318(4), Definition of ‘identifiable group’ (Canada, Bill C389). Siksay has tabled this bill twice before; in the previous attempts, the bill died on the
order paper due to Parliament being dissolved or being prorogued prior to the 2008
Canadian elections. In this third attempt, Bill C-389 achieved first reading in the House
of Commons on May 15, 2009, during the 2nd session of the 40th parliament. In the 3rd
session (March 3, 2010-), the bill was first read on March 3, 2010, placed on the Order of
Precedence on April 15, 2010 with the first hour of debate completed on May 10,
2010

. A second hour of debate will occur when C-389 once again reaches the top of

the order of precedence.
It is yet undetermined if the bill will receive Royal Assent and come into force.
The passage of Bill C-389 through the House of Commons and the Senate would provide
provinces and municipalities with guidelines for the implementation of criminal sanctions
to address the pervasive prejudice, discrimination and violence faced by many trans
people. The experience of discrimination and violence continues to be a large component
within research conducted regarding the trans community. For example, Chris Boodram
and Corie Langdon’s Trans Legislative Needs Survey (2004) is concerned with violence,
discrimination and harassment experienced by trans people in the Ottawa area. Although
the sample population was limited, they found that safety and human rights issues were*
The official report o f the first hour of debate concerning Bill C-389 (see: Private Members'
Business) is published under the authority of the Speaker of the House of Commons (Canada. Parliament.
House of Commons Debates, May 10, 2010), and is made available online at:
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/
Publication. aspx?Pub=Hansard&Doc=43&Language=E&Mode=l&Parl=40&Ses=3
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significant concerns of the Ottawa trans community. Their research found that trans
participants experienced high incidences of verbal harassment (74%), intimidation (54%),
hate propaganda (41%), attempted assault (38%) and physical assault without a weapon
(32%) (n. p.).113 Their findings echo other international studies concerned with trans
communities. A 1992 study conducted in London, England found that 52% of MtF
transsexuals and 43% of FtM transsexuals surveyed had been physically assaulted (145).
Viviane K. Namaste’s interviews (2000) - conducted in the summer of 1995 in Ontario also highlight violence as central to her research participants, suggesting that taken for
granted experiences such as basic safety remain a pressing issue for the survey’s trans
participants. Egale Canada’s First National Climate Survey on Homophobia in Canadian
Schools (2009) reported that 9 of 10 trans students were verbally harassed because of
their gender expression. As well, the survey showed that 95% of trans students felt unsafe
at school in comparison to the 20% of cissexual students who expressed similar feelings
(Egale 2009, n. p.).
As the members of the House of Commons continue to debate Bill C-389,1 would
also like to recognize Canada’s international support of human rights protection. Canada
is a signatory, alongside 66 other countries, to the draft text of the United Nations
Statement on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (2008). The draft
statement reaffirms “the principle of non-discrimination which requires that human rights
apply equally to every human being regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity”
(UN General Assembly). The draft text condemns violence, harassment, discrimination,

113
Boodram and Langdon also note that participants experienced “significant levels of discrimination
in housing, employment and services including unwelcome comments at work, 43%; unwelcome
comments in living accommodations, 32%; and discrimination in bars, restaurants, schools, universities and
colleges, each at 32%” (n. p.).
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exclusion, stigmatization, and prejudice based on sexual orientation and gender identity,
alongside its condemnation of torture, arbitrary arrest, killings and executions, and
deprivation of economic, social, and cultural rights based on those grounds (UN General
Assembly). If the government of Canada presents itself as a country that is internationally
concerned with the human rights protections of all transgendered and transsexual
individuals, it stands that the government should also implement equivalent federal
policies at home. As Canadians we must aim for more than mere tolerance or
accommodation of trans related issues, legal or otherwise. Trans Canadians deserve the
same level of respect and dignity accorded to other Canadians.
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Appendices
Appendix A: (Ontario) V ita l S ta tis tic s A c t R .S .0 .1990, CHAPTER V.4
Last amendment: 2009, c. 33, Sched. 17, s. 13.

Changes Resulting from Transsexual Surgery
Changing sex designation
36. ( 1) Where the anatomical sex structure of a person is changed to a sex other
than that which appears on the registration of birth, the person may apply to the Registrar
General to have the designation of sex on the registration of birth changed so that the
designation will be consistent with the results of the transsexual surgery.

Application
(2) An application made under subsection (1) shall be accompanied by,
(a) a certificate signed by a medical practitioner legally qualified to practise
medicine in the jurisdiction in which the transsexual surgery was
performed upon the applicant, certifying that,
(i) he or she performed transsexual surgery on the applicant, and
(ii) as a result of the transsexual surgery, the designation of sex of the
applicant should be changed on the registration of birth of the
applicant;
(b) a certificate of a medical practitioner who did not perform the transsexual
surgery but who is qualified and licensed to practise medicine in Canada
certifying that,
(i) he or she has examined the applicant,
(ii) the results of the examination substantiate that transsexual surgery
was performed upon the applicant, and
(iii) as a result of the transsexual surgery, the description of the sex of
the applicant should be changed on the registration of birth of the
applicant; and
(c) evidence satisfactory to the Registrar General as to the identity of the
applicant.

Alternate medical evidence
(3) Where it is not possible to obtain the medical certificate referred to in clause
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(2) (a) or (b), the applicant shall submit such medical evidence of the transsexual surgery
as the Registrar General considers necessary.
Notation on birth registration to be consistent with result of surgery

(4)
The Registrar General shall, upon application made to him or her in
accordance with this section, cause a notation to be made on the birth registration of the
applicant so that the registration is consistent with the results of the surgery.

Old certificates to be returned

(5)
Any person in possession or control of a certificate or certified copy of a birth
registration issued before the making of a notation under subsection (4) shall return the
certificate or certified copy to the Registrar General forthwith upon demand.
Birth certificate issued after notation

(6) Every birth certificate issued after the making of a notation under this section shall be
issued as if the original registration of birth had been made showing the designation of
sex as changed under this section. R.S.O. 1990, c. V.4, s. 36.

Citation: Vital Statistics Act R.S.O. 1990, CHAPTER V.4. Government of Ontario.
ServiceOntario e-Laws. Accessed 26 Jan 2010. http://www.elaws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_90v04_e.htm
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Appendix B: Data Set, News Articles
T h e G l o b e a n d M a il

Wilson, Robin. To sir - uh, madam with love. 21 Feb 1998, Focus, Gender
Bending. D9.
Gill, Alexandra. Ontario decision to halt
sex-change surgery payments
challenged. 4 May 1999. National News.
A10
Nolen, Stephanie. The third way. 25
September 1999. Focus, Gender. Dl.
Wente, Margaret. Check one: male,
female or gender gifted. 2 Nov 1999.
Column, Counterpoint. A21.
Spencer, Steven. Transgendered
minority. 9 Nov. 1999. Letter to the
Editor. A20
Wente, Margaret. Cutting it off is
mutilation, not therapy. 22 Feb 2000.
Column, Counterpoint. A21
Fryklun, Kevin. Sex-change surgery. 24
Feb 2000. Letter to the Editor. A20
Galt, Virginia. Marginalized workers
find a voice. 1 Aug 2000. Report on
Business: Managing, working life. B10.
Wente, Margaret. Who gets to be a
woman? 14 Dec 2000. Column,
Counterpoint. A 19

Chung, Matthew. Ontario upholds
transsexual rights. 25 May 2006.
National News. A2
Wente, Margaret. The explosive
rethinking of sex reassignment. 25 Aug
2007. Comment Column, Gender
Science and Politics. A19
Blanchard, Ray. Minor transgressions.
27 Aug 2007. Letter to the Editor. A 14
Dreger, Alice. Minor transgressions. 27
Aug 2007. Letter to the Editor. A 14
Canadian Press. Ottawa should not pay
for sex-change, MP says. 20 May 2008.
National News, Medicare. A7
Canadian Press. Province to cover sex
change operations. 16 May 2008.
Toronto News, in brief. A15

N a tio n a l P o s t

Raphael, Mitchel. The cruellest (sic) cut:
The Ontario government no longer funds
sex-change operations and there’s a
patchwork of policies in other provinces.
25 Nov 1998. Feature, Arts & Life. B5.
Norton, Keith C. Human rights issue. 9
Oct. 1999. Letters. B9.
Frum, David. Why can’t a man be more
like a man? A psychiatrist, not a knife, is
the best way to treat gender dysphoria.
12 Oct. 1999. Column. A18 '

Zucker, Kenneth J. What women look
like. 15 December 2000. Letter to the
Editor. A20

Frum, David. A profusion of gender
confusion. 20 Nov. 1999. Column. A18

Armstrong, Jane. The body within: the
Body without. 12 June 2004. Focus. FI

Berger, Joseph. Idiocy down under. 26
April 2004. Letters. A 13
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Jackson, Kristen. [I read with great
interest Dr. Joseph Berger's...]. 29 April
2004. Letters. A 19.
The perils of transgender politics. 22
Aug 2007. Editorial. A 16
Huber, Jordana. Ontario to resume
funding for sex-change operations. 16
May 2008. News. A1
Arsenault, Nina. Pay for my sex
reassignment. 17 June 2008. Issues and
Idea: Opinion. A 14
Skierszkan, Elliot. Health Priorities. 19
June 2008. Letter. A21
Berger, Joseph. Pay for your own sex
reassignment. 18 June 2008. A21
Russell, Paul. The week in Letters. 23
June 2008. Editorial. A 14

Terms explained. 18 June 2001. F02.
Hauch, Valerie. Clinic does ‘real-life’
transgender test. 20 June 2002. L02.
Plamer, Karen. Sex-change delisting
‘prejudiced’. 7 Dec. 2002. News. A08.
Levy, Harold. Transsexuals take fight
for surgery to tribunal. 27 Nov. 2004.
News. A12
Health minister vows government’s
delisting days over. 2 April 2005.
National, report, F03.
Gillespie, Kerry. Help eyed for sex
changes. 21 April 2005. News. A07
Ontario must pay for sex-change
surgery. 11 November 2005. News. A14
Hall, Barbara. Full legal protection
essential. 9 March 2007. Letter, A 19

Freedman, Jessica. Transsexuals:
misunderstood by heteros and gays. 24
June 2008. Letter. A13

Ferguson, Rob. OHIP to cover sex
change. 16 May 2008. News A02.

T h e T o r o n to S t a r

Leclair, Jennifer. Sex-change funding.
17 May 2008. Letter AA05.

Michelle Josef goes to court to free the
woman within. 2 May 1999. News.

Mellor, William. Sex-change funding.
17 May 2008. Letter AA05.

Volmers, Eric. Room for change. 19 Jan.
2001. Life.

Cain, Joan. Sex-change funding. 17 May
2008. Letter AA05.

Michelle. Inside the gender gap. 19 Jan.
2001. Life.

Powell, Gary. Sex-change funding. 17
May 2008. Letter AA05.

Dolan, Jeremiah. Letter of the day a
slippery slope. 24 Jan. 2001. News.

Davis, Sandra. Sex-change funding. 17
May 2008. Letter AA05.

Volmers, Eric. MP backs funding for
sex-change operation. 2 Feb 2001. Life.

Lenzi, Stefan. Sex-change funding. 17
May 2008. Letter AA05.
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Ontario. 20 May 2008. News. A 15.

Lee-Shanok, Philip. Another step on the
road from he to she suing government
for operation. 25 October 1999. News pg
4

McLarney, Geoffrey. Nothing trivial
about it. 20 May 2008. Letter. AA07.

Renee, Michelle. Letter of the Day
Column. 27 Oct 1999. Editorial. Pg 15.

Ferguson, Rob. Liberal questions paying
sex-change costs. 22 May 2008. News.
A21

Mick, Hayley. Transsexuals in gender
limbo, want province to reinstate surgery
cash. 2 Sept. 2003. News pg 12

Garfinkel, Paul. Definitely life-saving
surgery. 24 May 2008. Letter. AA05.

Findlay, Alan. Liberals change sex tune;
Ontario nixes paying for gender
switches. 28 May 2994. News pg 28

Cowan, Rob. Priorities are all wrong. 19
May 2008. Letter AA07.

Crawford, Trish. Woman interrupted. 21
June 2008. Life, L01.

Fight for sex ops. 29 May 2004. News
Pg?

Few surgeries approved. 21 June 2008.
Life. L05.

Blizzard, Christina. Grit popularity
crashes, burns. 20 May 2004. Comment.
Pg 23

T o r o n to S u n

Harder, Jeff. Sex-change surgery gets
axe Ontario cuts funding for expensive
‘lifestyle’ procedure. 3 October 1998.
News pg.l
Harder, Jeff. Transsexual surgery cut
from OHIP ‘it is demoralizing to me’. 10
Oct 1998. News Pg6
Lee-Shanok, Philip. ‘I’m a woman with
a penis’ OHIP funds cut off in middle of
sex change. 20 June 1999. News pg 44.
Misik, Herbert. Letters to the editor
comment. 4 July 1999. Comment:
Letters to the editor. C2
Harder, Jeff. Sex rights: the 3rd way
protection urged for transsexuals, drag
queens under Ontario human rights code.
24 Oct 1999. News pg 7

Artuso, Antonella. Sex changes
demanded, transsexuals want grits to
relist operations. 29 may 2004. News pg
46.
Letters to the Editor. Landry, L. 23 Nov.
2004. Letters to the Editor.
Letters to the editor. Knickle, Greg. 24
Nov. 2004. Letters to the Editor.
Findlay, Alan. Sex swap ok near. 21
April 2005. News pg 3
Blizzard, Christina. Sex change is a
human right? Paying for gender
reassignment is nuts. 22 April 2005.
Editorial/Opinion. Pg 19.
Letters to the Editor. Martin, Mario. 22
April 2005. Letters to the Editor.

Letters to the Editor. Mackinnon,
Robert. 22 April 2005. Letters to the
Editor.
Stonehouse, Martine. Letter of the day
column. 27 April 2005. Editorial:
Opinion; Letter of the day column. Pg
18.
CP. Pay for sex changes, Ontario told.
11 Nov. 2005. News pg 2.
Artuso, Antonella. OHIP to cover gender
surgery. 16 May 2008. News pg 6.
Donato, Andy. Editorial Cartoon.
Editorial/Opinion pg 01.
Mackinnon, Robert. Letters to the
Editor. 19 May 2008.
Foley, Rob. Can’t see this decision. 20
May 2008. Letters to the Editor. Pg 18
Artuso, Antonella. Advocate: hundreds
wait for sex change. 21 May 2008. News
Pg7.
Giorgi, Tracey. Say what, George? 24
May 2008. Letters to the Editor.
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